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Abstract
Online advertising, a form of advertising that reaches consumers through the World
Wide Web, has become a multi-billion dollar industry. Using the state of the art com-
puting technologies, online auctions have become an important sales mechanism for
automating transactions in online advertising markets, where advertisement (shortly
ad) inventories, such as impressions or clicks, are able to be auctioned off in millisec-
onds after they are generated by online users. However, with providing non-guaranteed
deliveries, the current auction mechanisms have a number of limitations including: the
uncertainty in the winning payment prices for buyers; the volatility in the seller’s rev-
enue; and the weak loyalty between buyer and seller. To address these issues, this
thesis explores the methods and techniques from finance to evaluate and allocate ad
inventories over time and to design new sales models. Finance, as a sub-field of mi-
croeconomics, studies how individuals and organisations make decisions regarding the
allocation of resources over time as well as the handling of risk. Therefore, we believe
that financial methods can be used to provide novel solutions to the non-guaranteed de-
livery problem in online advertising. This thesis has three major contributions. We first
study an optimal dynamic model for unifying programmatic guarantee and real-time
bidding in display advertising. This study solves the problem of algorithmic pricing
and allocation of guaranteed contracts. We then propose a multi-keyword multi-click
ad option. This work discusses a flexible way of guaranteed deliveries in the sponsored
search context, and it’s evaluation is under the no arbitrage principle and is based on
the assumption that the underlying winning payment prices of candidate keywords for
specific positions follow a geometric Brownian motion. However, according to our data
analysis and other previous research, the same underlying assumption is not valid em-
pirically for display ads. We therefore study a lattice framework to price an ad option
based on a stochastic volatility underlying model. This research extends the usage of
ad options to display advertising in a more general situation.
Acknowledgements
I have been very lucky to learn from a number of outstanding researchers at University
College London (UCL) during my PhD study. First of all, I wish to express my greatest
thanks to my first supervisor, Jun Wang, whose excellent guidance has been absolutely
essential for the completion of this thesis. I would like to thank him for introducing
me into the field of online advertising, and his consistent encouragement and support.
Over the years, I have learned many things from him: high quality research, effective
communication skills and hard-working attitude. I can not ask for more and the high
standards he has imparted to me will benefit my research efforts my whole life long.
I am grateful to Ingemar Cox for being my second supervisor and his constructive
technical guidance on my research. I would like to thank Mohan Kankanhalli for many
enjoyable discussions during his visit at UCL, and his support in my research and job
search. I would like to thank Sofia Ceppi for supervising me at Microsoft Research
Cambridge and her advice on algorithmic game theory and mechanism design. I would
like to thank Philip Trelevean and Dell Zhang for being my thesis examiners and their
useful comments. I also appreciate Philip’s guidance and support on my internship and
job search. I would like to thank Jinqiu Hua for recommending me to UCL and his kind
advice on talks, research, and everything in between. I am grateful to all the faculty,
staff, and students at UCL who have helped me in ways large and small. I appreciate the
funding supports from the Faculty of Engineering (Dean’s Prize), the UCL Advances
(PhD Enterprise Scholarship) and the UCL BITE (Secondment Exchange Award).
I would like to express my deep gratitude to my family and friends, for their con-
tinuous love, support, and encouragement. Special thanks go to my wife Xin Wang,
who has always been there right beside me through the most difficult periods of my
PhD journey. Without her many sacrifices, I would not have made it this far. Finally, I
would love to dedicate this thesis to my baby boy Yanchen Chen, who has brought so
much happiness and joy to our lives.
Contents
Abstract 4
Acknowledgements 5
List of Figures 14
List of Tables 17
Notation 18
1 Introduction 19
1.1 Major Types of Online Ads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.2 Market Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.3 Fundamental Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.4 Proposed Solutions Using Financial Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.5 Structure of the Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2 Background 29
2.1 Literature Review on Online Advertising . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.1.1 Evolution of Online Advertising Sales Mechanisms . . . . . . . 29
2.1.2 Guaranteed Advertising Deliveries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.2 Preliminaries on Financial Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.2.1 Uncertainty, Risk and Time Value of Money . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.2.2 Revenue Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.2.3 Options and Option Pricing Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3 Optimal Pricing and Allocation of Display Inventories 45
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Contents 7
3.2.1 Problem Formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.2.2 Distribution of Bids in RTB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.2.3 Risk Aversion and Purchase Behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.2.4 Optimal Dynamic Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.3 Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.3.1 Datasets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.3.2 Bidding Behaviours . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.3.3 Supply and Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.3.4 Bids and Payment Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.3.5 Demand for Guaranteed Impressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.3.6 Revenue Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4 Multi-Keyword Multi-Click Ad Options for Sponsored Search 69
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.2 Flexible Guaranteed Deliveries via Multi-Keyword Multi-Click Ad Op-
tions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.3 Option Pricing Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.3.1 Underlying Stochastic Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.3.2 Terminal Value Pricing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.3.3 Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.3.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.4 Revenue Analysis for Search Engine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.5 Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.5.1 Data and Experimental Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.5.2 Parameter Estimation and Option Pricing . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.5.3 Model Validation and Robustness Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.5.4 Effects on Search Engine’s Revenue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.7 Chapter Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.7.1 Proof of the No-Early Exercise Property for the Ad Option . . . 95
4.7.2 Derivation of the Ad Option Pricing Formula . . . . . . . . . . 96
Contents 8
4.7.3 Option Pricing Formulas for Special Cases . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5 Lattice Methods for Pricing Display Ad Options 100
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.2 Lattices for the GBM Underlying Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.2.1 Binomial Lattice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.2.2 Trinomial Lattice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.2.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.3 Censored Binomial Lattice for the SV Underlying . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.4 Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.4.1 Datasets and Experimental Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.4.2 Fitness of GBM and SV Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.4.3 Delivery Performance for Advertiser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5.4.4 Revenue Analysis for Publisher and Search Engine . . . . . . . 122
5.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.6 Chapter Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.6.1 Proof of Equivalence of the Option Price under the One-Step
Binomial Lattice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.6.2 Convergence of the Binomial Lattice Option Pricing Model to
the BSM Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
5.6.3 Trinomial Lattice Methods for Pricing Display Ad Options
with the GBM Underlying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
5.6.4 Binomial Diffusion Approximation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
5.6.5 Mathematical Results of the SV Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
6 Conclusion 133
6.1 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
6.2 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
6.2.1 Optimal Stochastic Dynamic Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
6.2.2 Stochastic Processes for Market Price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
6.2.3 Game-Theoretical Models for Ad Option Pricing . . . . . . . . 136
6.2.4 Market Design of Ad Derivatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
Contents 9
Appendices 137
A Glossary of Technical Terms 138
B Related Publications 141
Bibliography 143
List of Figures
1.1 Display ads (in dotted blue line box) on the Yahoo! Cars Web page. . . 22
1.2 Organic search results (in blue line box) and paid search results (in dot-
ted blue line box) on the Google Sponsored search results page (SERP). 22
1.3 Differences and relationships of the contributions in Chapters 3-5. . . . 26
3.1 Systematic view of PG and RTB in display advertising, where [t0, tn]
is the time period that a publisher (or SSP) sells the guaranteed impres-
sions which will be created in future period [tn, tn+1]. . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.2 The impact of model parameters on the guaranteed selling prices: α, β,
ζ , η are defined in Eqs. (3.6) & (3.7); ωκ is the expected size of penalty;
γ is the percentage of estimated future impressions to sell in advanced;
T is the length of guaranteed selling period; τ is the remaining time to
the delivery date; p(τ) is the guaranteed selling price at τ. . . . . . . . . 55
3.3 Overview of statistics for the winning advertisers from the SSP dataset
in the training period. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.4 Overview of daily supply and demand of ad slots in the SSP dataset
in the training period: S is the number of total supplied impressions;
Q is the number of total demand impressions; ξ is the per impression
demand (i.e., the number of advertisers who bid for an impression). . . 60
3.5 Hierarchical cluster tree of ad slots in the SSP dataset where the cluster
metric is average distance in the per impression demand ξ. . . . . . . . 60
3.6 Overview of advertisers’ hourly arrival per day, where the red shaded
bar represents the peak hour. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.7 Empirical example of estimating pi(ξ), φ(ξ) and ψ(ξ) for AdSlot25
from historical bids, where ξ is the per impression demand, pi(ξ) is the
expected winning bid, φ(ξ) is the expected payment price and ψ(ξ) is
the standard deviation of payment prices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
List of Figures 11
3.8 Empirical example of estimating the value of α for AdSlot25, where
α is calculated based on the smallest RMSE between the inverse func-
tion of empirical CDF of bids z(x) = 1 − F (x) and the function
c(p) = e−αp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.9 Numerical example of demand surface for guaranteed impressions of
an ad slot, where θ(τ, p(τ))f(τ)dτ represents the number of advertisers
who will buy guaranteed impressions at p(τ) and in [τ, τ + dτ]; other
parameters are α = 1.85; β = 0.01; ζ = 2000; η = 0.01;T = 30. . . . . 64
3.10 Empirical example of AdSlot14: (a) the optimal dynamic guaranteed
prices; (b) the estimated daily demand; (c) the daily demand calculated
based on the actual bids in RTB on the delivery date; (d) the winning
bids and payment price in RTB on the delivery date; (e) the compari-
son of revenues [see Table 3.8 for summary of notations B-I, B-II,
B-III, R-I, R-II]. The parameters are: Q = 17691;S = 2847;α =
2.0506; β = 0.2; ζ = 442; η = 0.2;ω = 0.05;κ = 1; γ = 0.4240; λ = 2. 65
3.11 Empirical example of AdSlot27: (a) the optimal dynamic guaranteed
prices; (b) the estimated daily demand; (c) the daily demand calculated
based on the actual bids in RTB on the delivery date; (d) the winning
bids and payment price in RTB on the delivery date; (e) the compari-
son of revenues [see Table 3.8 for summary of notations B-I, B-II,
B-III, R-I, R-II]. The parameters are: Q = 89126;S = 7678;α =
1.7932; β = 0.2; ζ = 2466; η = 0.2;ω = 0.05;κ = 1; γ = 0.66; λ = 2. . 66
4.1 Schematic view of buying, selling and exercising a multi-keyword
multi-click ad option for sponsored search. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.2 Empirical example of generating paths under a GBM for a 3-keyword
1-click option and calculating the corresponding payoffs: K1 =
‘canon cameras’, K2 = ‘nikon camera’, K3 = ‘yahoo web hosting’,
F1 = 3.8505, F2 = 4.6704 and F3 = 6.2520. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.3 Empirical example of the arbitrage analysis under the GBM dynamic
for the US market. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
List of Figures 12
4.4 Empirical example of the GBM assumptions checking for the keyword
‘canon 5d’, where the Shapiro-Wilk test is with p-value 0.2144 and the
Ljung-Box test is with p-value 0.6971. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.5 Overview of the GBM assumption checking for all candidate keywords
of experimental groups in both US and UK markets. . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.6 Overview of model similarity testing: Wilcoxon test, Ansari-Bradley
(A-B) test and Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test. . . . . . . 89
4.7 Overview of pricing model robust tests. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.8 Empirical example of analysing the search engine’s revenue for the
keyword ‘canon cameras’. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.9 Empirical example of analysing the search engine’s revenue for the
keywords ‘non profit debt consolidation’ and ‘canon 5d”, where ρ =
0.0259. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5.1 Binomial lattice for CPM. Detailed description of notations is given in
Table 5.1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.2 Trinomial lattice for CPM. Detailed description of notations is given in
Table 5.1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.3 Comparison of the convergence performance of the binomial and tri-
nomial lattices for pricing a display ad option with the GBM under-
lying: (a) the option value at time 0 is in the money where M0 = 2,
FC = 0.005, CTR = 0.3, r = 0.05, T = 31/365 and σ = 0.5;
and (b) the option value at time 0 is out of the money where M0 = 2,
FC = 0.075, CTR = 0.3, r = 0.05, T = 31/365 and σ = 0.5.
Detailed descriptions of notations are provided in Table 5.1. . . . . . . 107
5.4 Censored binomial lattice for the SV underlying. Detailed description
of notations is provided in Table 5.1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
List of Figures 13
5.5 Empirical example of binomial lattices for an ad slot from the SSP
dataset: (a) the censored binomial lattice for CPM based on the SV
model, where r = 0.05, T = 0.0384, n = 14, CPM = 0.7417, σ0 =
0.8723, κ = 96.4953, θ = 0.2959, δ = 14.9874; (b) the censored bino-
mial lattice for the option value. The model parameters are estimated
based on the training data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.6 Example of binomial lattices for the same ad slot in Figure 5.5: (a)
the CRR binomial lattice for CPM based on the GBM model, where
r = 0.05, T = 0.0384, n = 14, CPM = 0.7417, σ0 = 0.8723. Here
we use the same parameters’ values in Figure 5.5; (b) the CRR binomial
lattice for the option value. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.7 Empirical example of testing the GBM conditions on an ad slot from
the SSP dataset: (a) the plot of the average daily winning payment
CPMs from auctions; (b) the histogram of the logarithm ratios of the
CPM, i.e., ln(Mi+1/Mi), i = 1, . . . , n − 1; (c) the QQ plot of the
logarithm ratios; (d) the plot of the ACFs of the logarithm ratios. The
Shapiro-Wilk test is with p-value 0.0009 and the Ljung-Box test is with
p-value 0.1225. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.8 Empirical example of testing the GBM conditions on the keyword
“canon 5d” from the Google AdWords dataset: (a) the plot of aver-
age daily winning payment CPCs; (b) the histogram of logarithm ratios
of CPC, i.e., ln(Ci+1/Ci), i = 1, . . . , n − 1; (c) the QQ plot of the
logarithm ratios; (d) the plot of the ACFs of the logarithm ratios. The
Shapiro-Wilk test is with p-value 0.2144 and the Ljung-Box test is with
p-value 0.6971. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.9 Summary of the GBM conditions test for all keywords in the Google
AdWords dataset in (a) the US market; and (b) the UK market. . . . . . 116
List of Figures 14
5.10 Empirical example of comparing the fitness of GBM and SV models to
the keyword “kinect for xbox 360” from the Google AdWords dataset.
The training period is from time step 1 to 50, the development and test
periods are from time step 51 to 150. Plot (a), (c), (e) illustrates three
instances of simulated paths from the estimated GBM and SV, respec-
tively. Plot (b), (d), (f) provides the corresponding smooth pattern and
confidence interval of plot (a), (c), (e). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
5.11 Empirical examples of the publisher’s revenue: (a) from an ad slot in
the bull market; and (b) from an ad slot in the bear market. The sell
ratio represents the percentage of future daily impressions that are sold
in advance via display ad options. Note that here the ad slot in the bear
market does not receive enough bids in the test set, so we randomly
simulate some underlying prices for the bear market. . . . . . . . . . . 121
List of Tables
2.1 Comparison between the n-keyword 1-click ad option (see Chapter 4)
and other relevant options: Ci(t) is the price of the ith underlying asset
at time t ∈ [0, T ] and T is the contract expatriation date (if there is
only one underlying asset its price is denoted by C(t)); Fi is the strike
price (i.e., the fixed payment price) of the ith underlying asset (if there
is only one strike price we denote it by F ); ωi is the weight of ith asset
in a basket-type option. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.2 Summary of the relevant lattice methods for pricing a call option with
the GBM underlying model: ∆t is the length of each time step; r is
the continuous-time compounding risk-less interest rate; σ1, σ2 are the
volatilities for the underlying asset price and ρ is the correlation; u,m, d
are the state transition scale of underlying asset price in upward, un-
changed and downward movements; q1, q2, . . . , qn are the risk-neutral
transition probabilities from upward movement to downward move-
ment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.1 Summary of key notations in Chapter 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.2 Summary of RTB datasets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.3 Experimental design of the SSP dataset. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.4 Summary of winning advertisers’ statistics from the SSP dataset in the
training period: the numbers in the brackets represent how many ad-
vertisers who use the combined bidding strategies. . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.5 Summary of advertisers’ winning campaigns from the DSP dataset. All
advertisers use the fixed price bidding strategy. Each user tag contains
many ad slots and an ad slot is sampled from the dataset only if the
advertiser wins more than 1000 impressions from it. . . . . . . . . . . . 58
List of Tables 16
3.6 Summary of bids distribution tests, where the numbers in the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) and Jarque-Bera (J-B) tests represent the
percentage of tested auctions that have lognormal bids. . . . . . . . . . 61
3.7 Comparison of estimations between the empirical distribution and the
actual bids: φ(ξ) is the expected payment price; ψ(ξ) is the standard
deviation of payment prices; pi(ξ) is the expected winning bid; and the
per impression demand ξ = Q/S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.8 Summary of plot notations in Figures 3.10 & 3.11. . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.9 Summary of revenue evaluation of all 31 ad slots in the SSP dataset. . . 67
4.1 Summary of notations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.2 Overview of experimental settings of data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.3 Test of arbitrage for ad options under the GBM assumption: n is the
number of keywords, N is the number of options priced in a group,
P(α) is percentage of options in a group found arbitrage, and the E[α]
is the average arbitrage value of the options found arbitrage, where the
arbitrage α is defined by Eq. (4.20) and the risk-less bank interest rate
r = 5%. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.4 Other underlying models or dynamics examined, where the parameter
ki is set 0.5 and the rest of parameters are estimated from the training
data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.5 Overview of delta hedging arbitrage testing for non-GBM dynamics.
Notations are described in Table 4.3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5.1 Summary of key notations in Chapter 5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.2 Summary of datasets for experiments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.3 Experimental settings of the SSP dataset. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.4 Experimental settings of the Google AdWords dataset. . . . . . . . . . 114
5.5 Comparing the model fitness for all 31 ad slots in the SSP dataset. L-2
distance is the Euclidean distance, and the number represents the per-
centage of ad slots which shows that the SV model has a better fitness
(i.e., a smaller L-2 distance). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
List of Tables 17
5.6 Comparing the model fitness for the non-GBM keywords in the Google
AdWords dataset. L-2 distance is the Euclidean distance, and the num-
ber represents the percentage of non-GBM keywords which shows that
the SV model has a better fitness (i.e., a smaller L-2 distance). . . . . . 118
5.7 Empirical example of an advertiser’s delivery of an ad slot from the
SSP dataset in RTB (Note: CTR is 0.03 and the non-integer numbers
are displayed at 4 digits after the decimal point while in computing we
consider 25-digit scale). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.8 Empirical example of an advertiser’s delivery of buying ad options for
an advertisement slot in the SSP dataset (Note: CTR is 0.03 and the
non-integer numbers are displayed at 4 digits after the decimal point
while in computing we consider 25-digit scale). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.9 Overview of the improvement in delivery performance by using ad op-
tions for all ad slots in the SSP dataset. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.10 Overview of the improvement in delivery performance by using ad op-
tions for keywords in the Google AdWords dataset. . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.11 Overview of the improvement in revenue by selling display ad options
for ad slots in the SSP dataset. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.12 Overview of the improvement in revenue by selling display ad options
for ad slots in the Google AdWords dataset. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
6.1 Summary the developments in Chapters 3-5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
Notation
The following mathematical notations are used throughout the thesis. For the reader’s
convenience, in addition to their definitions here, they are also described in their first
occurrences in each chapter. Other notations used in Chapters 3-5 are further described
in Tables 3.1, 4.1 and 5.1, respectively.
Notation Description
BIN(n, p) Binomial distribution for n trials with probability p ∈ [0, 1], n ∈ Z∗
A, F, M Collection of sets or σ-fields
cov[X,Y ], Σ Covariance, correlation matrix
f(x) or fX(x) Density function
|Σ| Determinant of Σ
∅ Empty set
E[·], E[· | F] Expectation, conditional expectation on F
exp{·} Exponential function
fX,Y (x, y) Joint density function
LN(µ, σ2) Log-normal distribution with mean µ and variance σ2, µ ∈ R, σ ∈ R
max{·} Maximum function
ln{·} Natural logarithm function
N(µ, σ2) Normal distribution with mean µ and variance σ2, µ ∈ R, σ ∈ R
N (x) Cumulative distribution function of a standard normal, x ∈ R
P, Q Probability measure
X, X Random variables, vector or matrix
Z, Z∗ Set of integers {. . . ,−1, 0, 1, . . .}, non-negatives integers {0, 1, . . .}
R, R+ Set of real numbers (−∞,∞), non-negative real numbers [0,∞)
Ω Sample space
W (t), W(t) Standard Brownian motion
σ[·], var[·] Standard deviation, variance
Σ, Π Sum, product
s.t. Subject to
XT Transpose of X
U[a, b] Uniform distribution on closed interval [a, b], a ∈ R, b ∈ R
Chapter 1
Introduction
The rapid growth of the Internet and the World Wide Web has transformed the way
that information is being accessed and used. They have also transformed the business
of advertising. Traditional advertising reaches consumers through televisions, radios,
newspapers, magazines, etc. Today, many marketing messages are delivered through
the Internet and the World Wide Web to online users [Evans, 2009].
By most accounts, the very first online ad was an email sent by Gary Thuerk on
3rd May 1978, who was a marketing manager at the Digital Equipment Corporation
(DEC) and also known as the father of spam [Templeton, 2008]. The recipient list
was about 400 ARPANET1 users on the west coast of the United States. This email
was an invitation to users to the demonstrations of the DEC’s new product. Although
some users were happy about the notification, the majority felt annoyed. Despite the
generally negative reactions at the beginning, online advertising grew rapidly.
Online advertising has now become a multi-billion dollar industry and a signif-
icant source of revenue for many Web based businesses, such as Google, Facebook,
Yahoo! and AppNexus. According to the Interactive Advertising Bureau (IAB)2, the
US-only online advertising annual revenues for 2013 totalled $42.8 billion, $6.2 bil-
lion (or 17.0%) higher than in 2012. In Europe, the region’s online ads spending rose
by 11.9% in 2013 to total e27.3 billion (equivalent to $36.4 billion) and the major
Western European countries were with 5%-18% annual growth rates respectively3. The
1The Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET) was one of the world’s first opera-
tional packet switching networks, the first network to implement TCP/IP, was then decommissioned on
28th February 1990.
2http://www.iab.net
3http://www.emarketer.com
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UK has the biggest digital market size in Western Europe4, whose online advertising
market grew 15.6% in 2013, to £6.3 billion (equivalent to $9.23 billion), and has been
estimated to account for more than 1/3 of the total revenue of Western Europe in 2014.
The above numbers reveal the fact that online advertising has become one of most fast-
growing industries, which also means there is emerging demand of the high-quality
research in this field.
In fact, online advertising are becoming a new scientific sub-discipline in com-
puter science, bringing the gap among the areas of information systems, data min-
ing, artificial intelligence, machine learning, economics, marketing science, opera-
tions research, etc. It arises many interdisciplinary challenges, such as advertising
auction mechanism design, re-targeting models, programmatic bidding strategies and
risk-aware advertising technologies. Good and timely solutions to those challenges can
feed back into a better product or market design that will generate more economic value
and produce more benefits to people and businesses associated with it.
1.1 Major Types of Online Ads
It is difficult to use the Internet without seeing online ads. They can be found in almost
all types of Web pages, ranging from an online newspaper, to a search engine results
page (SERP), to a Facebook homepage, etc.
Display advertising is one of the most popular types of online advertising. It
is graphical information that appears next to content on Web pages, pop-up videos,
emails, etc. These ads, often referred to as banners, come in standardized ad sizes,
and can include text, logos, pictures, or more recently, rich media [IAB, 2013, Jansen,
2011]. Figure 1.1 presents an example of display ads. On the Yahoo! Cars Web page,
there are three ad slots (shown in dotted blue line boxes) and Yahoo! can display these
three ads together at a same time if a user visits the site. Therefore, display ads are
usually sold on the basis of 1000 views of display. Each display is called an impression
and the cost for 1000 impressions is called the cost per mille (CPM).
Sponsored search, also called search advertising, is another popular type of adver-
tising. As the name implies, the advertising is triggered by a search behaviour [Jansen,
2011]. In Figure 1.2, within the search box is one term that a user submitted to the
4http://www.iabuk .net
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search engine. The term is collectively known as the query. Along with the click on
the search button, the query term is what triggers the results on the SERP to appear.
The shown SERP (see Figure 1.1) has two types of result listings in response to the
submitted query: organic results and paid results. Organic search results are the Web
page listings that most closely match the user’s search query based on relevance. Paid
results are basically ads – the websites have paid to have their Web pages display for
certain keywords, so these listings show up when someone runs a search query con-
taining those keywords. In sponsored search, the value of an ad is not measured by
impressions, instead, it is measured if the user clicks on it. The cost of each valid click
is called the cost per click (CPC).
Many ad inventories, such as display impressions and clicks, are auctioned off
in real time. In display advertising, auctions are normally run in ad exchanges and
each auction can target to a single impression from a specific group of users, called
the real-time bidding (RTB) [Google, 2011, Yuan et al., 2013]. In sponsored search,
auctions are mainly run by search engines. These auctions are slightly different to
RTB because ad inventories are keyword-based (therefore, called keyword auctions)
and the search engine also needs to consider the position effects on the probability of
clicks [Edelman et al., 2007, Varian, 2007, Lahaie and Pennock, 2007, Bo¨rgers et al.,
2013]. These topics are not discussed here, instead, a detailed review on advertising
sales mechanisms are provided in Section 2.1.1.
1.2 Market Participants
Participants in online advertising markets can be divided into three groups: users, sell-
ers and buyers. They are also called interactive entities [Evans, 2009, Jansen, 2011].
Online users can be anyone who use the Internet and the World Wide Web. Nor-
mally, a user issues ad-hoc topics to express his information needs, such as searching
on Google or surfing Yahoo! Cars.
Sellers in online advertising include publishers, search engines, and supply-side
platforms (SSPs). A publisher is an individual or organisation that prepares, issues,
and disseminates content for public distribution [IAB, 2013]. Simply, publishers are
those who have the space for ads to be displayed. A search engine is a company that
indexes documents and then attempts to match documents by relevancy to the users’
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Figure 1.1: Display ads (in dotted blue line box) on the Yahoo! Cars Web page.
Mainline
paid results
Sidebar
paid results
Organic 
results
Search query
Figure 1.2: Organic search results (in blue line box) and paid search results (in dotted blue line
box) on the Google Sponsored search results page (SERP).
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search queries. A supply-side platform (SSP) is an intermediary company with the
single mission of enabling publishers to manage their display impressions and max-
imise revenue. In the display advertising market, sellers refer to publishers or SSPs; in
sponsored search, sellers normally refer to search engines.
Buyers include advertisers and demand-side platforms (DSPs). An advertiser is
the one who requires places or slots to place marketing messages–online ads–in order
to attract the attention of particular online users [Jansen, 2011]. In display advertis-
ing, advertisers sometimes join an automated bidding platform to get better or more
impressions at low cost and such a platform is called the demand-side platform (DSP).
1.3 Fundamental Challenges
Despite the strong growth of online advertising, the following fundamental challenges
are worth of investigation:
1. In either keyword auction or RTB, the highly volatile bid prices make it difficult
for online buyers to predict their campaign costs and returns, and thus further
complicate their budget planning for advertising. This can be regarded as the
price risk inherited from the spot market because bid prices reflect the changes
of supply and demand of ad inventories, and the price risk cannot be avoid in an
auction mechanism.
2. Guaranteed contracts are a solution to reducing the price risk because they spec-
ify the ad inventories and their delivery prices in advance for online buyers. How-
ever, they are mostly still sold through private human negotiations (particularly
in display advertising) and therefore only a small number of inventories can be
sold. According to eMarketer [2013], only 20% display ad inventories in 2012
were sold in terms guaranteed contracts, even through which generated 75% of
publishers’ revenue. This shows the current problem while great potential of
selling guaranteed inventories programmatically.
3. The evolution of online advertising sales mechanisms (see Section 2.1.1) shows
that online buyers always require more certainty and more control of their in-
vested ad inventories. “They want more data to inform their bids, exposure
to inventory not currently available to them, and preferred access to inven-
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tory” [OpenX, 2013]. The current auction mechanisms and guaranteed contracts
can partially fulfil the needs on the buyer side. For example, RTB allows adver-
tisers to bid for their targeted users; guaranteed contracts allows advertisers to
reserve the inventories that will be created in the future period. However, in gen-
eral, online buyers have less flexibility and control of advertising in the process,
which motivates us to design new ad products that can provide flexible guaran-
teed deliveries for advertisers.
4. Creating a loyal buyers’ base is one important task that online sellers
face [OpenX, 2013]. The “pay-as-you-go” attribute of auction mechanisms
allows buyers to switch from one seller to another in the next bidding without
paying any cost. If the sellers’ ad inventories are similar to each other (also
called substitutable in economics [Mankiw, 2006]), their revenues are difficult
to be stable over time and to be optimised. This is because buyers rationally
choose to advertise on the lower cost advertising placement and dynamically ad-
just their strategies across different sellers. This will be more obvious when the
programmatic trading becomes more popular as algorithms can give the fastest
feedback to buyers to choose the ad inventories with better effectiveness and
profit conversion. Hence, sellers must take multiple issues into account in order
to maintain their buyers on the long run and one possible solution is to establish
contractual relationships with buyers.
The first and fourth statements explain why we study the non-guaranteed prob-
lem; the second and third statements describe how challenging the problem is. The
first statement tells there is price risk inherent from auction mechanisms which makes
online advertising difficult for advertisers. That is one motivation because we want to
make advertisers satisfied. The fourth statement describes our second motivation and
which is from the seller’s perspective. Guaranteed deliveries allow a seller to expand
and maintain his loyal advertisers so that his long-term revenues can be increased or
stabilised. The second statement reveals the fact that most of profitable guaranteed
contracts nowadays are not programmatically sold; therefore, there is much room for
improvement on automating the selling of guaranteed inventories. The third statement
indicates, apart from automation, offering more flexibility to advertisers is another chal-
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lenge in providing guaranteed deliveries.
1.4 Proposed Solutions Using Financial Methods
The research carried out through this thesis focuses on using financial models to pro-
vide solutions to the non-guaranteed delivery problem in online advertising. Specifi-
cally, we consider how can online sellers, such as publishers, search engines and SSPs,
develop novel computational algorithms or automated systems to provide guaranteed
advertising deliveries for online buyers such as advertisers and DSPs.
By its very nature, advertising is a prominent feature of economic life [Bagwell,
2001]. Economic models contribute to online advertising on many aspects. Marketing
researchers use the social choice theory to explore the effectiveness of advertising types
and users’ engagement. Computer scientists and economists employ the applied game-
theoretical models to design online auctions, such as the Generalised Second-Price
(GSP) auction [Edelman et al., 2007]. However, finance, as a sub-field of microeco-
nomics, has received surprisingly little attention in online advertising. Two features can
distinguish financial studies from other economic resource allocation decisions. First,
financial decisions are spread out over time. Second, they are usually not known with
certainty in advance by either the decision makers or anybody else [Bodie et al., 2009].
These two features make financial methods particularly suitable and interesting to solve
the non-guaranteed delivery problem in online advertising.
This thesis contributes to the field of online advertising both methodologically
and algorithmically: the former is supported by mathematical models and statistical
analysis; and the latter is validated by empirical experiments. There are three major
contributions of this thesis, which are discussed in Chapters 3-5:
1. We study an optimal dynamic model for a publisher or SSP who engages in
RTB and wants to provide the guaranteed delivery of display impressions. The
model mimics the advanced booking system in the airline industry, and considers
both allocation and pricing of estimated future impressions. This work will be
introduced in Chapter 3 [Chen et al., 2014b].
2. We propose a multi-keyword multi-click ad option for sponsored search. The
proposed option allows an advertiser to: (i) target a set of ad keywords for a cer-
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Figure 1.3: Differences and relationships of the contributions in Chapters 3-5.
tain number of clicks; (ii) multiply exercise the option at any time prior to or on
the contract expiration date; and (iii) switch the guaranteed delivery request from
one keyword to another without paying any cost. We discuss the option evalua-
tion models based on the assumption that the underlying winning payment prices
of targeted keywords follow an univariate (or multivariate) geometric Brownian
motion (GBM) [Samuelson, 1965a, Wilmott, 2006]. This work will be described
in Chapter 4 [Chen et al., 2014a].
3. We discuss a display ad option for display advertising and study a lattice frame-
work for evaluation. The proposed option allows an advertiser to pay a fixed
CPM or CPC for an impression or click that is same or different to its under-
lying measurement model from real-time auctions. The display ad option can
be priced for those situations where the GBM assumption is not valid empir-
ically. We use the stochastic volatility (SV) model to describe the underlying
price movement and construct a censored binomial lattice to approximate the un-
derlying SV model. This work will be discussed in Chapter 5 [Wang and Chen,
2012, Chen and Wang, 2014].
Figure 1.3 shows the structural relationships of studies in Chapters 3-5. Overall,
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our three studies provide novel solutions to the non-guaranteed delivery problem in
online advertising via contract mechanisms (i.e., guaranteed contracts in Chapter 3
and option contracts in Chapters 4-5). Therefore, each chapter discusses the contract
pricing models depending on different advertising environments and the pricing can
algorithmically adapt to the changes of supply and demand of inventories in auction
mechanisms.
Chapters 4-5 are also uniquely different to each other. Chapter 3 focuses on bring-
ing automation into selling premium impressions in display advertising apart from RTB
and discusses both optimal allocation and pricing. The guaranteed contracts are as
same as those sold through human direct negotiations: advertisers are guaranteed with
needed deliveries at the pre-specified price in the pre-specified future period, therefore,
they need to pay the full amount of reservation in advance. Chapter 4 moves several
steps further and introduces a flexible guaranteed contract (i.e, ad option) into spon-
sored search. The flexibility contains non-obligatory exercise right, multiple keywords
targeting, multiple clicks exercising, etc. The contract pricing is based on the GBM
underlying model as it is suitable for the search ad inventories according to our data
analysis and other previous research. Chapter 5 extends the option idea into display
advertising and proposes an option contract which allows its buyer to have different
payment schemes to the underlying ad format. In addition, as the GBM underlying
model is not suitable for display advertising, we study the SV underlying model for
more general situations.
1.5 Structure of the Thesis
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 reviews the related literature in online advertising and financial theory.
Section 2.1 gives a chronological review of the development of online advertising sales
mechanisms and discusses the related work of guaranteed advertising deliveries. Sec-
tion 2.2 introduces the basic financial concepts that will be used for the research of this
thesis, reviews the related work of revenue management (with special focus on dynamic
pricing models in airline industry), and discusses financial options and their evaluation
methods.
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Chapter 3 proposes an optimal dynamic model for unifying programmatic guar-
antee (PG) and real-time bidding (RTB) in display advertising. Section 3.1 introduces
the background and the overview of this study. Section 3.2 formulates the problem,
discusses our assumptions and provides a solution. Section 3.3 presents the results of
our experimental evaluation and Section 3.4 summarises the chapter.
Chapter 4 discusses an ad option tailored for the unique environment of spon-
sored search, where multiple ad keywords and certain number of required clicks are
considered. Chapter 4.1 introduces the background and indicates the problem. Sec-
tion 4.2 introduces option structure, and the process of buying, selling and exercising.
Section 4.3 discusses the option pricing methods. Section 4.4 analyses the effects on
search engine’s revenue. Section 4.5 presents our experimental evaluation and Sec-
tion 4.6 summarises the chapter. The mathematical results used throughout the chapter
are provided in Section 4.7.
Chapter 5 studies an ad option for display advertising. Section 5.1 introduces the
background and indicates the problem. Section 5.2 investigate several lattice methods
for pricing a display ad option with the GBM underlying model. Section 5.3 discusses
our lattice method for pricing a display ad option with the SV underlying model. Sec-
tion 5.4 presents our experimental results. Section 5.5 summarises the chapter. The
mathematical results used throughout the chapter are provided in Section 5.6.
Chapter 6 sums up what has been learned in this endeavor and suggests the direc-
tions for future research.
Appendix A provides a brief summary of the technical terms that are used through-
out the thesis. Appendix B lists the publications and submissions that have been com-
pleted during my PhD study at University College London.
Chapter 2
Background
This chapter reviews the literature on online advertising and introduces the prelimi-
naries of modern financial theory. The mathematical content of the chapter is kept to
the minimum necessary to achieve a proper understanding of important concepts and
models in these two fields. Detailed mathematical modelling and data analysis will be
discussed in Chapters 3-5.
2.1 Literature Review on Online Advertising
The following is a chronological review of the development of online advertising sales
mechanisms, and then a review of the research related to guaranteed advertising deliv-
eries.
2.1.1 Evolution of Online Advertising Sales Mechanisms
The first banner ads were introduced on 27th October 1994, when HotWired (today
Wired News, part of Lycos) signed fourteen banner ads with AT&T, Club Med and
Coor’z Zima [Bruner, 2005, Evans, 2009]. These banner ads were largely sold on the
number of impressions – individuals who saw the ads – which was the model used
by most traditional media for brand advertising [Evans, 2009]. Many online ads were
subsequently sold based on 1000 viewers per ad. This is also referred to as the cost-per-
mille (CPM) measurement (or payment) model. In early online advertising, advertisers
paid flat fees to show their ads a fixed number of times. Advertisements were negotiated
on a case-by-case basis, minimum contracts for purchases were large and entry was
slow [Edelman et al., 2007].
In 1994, search engine InfoSeek introduced the concept of targeting ads to key-
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word search queries, albeit against display banners not text ads [Bruner, 2005]. How-
ever, paying by the number of viewers remained the norm until Procter & Gamble
negotiated a deal with Yahoo! in 1996. Procter & Gamble was allowed to pay for ads
only on the cost-per-click (CPC) basis – Yahoo! was paid only when an online user
clicked on the ad [Lahaie and Pennock, 2007, Evans, 2009]. This was the Web version
of paying for direct response commonly used by advertisers for things such as mail
and telephone solicitations [Bruner, 2005]. Search engine OpenText first tried to put
together targeted search queries with paid listings in 1996, but it met with considerable
outcry from users [Bruner, 2005, Jansen, 2011].
On 21st February 1998, GoTo.com (then Overture Services, now owned by Ya-
hoo!) launched a sponsored search business model in which the search engines ranked
the Web sites based on how much the sites are willing to pay to be placed at the top of
the search results under a real-time competitive bidding process [Edelman et al., 2007,
Lahaie and Pennock, 2007, Jansen, 2011].
In the original design of GoTo.com’s auction, each advertiser submitted a bid re-
porting his willingness to pay on a per-click basis for a particular search keyword.
Advertisers can: (i) target their ads instead of paying for a banner ad that would be
shown to everyone visiting a Web site; (ii) specify which keywords were relevant to
their products and how much each of those keywords was worth to them based on
the users’ clicks. Also, ads were sold on the CPC basis. Every time a user clicked
on a sponsored link, an advertiser’s account was automatically billed the amount of
the advertiser’s most recent bid. The sponsored links to advertisers were arranged in
descending order of bids, making highest bids the most prominent. The GoTo’s auc-
tion is actually a generalised first-price (GFP) auction [Edelman et al., 2007, Jansen,
2011]. The ease of use, the very low entry costs, and the transparency of the mecha-
nism quickly led to the success of GoTo’s paid search platform. Yahoo! and MSN soon
adopted the GoTo’s concept and implemented the GFP auction model on their adver-
tising platforms. However, the underlying auction mechanism itself was far away from
perfect. Under the GFP auction framework, the advertiser who can react to competi-
tors’ moves fastest had a substantial advantage. The mechanism therefore encouraged
inefficient investments in gaming the system, causing volatile prices and allocative in-
efficiencies [Edelman et al., 2007].
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Google provided its solution to these problems by launching its own sponsored
search platform, Google AdWords, in February 2002 [Edelman et al., 2007]. Google
AdWords adopted many of GoTo.com’s concepts but introduced some significant
changes. First, Google continued the sales-by-impression model in parallel before fi-
nally dropping it altogether in favour of the CPC measurement model [Jansen, 2011].
Second, Google changed the auction model from the GFP auction to a more stable gen-
eralised second-price (GSP) auction. In the simplest GSP auction, suppose there are n
ad positions, an advertiser in position i pays a CPC equal to the bid of an advertiser in
position i + 1 plus a minimum increment. This second-price structure makes the mar-
ket more user friendly and less susceptible to gaming [Varian, 2007, Edelman et al.,
2007]. Third, Google also changed the standard allocation rule. Instead of ranking ads
by bid price alone, the platform computed a quality score derived from the bid amount
and click-through rate (CTR). CTR measures the rate at which the searchers click on
an ad’s link. These factors were later enhanced with other factors such as keyword
relevancy and landing-page quality. Google’s approach ensured that no advertiser can
just buy their way to the top search results while getting no clicks. Recognizing these
advantages, Yahoo!, Microsoft and other major search engines subsequently switched
their sponsored search platforms from GFP auctions to GSP auctions.
It is worth mentioning that the GSP auction is similar but different to another
famous second-price auction mechanism, called the Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) auc-
tion [Vickrey, 1961, Clarke, 1971, Groves, 1973], which was recently implemented by
Facebook [Varian and Harris, 2013]. The VCG auction has the same allocation rule as
the GSP auction. In its simplest version, ad slots are allocated to advertisers by ranking
their bids in decreasing order. However, winning advertisers are charged differently to
the GSP auction. For the position i, the winning advertiser pays for the externalities
that he imposes on others rather than the highest bid next to him.
From a mechanism design perspective, the GSP and VCG auctions have their
own advantages and disadvantages. Here we simply compare the two auction mod-
els along the following four dimensions: incentive compatibility, solution equilibrium,
revenue maximisation and allocative efficiency. Incentive compatibility (also called
truth-telling) essentially refers to offering the right incentives that make advertisers re-
veal their value truthfully [Narahari et al., 2009]. Truth-telling is a dominant strategy
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under VCG auctions but not under GSP auctions. In a GSP auction, advertisers may
shade their bids to maximise their expected utilities. Varian [2007] and Edelman et al.
[2007] proved there is a special equilibrium under GSP auctions, called the symmetric
Nash equilibria (SNE) (or the locally Envy-free equilibrium). In the SNE, the expected
revenue of a GSP auction is at least as same as a VCG auction. However, the SNE does
not always hold in front of random bids. Allocative efficiency is achieved when the so-
cial utility (i.e., the sum of utilities) of all winning advertisers is maximised. Allocative
efficiency ensures that the inventories are allocated to the advertisers who value them
most. VCG auctions satisfy allocative efficiency while GSP auctions do not satisfy
this property. Even though VCG auctions offer more economic properties, most of the
current advertising platforms still use GSP auctions. Edelman et al. [2007] pointed out
several possible reasons. First, in many situations, GSP auctions are more profitable for
a publisher or search engine. Second, switching from GSP auctions to VCG auctions
may generate substantial transition costs. Third, the payment rules of GSP auctions are
simple and easy to explain to advertisers.
The introduction of ad networks was another milestone in online advertising. The
original ad networks were set up in 1997 to address the problem for advertisers who
want to advertise across many different websites [OpenX, 2010]. By aggregating in-
ventory across multiple sites, ad networks offered advertisers the ability to reach the
size of audience that they had come to expect from traditional channels like televisions.
However, there are several limitations of ad networks. First, there are many intermedi-
aries in the value chain between publishers and advertisers, each taking a slice of “profit
cake”. For example, an ad network who cannot sell some particular inventories may
offer them at a cheaper price to another ad network. Second, advertisers may spend
much time and effort on exploring which network is the best one to purchase invento-
ries. Third, to maximise revenue, publishers may spend much time and effort on the
allocation of inventories among ad networks.
Ad exchanges came up to improve the limitations of ad networks, which are the
technology platforms that facilitate the buying and selling of ad inventories from mul-
tiple ad networks [Muthukrishnan, 2009, OpenX, 2010]. Three major exchanges were
acquired in 2007: Yahoo! bought Right Media in April, Google bought DoubleClick
in May and Microsoft bought AdECN in August. Each company quickly made vast
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pools of ad inventories, which greatly improved the experience for many participants
to transact centrally.
The arrival of ad exchanges and ad networks brought another innovative sale
mechanism to online advertising (mainly for display advertising) – real-time bidding
(RTB) – a programmatic trading technique designed to help advertisers take advantage
of increased data and inventory liquidity [PubMatic, 2010]. Before RTB, buying from
multiple exchanges was time-consuming and inefficient for advertisers. They had to
use a different system to access each exchange. And since a typical campaign would
pull inventories from more than one exchange, there was no easy way to achieve de-
duplicated reach or to cap the number of impressions that audiences would receive
from any given campaign [Google, 2011]. RTB therefore was originally conceived as
an advertiser-focused solution and many DSPs provided services based on it.
2.1.2 Guaranteed Advertising Deliveries
In the following discussion, the research related to guaranteed advertising deliver-
ies is reviewed. As described in Section 2.1.1, guaranteed contracts appeared in the
early stages of online advertising but were negotiated by advertisers and publishers
privately [Edelman et al., 2007]. Each negotiation contains an amount of needed in-
ventories over a certain period of time and a pre-specified guaranteed price. Hence, in
discussing the guaranteed delivery, the following issues must be considered: allocation
and pricing. Many studies discussed the two issues separately. Allocation models will
be explored first, and then pricing models.
Feldman et al. [2009] studied an ads selection algorithm for a publisher whose ob-
jective is not only to fulfil the guaranteed contracts but also to deliver the well-targeted
display impressions to advertisers. This research was more relevant to a service match-
ing problem. The allocation of impressions between the guaranteed and non-guaranteed
channels was first discussed by Ghosh et al. [2009], where a publisher was considered
to act as a bidder who bids for guaranteed contracts. This modelling setting was rea-
sonably good as the publisher acts as a bidder who would allocate impressions to online
auctions only when other winning bids are high enough. Balseiro et al. [2011] inves-
tigated the same allocation problem but used some stochastic control models. Simply,
they considered, for a given price of an impression, the publisher can decide whether to
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send it to ad exchanges or assign it to an advertiser with a fixed reserve price. The deci-
sion making process aims to maximise the expected total revenue. Roels and Fridgeirs-
dottir [2009] proposed a similar allocation framework to Balseiro et al. [2011], where
the publisher can dynamically select which guaranteed buy requests to accept and to
deliver the guaranteed impressions accordingly. However, compared to Balseiro et al.
[2011], the uncertainty in advertisers’ buy requests and the traffic of website were ex-
plicitly modelled under the revenue maximisation objective. Recently, a lightweight
allocation framework was proposed by Bharadwaj et al. [2012]. They used a simple
greedy algorithm to simplify the computations of revenue maximisation.
Bharadwaj et al. [2010] discussed two algorithms for pricing the guaranteed dis-
play contracts. Each contract contains a bulk of impressions and the proposed algo-
rithms solved the revenue optimisation problem for the given number of users’ visits
(i.e., the demand level). However, their work did not consider the auction effects on
the contract pricing, and the developed algorithms were purely based on the statistics
of users’ visits.
Consider if the online advertising market is bulling (i.e., the winning payment
prices of specific ad inventories from online auctions increase) and the non-guaranteed
selling looks more profitable for publishers, they may want to cancel the sold guar-
anteed contracts before the time that the targeted inventories will be created. Online
auctions with cancellations were recently discussed by Babaioff et al. [2009] and Con-
stantin et al. [2009]. They both considered a design that a publisher can cancel the sold
guaranteed contracts but needs to pay a penalty to advertisers. The proposed auctions
with cancellations enjoyed some economic properties, such as allocative efficiency and
equilibrium solution. However, there may exist speculators who pursue the cancella-
tion penalty only. In fact, the discussed cancellation penalty is very similar to the over-
selling booking of flight tickets. Several over-selling booking models were discussed
by Talluri and van Ryzin [2005].
Up to this point, the reviewed guaranteed contracts are all for display advertising.
Salomatin et al. [2012] studied a framework of guaranteed deliveries for sponsored
search, under which advertisers are able to send their guaranteed requests to a search
engine. Each guaranteed request includes the needed number of clicks and the ad bud-
get. The search engine then decides the guaranteed delivery according to search queries
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and available positions. Since the allocation decision is based on the joint revenue max-
imisation from guaranteed deliveries and keyword auctions, some advertisers may not
receive all their demanded clicks. In such cases, the search engine pays a penalty. How-
ever, advertisers still have less control of the ad exposure time and the position of the
ad. In addition, with the number of guaranteed advertisers increasing, it is less likely
that advertisers will meet their business needs in such a mechanism.
The ad option concept was initially introduced by Moon and Kwon [2010] (even
though Meinl and Blau [2009] discussed the possibility of Web service derivatives, their
proposal was not intended for online advertising). The ad option buyer can be guaran-
teed the right to choose the minimum payment between CPM and CPC once CTR is
realized. This option contract was similar to a paying the worst and cash option [Zhang,
1998]. Moon and Kwon [2010] suggested an evaluation of the option under the frame-
work of a Nash bargaining game. Simply, they considered two utility functions: one
for advertiser and one for publisher. The objective function is the product of these two
utilities and each utility function is restricted by a negotiation power. The option price
is the optimal solution which maximises the negotiated joint utility. The work of Moon
and Kwon [2010] motivates the research in Chapters 4-5. However, in this study, the
proposed ad options differ from theirs in contract structure and evaluation methods.
2.2 Preliminaries on Financial Methods
Finance mainly studies how people make decisions regarding the allocation of re-
sources over time and the handling of risk [Mankiw, 2006]. In this section, an in-
complete sketch of financial models is presented. First, some basic concepts, such as
uncertainty, risk and time value of money are introduced. Then, revenue management
models for airline industry are discussed, which lays the foundation for the research in
Chapter 3. Financial options and their evaluation techniques are explored, which form
the prelude for the research in Chapters 4-5.
2.2.1 Uncertainty, Risk and Time Value of Money
Uncertainty and risk are manifestations of the same underlying force – random-
ness [Schmid, 2012]. They are closely related but slightly different concepts. Un-
certainty is lack of certainty. Therefore, an uncertain environment is one in which the
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individual decision maker is not absolutely sure of the consequences of any particular
actions. Individuals make decisions according to some rules but the outcomes of those
decisions are not known with certainty at the time the decision is taken. Therefore,
uncertainty is a non-quantifiable form of randomness. Its application to real-world
situations is not well-charted. Risk is randomness in which events have measurable
probabilities [Knight, 1921, Schmid, 2012]. Probabilities may be attained either by de-
duction using theoretical models or induction using the observed frequency of events.
This notion implies that a choice sometimes has an influence on the outcome. We may
simply distinguish between the two concepts as follows: “uncertainty exists whenever
one does not know for sure what will occur in the future. Risk is the uncertainty that
‘matters’ because it affects people’s welfare. Thus, uncertainty is a necessary but not a
sufficient condition for risk. ” [Bodie et al., 2009].
There is a time dimension in an uncertain world, since decisions and outcomes are
separated in time. Time value of money refers to the fact that money in hand today is
worth more than the expectation of the same amount to be received in the future. There
are three reasons why this is true [Sundaresan, 2000, Bodie et al., 2009]: the first is that
one can invest it, earn interest, and end up with more in the future; the second is that
the purchasing power of money can change over time because of inflation; the third is
that the receipt of money expected in the future is, in general, uncertain.
2.2.2 Revenue Management
Revenue management (RM) investigates specific resource allocation problems within
finance. The following three types of decisions faced by a seller of products or ser-
vices are considered to be the RM research [Talluri and van Ryzin, 2005]: structural
decisions, price decisions and quantity decisions. Structural decisions refer to the sales
mechanism design. For example, that method a seller uses to deliver his products or
services to consumers, such as posted prices, private negotiations, auctions and so on.
Price decisions are means of evaluating a seller’s products or services under a specific
market structure. This includes, how to set posted prices, how to set reserve prices
in auctions, how to price products across different categories, and how to adjust price
over time. Quantity decisions refer to the capacity problem. For example, whether to
accept or reject a purchase request for a given stock level, or how to allocate products
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to different types of consumers.
In the following discussion, several RM models that were used in the airline in-
dustry are briefly reviewed as the situation of selling a given stock of flight tickets by
a deadline is similar to selling future ad inventories in advance. Talluri and van Ryzin
[2005] introduced the basic mathematical settings of both price-based RM models and
capacity-based RM models for pricing flight tickets. Price-based RM models aim at
maximizing the seller’s expected revenue by setting the optimal dynamic prices over
time; capacity-based RM models aim at maximizing the seller’s expected revenue by
allocating the remaining tickets effectively. In fact, most of these two types of mod-
els consider both pricing and allocation problems for the estimated level of supply and
demand. The main difference between them is which variable (i.e., price or capacity)
is the control variable in optimisation. Anjos et al. [2004] studied a dynamic model
which finds the optimal price to charge for flight tickets under one-way pricing. Their
model was based on two underlying assumptions of the consumer’s behaviour. The first
assumption stated that consumers are price sensitive. If the ticket price increases, con-
sumers are less willing to buy. The second assumption stated that consumers are time
sensitive. Their needs to purchase the tickets increase when approaching to the flight
departure time. Anjos et al. [2005] then discussed a general framework and examined
several pricing policies under various formulations of consumer behaviour. Malighetti
et al. [2009] analysed the pricing policy adopted by Ryanair, a main low-cost carrier in
Europe. They examined several preference choice functions for one-way pricing using
a wide range of actual prices on all of Ryanairs routes, thus validating assumptions
made by Anjos et al. [2004, 2005]. Chapter 3 considers the sale of identical future ad
inventories in advance, which are based on the economic settings discussed by Anjos
et al. [2004, 2005] and Malighetti et al. [2009]. However, our work is more sophisti-
cated because the salvage value of ad inventories on the delivery date is not zero, which
is determined by the level of competitions in future real-time auctions.
2.2.3 Options and Option Pricing Methods
Options have been widely used in many fields: financial options are an important
derivative to speculate profits as well as to hedge risk [Wilmott, 2006]; real options
are an effective decision-making tool to evaluate business projects and corporate risk
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management [Boer, 2002]. The research carried our throughout Chapters 4-5 is closely
related to financial options, whose evaluation is regarded as one of the most impor-
tant application areas of mathematics today. Sundaresan [2000], Constantinides and
Malliaris [2001] and Hobson [2004] provided good surveys on financial options and
option pricing models. In the following discussion, the basic option concepts are intro-
duced and the studies related to the research in Chapters 4-5 are reviewed.
2.2.3.1 Standard Options
A standard option (or vanilla option) is a contract in which the seller grants the buyer
the right, but not the obligation, to enter into a transaction with the seller to either buy
or sell the underlying asset at a fixed price on or prior to a fixed date [Wilmott, 2006].
The underlying asset can be a stock, bond, foreign currency, or index such as S&P-
100, FTSE-100 etc. The market price of the underlying asset is called the underlying
price; the fixed price is called the strike price; and the fixed date is called the expiration
date (or maturity date). The seller grants this right in exchange for a certain amount of
money, called the option price.
An option is called the call option if its buyer has the right to buy the underlying
asset in the future. Another case is called the put option where the option buyer has
the right to sell. The simplest standard option is the European option [Wilmott, 2006],
which can be exercised only on the expiration date. This differs from an American
option [Wilmott, 2006], which can be exercised at any time during the contract period.
Both European and American options are standard options.
2.2.3.2 Exotic Options
In the beginning of the 1980s, standard options became more widely understood and
their trading volume exploded. Financial institutions began to search for alternative
forms of options, known as exotic options [Zhang, 1998], to meet their new business
needs. Among them, two types of options, multi-asset options and multi-exercise op-
tions, are particularly relevant to our research.
Multi-asset options are options written on at least two underlying assets [Zhang,
1998]. These underlying assets can be stocks, bonds, currencies and indices in either
the same category or different markets. Several types of multi-asset options are worth
mentioning, such as basket options, dual-strike options, rainbow options, paying the
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best and cash options, and quotient options. Table 2.1 provides a brief summary of
these multi-asset options, and compares them to standard options and our proposed
multi-keyword multi-click ad options (see Chapter 4) along the following seven di-
mensions: payoff function, underlying variable, exercise opportunity, early exercise
opportunity, strike price and application area. This comparison indicates that our pro-
posed ad options are more complex than others and are, therefore, more difficult to
evaluate.
In Table 2.1, it is worth emphasising basket options and dual-strike options. Bas-
ket options are those options whose payoff is determined by the weighted sum of un-
derlying asset prices [Wilmott, 2006]. This structure can be extended to the keyword
broad match scenario, where the weights are the probabilities that sub-phrases occur in
search queries. Dual-strike options are the options with two different strike prices for
two different underlying assets [Zhang, 1998]. The simplest version of our proposed ad
options is a dual-strike call option, which allows an advertiser to switch his targeted two
ad keywords during the contract lifetime. However, in sponsored search, the number of
candidate ad keywords to choose from is usually more than two, so the two keywords
are extended to higher dimensions (see Chapter 4). In addition, as an advertiser usually
needs more than a single click for guaranteed delivery, the dual-strike call option is
extended to a multi-exercise option.
Multi-exercise options are a generalisation of American options, which provide
a buyer with more than one exercise right and sometimes control over one or more
other variables [Villinski, 2004], such as the amount of the underlying asset exercised
in certain time periods. Multi-exercise options have become more prevalent over the
past decade, particularly, in the energy industry, such as electricity swing options and
water options. Contributors to the multi-exercise options include Deng [2000], Deng
and Oren [2006], Clewlow and Strickland [2000], Villinski [2004], Weron [2006], Mar-
shall et al. [2011] and Marshall [2012]. Their work is not discussed further here as our
proposed ad options in Chapter 4 are simple examples of multi-exercise options. Com-
pared to the energy industry, the multi-exercise opportunity in sponsored search is more
flexible. Ad options are proposed that can allow advertisers to exercise options at any
time in the option lifetime, i.e. the exercise time is not pre-specified, and no minimum
number of clicks is required for each exercise. Therefore, there is no penalty fee if the
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advertiser does not exercise the minimum clicks. In addition, there is no transaction fee
for the ad option in sponsored search.
2.2.3.3 Option Pricing Methods
Motivated by an attempt to model the fluctuations of asset prices, Brownian motion
(i.e., the continuous-time random walk process [Shreve, 2004]) was first introduced
by Bachelier [1900] to price an option. However, the impact of his work was not
recognised by financial community for many years. Sixty five years later, Samuelson
[1965b] replaced Bachelier’s assumptions on asset price with a geometric form, called
the geometric Brownian motion (GBM). In the GBM model, the proportional price
changes are exponentially generated by a Brownian motion, thereby solving the prob-
lem of negative asset prices in option pricing. While the GBM model is not appropriate
for all financial assets in all market conditions, it remains the reference model against
which any alternative dynamics are judged.
The research of Samuelson highly affected Black and Scholes [1973] and Merton
[1973], who then examined the option pricing based on the GBM underlying model.
They constructed a portfolio from risky and risk-less underlying assets to replicate the
value of a European option. Risky assets can be stocks, foreign currencies, indices,
and so on; risk-less assets can be bonds. Once the value of the replicated portfolio
is estimated, the option value can be obtained accordingly. The pricing methods pro-
posed by Black and Scholes [1973] and Merton [1973] were based on the assumption
that investors on the market cannot obtain arbitrage. Therefore, the replicated portfolio
is treated as a self-adjusting process whose least expectation of returns increase at the
same speed as the constant bank interest rate. If considering the constant bank interest
rate as a discount factor, the discounted value of the replicated portfolio would be a
Martingale [Bjo¨rk, 2009], whose probability measure is called the risk-neutral proba-
bility measure. Since a closed-form pricing formula can be obtained from the settings
of Black and Scholes [1973] and Merton [1973], we normally call their work as the
Black-Scholes-Merton (BSM) option pricing formula.
The BSM option pricing formula spurred research in option evaluation. Various
numerical procedures have appeared in this field, including lattice methods, finite dif-
ference methods, Monte Carlo simulations, and so on. These numerical procedures are
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capable of evaluating more complex options when the closed-form solution does not
exist. In the following discussion, lattice methods for pricing options with a parametric
underlying process are reviewed. This provides literature for the research in Chapter 5.
Sharpe [1978] initiated the concept of pricing a call option written on an asset with
simple up and down two-state price changes. We call it the one-step binomial lattice
method and use it as a pedagogical framework to explain the continuous-time option
pricing model without reference to stochastic calculus. Cox et al. [1979] then devel-
oped a multi-step binomial framework, called the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein (CRR) model,
which can converge with the BSM pricing formula if the length of the time step is suf-
ficiently small. Boyle [1986] proposed a trinomial lattice, whereby the asset price can
either move upwards, downwards, or stay unchanged in a given time period. Boyle
also discussed the pricing for an option with two underlying assets via two correlated
trinomial lattices [Boyle, 1988] and investigated how a multinomial lattice can be de-
veloped to price an option with a single asset [Boyle et al., 1989]. Other contributors to
lattice methods include Kamrad and Ritchken [1991], Tian [1993] and Haahtela [2010].
The mathematical results of these lattice methods are presented in Table 2.2, where the
movement scale is the ratio of the price in the next state to the current one, and the
transition probability is the risk-neutral probability that the asset price moves from the
current state to the next one.
As discussed above, lattice methods adopt Samuelson’s GBM assumption for the
underlying asset price. However, the GBM assumption may not always be empirically
valid. This motivates a general Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) diffusion process for option
pricing. Nelson and Ramaswamy [1990] discussed the conditions under which a se-
quence of binomial processes converges weakly to an OU diffusion process and inves-
tigated its application to pricing an option written on an asset with constant volatility.
Primbsa et al. [2007] then proposed a pentanomial lattice method that incorporates the
skewness and kurtosis of the underlying asset price and found that the limiting dis-
tribution is compounded Poisson. Nelson and Ramaswamy [1990] and Primbsa et al.
[2007] only solved the lattice pricing for the non-GBM underlyings which have a con-
stant volatility. Florescu and Viens [2008] proposed a lattice method that deals with the
stochastic volatility (SV) underlying model. However, their method is not very practi-
cal in terms of computational efficiency as the transition probabilities are restricted by
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Table 2.2: Summary of the relevant lattice methods for pricing a call option with the GBM
underlying model: ∆t is the length of each time step; r is the continuous-time compounding
risk-less interest rate; σ1, σ2 are the volatilities for the underlying asset price and ρ is the corre-
lation; u,m, d are the state transition scale of underlying asset price in upward, unchanged and
downward movements; q1, q2, . . . , qn are the risk-neutral transition probabilities from upward
movement to downward movement.
Model Movement scales Transition probabilities
u, d (or u,m, d) q1, q2, · · · qk
Binomial lattice (one factor)
CRR u = eσ
√
∆t, d = 1/u. q1 = e
r∆t−d
u−d , q2 = 1− q1.
Tian-BIN u = γζ2 (ζ+1+
√
ζ2 + 2ζ − 3), q1 = er∆t−du−d , q2 = 1− q1.
d = γζ2 (ζ+1−
√
ζ2 + 2ζ − 3),
γ = er∆t, ζ = eσ
2∆t.
Haahtela-BIN u = e
√
eσ2∆t−1+r∆t, q1 = e
r∆t−d
u−d , q2 = 1− q1.
d = e−
√
eσ2∆t−1+r∆t.
Trinomial lattice (one factor)
Boyle-TRIN u = eλσ
√
∆t, q1 =
(ζ+γ2−γ)u−(γ−1)
(u−1)(u2−1) , γ = e
r∆t,
m = 1, q2 = 1− q1 − q3,
d = e−λσ
√
∆t, q3 =
(ζ+γ2−γ)u2−(γ−1)u3
(u−1)(u2−1) .
KR-TRIN u = eλσ
√
∆t, q1 = 12λ2 +
(r− 12σ2)
√
∆t
2λσ ,
m = 1, q2 = 1− 1λ2 ,
d = e−λσ
√
∆t. q3 = 12λ2 −
(r− 12σ2)
√
∆t
2λσ ,
ζ = e2r∆t
(
eσ
2∆t − 1).
Tian-TRIN u = $ +
√
$2 −m2, q1 = md−γ(m+d)+γ
2ζ
(u−d)(u−m) ,
m = γζ2, γ = er∆t, ζ = eσ
2∆t, q2 =
γ(u+d)−ud−γ2ζ
(u−m)(m−d) ,
d = $ −√$2 −m2, q3 = um−γ(u+m)+γ
2ζ
(u−d)(m−d) .
$ = γ2 (ζ
4 + ζ3).
Quadrinomial lattice (two factors)
Boyle-TRIN2 u1 = eσ1
√
∆t, d1 = e−σ1
√
∆t, q1 = 14
(
1 + ρ+
√
∆t
(
r− 12σ21
σ1
+
r− 12σ22
σ2
))
,
m1 = 1, m2 = 1, q2 = 14
(
1− ρ+√∆t
(
r− 12σ21
σ1
− r− 12σ22σ2
))
,
u2 = e
σ2
√
∆t, d2 = e−σ2
√
∆t. q3 = 14
(
1− ρ+√∆t
(
− r− 12σ21σ1 +
r− 12σ22
σ2
))
,
q4 =
1
4
(
1 + ρ+
√
∆t
(
− r− 12σ21σ1 −
r− 12σ22
σ2
))
.
Pentanomial lattice (two factors)
KR-TRIN2 u1 = eλσ1
√
∆t, d1 = e−λσ1
√
∆t, q1 = 14
(
1
λ2 +
√
∆t
λ
(
r− 12σ21
σ1
+
r− 12σ22
σ2
+ ρλ2
))
,
m1 = 1, m2 = 1, q2 = 14
(
1
λ2 +
√
∆t
λ
(
r− 12σ21
σ1
− r− 12σ22σ2 −
ρ
λ2
))
,
u2 = e
λσ2
√
∆t, d2 = e−λσ2
√
∆t. q3 = 14
(
1
λ2 +
√
∆t
λ
(
− r− 12σ21σ1 −
r− 12σ22
σ2
+ ρλ2
))
,
q4 =
1
4
(
1
λ2 +
√
∆t
λ
(
− r− 12σ21σ1 +
r− 12σ22
σ2
− ρλ2
))
,
q5 = 1− 1λ2 .
Note: CRR [Cox et al., 1979]; Tian-BIN, Tian-TRIN [Tian, 1993]; Haahtela-BIN [Haahtela, 2010];
Boyle-TRIN [Boyle, 1988]; Boyle-TRIN2 [Boyle et al., 1989]; KR-TRIN, KR-TRIN2 [Kamrad and
Ritchken, 1991].
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many conditions and need to be estimated independently before building up the price
lattice. For the purpose of this study, a direct censor on transition probabilities of each
node would be more efficient, as proposed by Nelson and Ramaswamy [1990]. Our
suggested pricing method in Chapter 5 is based on this concept.
Chapter 3
Optimal Pricing and Allocation of
Display Inventories
This chapter discusses an optimal dynamic model for unifying programmatic guaran-
tee (PG) and real-time bidding (RTB) in display advertising. Section 3.1 introduces
the background and the overview of this study. Section 3.2 formulates the problem,
discusses our assumptions and provides a solution. Section 3.3 presents the results of
our experimental evaluation and Section 3.4 summarises the chapter.
3.1 Introduction
Over the last few years, the demand for automation, integration and optimisation has
been the key driver for making online advertising one of the fastest advancing indus-
tries. In display advertising, a significant development is the emergence of RTB, which
allows buying and selling display impressions in real-time and even a single impression
at a time [Google, 2011, Yuan et al., 2013]. Yet, despite the strong growth of RTB, ac-
cording to eMarketer [2013], 75% of publishers’ revenue in 2012 still came from 20%
guaranteed inventories, which were mainly sold through direct sales by negotiation.
Guaranteed inventories stand for the guaranteed contracts sold by top tier websites.
Generally, they are [Dunaway, 2012, OpenX, 2013]:
• Highly viewable because of good position and size;
• Rich in the first-party data for behaviour targeting;
• Flexible in format, size, device, etc.;
• Audited content for brand safety.
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Figure 3.1: Systematic view of PG and RTB in display advertising, where [t0, tn] is the time
period that a publisher (or SSP) sells the guaranteed impressions which will be created in future
period [tn, tn+1].
Therefore, it is not surprising that guaranteed inventories are normally sold in bulk at
high prices in advance than those sold on the spot market (i.e., RTB).
Programmatic guarantee (PG), sometimes called programmatic reserve or pro-
grammatic premium [Dunaway, 2012, OpenX, 2013], is a new concept that has gained
much attention recently. Notable examples of some early services on the market are
iSOCKET.com, BuySellAds.com and ShinyAds.com. It is essentially an al-
location and pricing engine for publishers or SSPs that brings the automation into the
selling of guaranteed inventories apart from RTB. Figure 3.1 illustrates how PG works
for a publisher (or SSP) in display advertising. For a specific ad slot or user tag, the
estimated total impressions in a future period can be evaluated and allocated algorith-
mically at the present time between the guaranteed market and the spot market. Impres-
sions in the former are sold in advance via guaranteed contracts until the delivery date
while in the latter are auctioned off in RTB. Unlike the traditional way of selling guar-
anteed contracts, there is no negotiation process between publisher and advertiser. The
guaranteed price (i.e., the fixed per impression price) will be listed in ad exchanges dy-
namically like the posted stock price in financial exchanges. Advertisers (or DSPs) can
see a guaranteed price at a time, monitor the price changes over time and purchase the
needed impressions directly at the corresponding guaranteed prices a few days, weeks
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or months earlier before the delivery date.
Developing a revenue maximisation model for the programmatic guarantee is so-
phisticated and challenging. We need to solve the problem of selling unstorable im-
pressions in advance. Similar problems have been studied in many other industries.
Examples include retailers selling fashion and seasonal goods and airline companies
selling flight tickets [Talluri and van Ryzin, 2005]. However, in display advertising,
impressions are with uncertain salvage values because they can be auctioned off in
real-time on the delivery date. The combination with RTB makes our work interesting
and novel.
Several economic assumptions are made in our study. We consider that future sup-
ply and demand of impressions from an ad slot (or user tag) can be well estimated and
assume that advertisers’ purchase behaviour of guaranteed contracts are determined by
both the guaranteed price and the time interval between the purchase time and the im-
pression delivery date. For RTB, we consider the sealed-bid second price auction and
discuss both probabilistic and empirical distributions of advertisers’ bids. Under the
above assumptions, an algorithmic framework is developed which gives out a func-
tional form of the dynamic optimal price and computes the optimal amount of future
impressions to sell in advance.
The development of this chapter is evaluated with two RTB datasets. Advertis-
ers bidding behaviours in RTB are investigated and we find that the developed model
adopts different strategies in pricing and allocation of impressions according to the
level of competition on the spot market. If the spot market in future is less competitive,
a small amount of impressions would be sold via guaranteed contracts at low prices.
The maximised revenue is mainly contributed by the spot market because there is a sig-
nificant growth in the expected price of auctions in the future. In a highly competitive
market, the model allocates more future impressions into guaranteed contracts at high
prices and the maximised revenue mainly comes from guaranteed selling. Under either
situation, the revenue can be maximised successfully.
3.2 The Model
We consider there is a premium ad slot on a publisher’s webpage. If there is a user
comes to this webpage, the ad slot can generate a chance of ad view, usually referred
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Table 3.1: Summary of key notations in Chapter 3.
Notation Description
t0, . . . , tn+1 Discrete time points: [t0, tn] is the period to sell the guaranteed impres-
sions; [tn, tn+1] is the period that the estimated impressions should be cre-
ated, auctioned off (in RTB) and delivered.
t ∈ [0, T ] Continuous time where t0 = 0, tn = T .
τ ∈ [0, T ] Remaining time to the impression delivery period, where τ = T − t.
Q Estimated total demanded impressions for the ad slot in [tn, tn+1].
S Estimated total supplied impressions for the ad slot in [tn, tn+1].
p(τ) Guaranteed price to sell an impression when the remaining time till the
delivery period is τ.
θ(τ, p(τ)) Proportion of those who want to purchase an impression in advance at τ
and at p(τ).
f(τ) Density function so that the number of those who want to purchase in ad-
vance in [τ, τ + dτ] is f(τ)dτ.
ω Probability that the publisher fails to deliver a guaranteed impression in the
delivery period.
κ Size of penalty: if the publisher fails to deliver a guaranteed impression
that is sold at p(τ), he needs to pay κp(τ) penalty to the advertiser.
ξ Number of advertisers who need an impression in RTB.
φ(ξ) Expected payment price of an impression in RTB for the given ξ.
ψ(ξ) Expected risk of an impression in RTB for the given ξ.
λ Level of risk aversion for advertisers.
pi(ξ) Expected winning bid of an impression in RTB for the given ξ.
to as an impression. In RTB, an impression is auctioned off simultaneously once a
user comes and the winning bidder (i.e., the advertiser) has his ad displayed to the
user [Google, 2011, Yuan et al., 2013]. Suppose that the publisher can estimate supply
and demand of impressions from an ad slot (or user tag1) from historical transactions
and plan to sell some of the future impressions via guaranteed contracts in advance
in order to maximise the revenue. We consider an environment that is risk-averse and
both publisher and advertiser make their strategies by maximizing their expected util-
ities [Bhalgat et al., 2012]. In other words, the advertiser is willing to pay a higher
price for a fixed number of future impressions if the delivery is guaranteed. This gives
the publishers an additional possibility of increasing their revenue by pre-selling some
future impressions, apart from the price discrimination over time.
1Group of ad slots which target specific types of users.
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3.2.1 Problem Formulation
The optimisation problem can be expressed as follows:
max
{ ∫ T
0
(1− ωκ)p(τ)θ(τ, p(τ))f(τ)dτ︸ ︷︷ ︸
G = Expected total revenue from guaranteed selling minus
expected penalty of failling to delivery
+
(
S −
∫ T
0
θ(τ, p(τ))f(τ)dτ
)
φ(ξ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
H = Expected total revenue from RTB
}
, (3.1)
s.t. p(0) =
{
φ(ξ) + λψ(ξ), if pi(ξ) ≥ φ(ξ) + λψ(ξ)
pi(ξ), if pi(ξ) < φ(ξ) + λψ(ξ),
(3.2)
where
ξ =
Remaining demand in [tn, tn+1]
Remaining supply in [tn, tn+1]
=
Q− ∫ T
0
θ(τ, p(τ))f(τ)dτ
S − ∫ T
0
θ(τ, p(τ))f(τ)dτ
.
The notations are given in Table 3.1. The publisher’s expected total revenue con-
tains: the expected revenue from guaranteed impressions sold during [0, T ]; the ex-
pected penalty of failing to delivery guaranteed impressions in [tn, tn+1]; the expected
revenue from RTB in [tn, tn+1]; and the price constraint that ensures the advertisers’
willingness to buy guaranteed impressions. Eq. (3.2) shows that an advertiser’s deci-
sion of buying either a guaranteed or non-guaranteed impression depends on the ex-
pected payment price and his level of risk-aversion. For simplicity and without loss of
generality, each guaranteed impression is considered as a single guaranteed contract.
This setting can be extended to a bulk sale in practice.
The solution to the above optimisation problem appears a bit complicated as it
needs to answer how many future impressions to sell and at what prices to sell. Before
discussing the solution, several assumptions, such as the distribution of bids in RTB
and the advertisers’ purchase behaviour in advance, have to be made.
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3.2.2 Distribution of Bids in RTB
Advertisers bid for individual impressions separately in RTB [Google, 2011, Yuan
et al., 2013]. Therefore, the following second-price auction is considered: for a sin-
gle impression from a specific ad slot (or user tag), advertisers submit sealed bids to
the publisher (or SSP), and the highest bidder wins the impression but finally pays at
the bid next to him.
Either probabilistic or empirical distribution of bids in RTB can be discussed.
Bidders are assumed to be symmetric in probabilistic method. Therefore, advertisers
would reveal their preference and truthfully offer bids [Edelman et al., 2007, Varian,
2007, Narahari et al., 2009]. In this research, we adopt the settings used by Lahaie
and Pennock [2007] and Ostrovsky and Schwarz [2011], where bids are assumed to
follow a log-normal distribution, denoted by X ∼ LN(µ, σ2). Then, the expected per
impression payment price from a second-price auction is
φ(ξ) =
∫ ∞
0
xξ(ξ − 1)g(x)
(
1− F (x)
)(
F (x)
)ξ−2
dx, (3.3)
where g(x) and F (x) are the log-normal density function and its cumulative distribution
function, respectively, given by
g(x) =
1
xσ
√
2pi
e−
(ln(x)−µ)2
2σ2 , (3.4)
F (x) =
1
2
+
1√
pi
∫ ln(x)−µ√
2σ
0
e−z
2
dz, (3.5)
so that ξ(ξ−1)g(x)(1−F (x))(F (x))ξ−2 represents the probability that if an advertiser
is the second highest bidder, then one of the ξ − 1 other advertisers must bid at least
as much as he does and all of the ξ − 2 other advertisers have to bid no more than he
does. We can check if the bids follow the log-normal distribution by the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (K-S) [Smirnov, 1948] and the Jarque-Bera (J-B) [Jarque and Bera, 1980]
statistics (see Table 3.6). Once the log-normal distribution is met, φ(ξ) can be estimated
numerically because the values of g(x) and F (x) in each integration increment can be
calculated.
If the bids do not follow the log-normal distribution, empirical methods can be
used to compute φ(ξ). Simply, for an ad slot (or user tag), the winning payment prices
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Algorithm 3.1 Estimation of φ(ξ) by using the robust locally weighted regression
(RLWR) method [Cleveland, 1979].
function RLWRSOLVE(ξ)
// (ξj , φj), j = 1, . . . ,m, are the learning data with size m.
β̂(ξ)← argmin∑mj=1$j(ξ)(φj − β0 − β1ξj − . . .− βdξdj )2,
where $j(ξ)←
{ (
1−
∣∣∣ ξ−ξjh(ξ) ∣∣∣3)3, if ∣∣∣ ξ−ξjh(ξ) ∣∣∣ < 1,
0, if
∣∣∣ ξ−ξjh(ξ) ∣∣∣ ≥ 1.
// h(ξ) is the distance from ξ to the most distant neighbour of ξ within the span
// we choose d = 2.
φ̂←∑dk=0 β̂k(ξ)ξk.
loop i← 1 to nˆ // repeat the update in nˆ iterations
← φ− φ̂, χ()← median(|  |).
for j ← 1 to m do
$j(ξ)←
{ (
1− ( ej6χ())2)2, if | j |< 6χ(),
0, if | j |≥ 6χ().
end for
β̂(ξ)← argmin∑mj=1$j(ξ)(φj − β0 − β1ξj − . . .− βdξdj )2.
φ̂←∑dk=0 β̂k(ξ)ξk.
end loop
return φ(ξ)← φ̂.
end function
are trained to develop a regression model that explains their correlation to the level of
demand. Here we use the robust locally weighted regression (RLWR) method [Cleve-
land, 1979] (see Algorithm 3.1 and an empirical example in Section 3.3.4). Other
statistical learning and forecasting methods can be developed to estimate φ(ξ), but they
are not further discussed here.
3.2.3 Risk Aversion and Purchase Behaviour
Eq. (3.2) tells that at time T an advertiser’s decision between guaranteed and non-
guaranteed channels are indifferent. In this research, the advertisers’ arrival is not
modelled as a stochastic process [Gallego and van Ryzin, 1994], instead, we consider
that the total demand for future impressions is deterministic but can be shift from future
to present. The possibility of this shift is because advertisers are assumed to be risk-
averse.
Under our risk aversion settings, pi(ξ) and ψ(ξ) can be estimated by the RLWR
method, and λ can be set as any non-negative number. First, the estimation of pi(ξ) is
as same as Algorithm 3.1 while we consider the highest bids (per transaction) rather
than the payment prices (per transaction). Second, the estimation of ψ(ξ) is slightly
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different. We compute a series of standard deviations of daily winning payment prices
and use Algorithm 3.1 to compute ψ(ξ) for the given demand level. Third, advertis-
ers’ risk-averse preference are not same; therefore, λ can be regarded as the average
risk-aversion level of all advertisers or of key advertisers (we consider the former in
the experiments). The larger λ the more risk-averse advertisers are. More detailed
discussion about the estimation of pi(ξ), ψ(ξ) and λ is given in Section 3.3.4.
Similar to flight tickets booking [Anjos et al., 2004, 2005, Malighetti et al., 2009],
we have the following two economic assumptions on demand:
Assumption 3.1 Demand is negatively correlated with guaranteed price as advertisers
would buy less impressions if price increases. Given τ and 0 ≤ p1 ≤ p2, then θ(τ, p1) ≥
θ(τ, p2), subject to the boundary condition θ(τ, 0) = 1.
Assumption 3.2 Demand is negatively correlated with the time interval between pur-
chase and delivery because more advertisers’ would want to buy impressions when the
delivery date is approached. Given p and 0 ≤ τ2 ≤ τ1, then θ(τ2, p) ≥ θ(τ1, p).
We adopt the functional forms of demand proposed by Anjos et al. [2004] (which
were used in flight tickets booking):
θ(τ, p(τ)) = e−αp(τ)(1+βτ), (3.6)
f(τ) = ζe−ητ, (3.7)
where α is the level of price effect, β and η are the levels of time effect, and the demand
density rises to a peak ζ on the delivery date. Therefore, f(τ)dτ is the number who
would like to purchase in advance, and θ(τ, p(τ)) is the proportion of those who want
to purchase an impression in advance at time T − τ and at price p(τ).
3.2.4 Optimal Dynamic Prices
The optimisation problem in Eq. (3.1) can be solved by Algorithm 3.2. We simulate
many values of γi ∈ [0, 1], i = 1, . . . ,m. For each given γi, we solve the optimisation
problem in Eq. (3.8), find the optimal series of guaranteed prices, and calculate the
optimal total revenue Ri. Then, in the global comparison, we can find the optimal γ∗
that generates the maximum value of total revenue.
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Algorithm 3.2 Solution to Eq. (3.1).
function PGSOLVE(α, β, ζ, η, ω, κ, λ, S,Q, T )
t← [t0, · · · , tn], 0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tn = T .
τ← T − t, m← 500.
loop i← 1 to m
γi ← RandomUniformGenerate([0, 1])∫ T
0 θ(τ, p(τ))f(τ)dτ← γiS
ξi ← (Q− γiS)/(S − γS)
Hi ← (1− γi)Sφ(ξi)
Gi ←
∫ T
0 (1− ωκ)p(τ)θ(τ, p(τ))f(τ)dτ
pi ←arg max Gi, (3.8)
s.t.
∫ T
0
θ(τ, p(τ))f(τ)dτ = γiS, (3.9)
p(0) =
{
φ(ξi) + λψ(ξi), if pi(ξi) ≥ φ(ξi) + λψ(ξi),
pi(ξi), if pi(ξi) < φ(ξi) + λψ(ξi).
(3.10)
Ri ←maxGi +Hi
end loop
γ∗ ← arg maxγi∈Ω(γ){R1, . . . , Rm}
p∗ ← arg maxpi∈Ω(p){R1, . . . , Rm}
return γ∗,p∗
end function
Let us discuss how to solve the optimisation problem in Eq. (3.8). We consider
the following Lagrangian:
L(λ˜, p(τ)) =
∫ T
0
(1− ωκ)p(τ)θ(τ, p(τ))f(τ)dτ + λ˜
(
γiS −
∫ T
0
θ(τ, p(τ))f(τ)dτ
)
,
(3.11)
where λ˜ is the Lagrange multiplier. The Euler-Lagrange condition is ∂L/∂p = 0. For
τ ∈ (0, T ], we have
(1− ωκ)θ(τ, p(τ)) +
(
(1− ωκ)p(τ)− λ˜
)∂θ(τ, p(τ))
∂p(τ)
= 0. (3.12)
Substituting Eq. (3.6) into Eq. (3.12) then gives the formula of the optimal guar-
anteed price:
p(τ) =
λ˜
1− ωκ +
1
α(1 + βτ)
. (3.13)
Consider a small time step dτ˜, then in [0, 0 + dτ˜], there are θ(0, p(0))f(0)dτ˜ de-
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mand fulfilled. Therefore, we have
∫ T
dτ˜
θ(τ, p(τ))f(τ)dτ = γiS − θ(0, p(0))f(0)dτ˜ (3.14)
By substituting Eqs. (3.2) and Eqs. (3.6)-(3.7) into Eq. (3.14), we have
−ζ(1− ωκ)e−
(
αλ˜
1−ωκ+1
)
αλ˜β + (1− ωκ)ζ
(
e−
(
αλ˜β
1−ωκ+η
)
T − e−
(
αλ˜β
1−ωκ+η
)
dτ˜
)
= γiS − e−αp(0)dτ˜.
(3.15)
Eq. (3.15) shows that the value of λ˜ is dependent on γjS and other parameters.
However, the explicit solution of λ˜ cannot be deduced. The value of λ˜ can be estimated
by using numerical methods, e.g. the Newton-Raphson method. Eq. (3.13) can then be
rewritten as follows
p(τ) =
λ˜(α, β, ζ, η, ω, κ, γiS)
1− ωκ +
1
α(1 + βτ)
. (3.16)
The notation λ˜(α, β, ζ, η, ω, κ, γiS) represents the dependency relationship among
λ˜ and other parameters. Figure 3.2 gives a numerical investigation on the relationships
between p(τ) and model parameters. Recall that in Eqs. (3.6)-(3.7) a large value of α
means advertisers are price sensitive; therefore, p(τ) decreases if α increases. Similar
negative correlations are with β and η. These two parameters describe the time effect
on advertisers’ willingness to purchase. The model thus encourages advertisers to pur-
chase in advance by selling guaranteed contracts at low prices. Conversely, the optimal
price is positively correlated with ζ because the parameter shows the maximum num-
ber of advertisers that would be willing to buy guaranteed impressions at a time point.
More advertisers means more competition; therefore, more advertisers would purchase
in advance in order to secure the targeted impressions. In such a situation, the model
gives out high guaranteed prices and allocates more impressions to guaranteed con-
tracts. While the expected penalty ωκ has less effect on price, the larger ωκ the higher
p(τ). It is worth noting that ω and κ are considered as given parameters because: (i) κ
can be set by negotiation between publisher and advertiser; (ii) ω can be estimated2 and
2ω can be approximated by the percentage of guaranteed impressions that the publisher failed to
deliver.
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Figure 3.2: The impact of model parameters on the guaranteed selling prices: α, β, ζ, η are
defined in Eqs. (3.6) & (3.7); ωκ is the expected size of penalty; γ is the percentage of estimated
future impressions to sell in advanced; T is the length of guaranteed selling period; τ is the
remaining time to the delivery date; p(τ) is the guaranteed selling price at τ.
updated once the PG system runs for a certain period of time. Here we set ω = 0.05,
κ = 1. With less and less supplied impressions to sell on the market, the price p(τ)
increases. The total length of time period to sell guaranteed contracts positively affects
the guaranteed price, the longer T , the higher the p(τ).
3.3 Experiments
We describe our datasets in Section 3.3.1, investigate the RTB campaigns in Sec-
tions 3.3.2-3.3.3, discuss the estimation of model parameters in Sections 3.3.4-3.3.5,
and evaluate the performance of revenue maximisation in Section 3.3.6.
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Table 3.2: Summary of RTB datasets.
Dataset SSP DSP
Time period (date) 08/01/2013-14/02/2013 19/10/2013-27/10/2013
No. of ad slots 31 53571
No. of user tags NA 69
No. of advertisers 374 4
No. of impressions 6646643 3158171
No. of bids 33043127 11457419
Bid quote GBP/CPM CNY/CPM
Table 3.3: Experimental design of the SSP dataset.
Time period (date)
Training set 08/01/2013-13/02/2013
Development set 08/01/2013-14/02/2013
Test set 14/02/2013
3.3.1 Datasets
We use two different RTB datasets: one from a medium-sized SSP in the UK and the
other from a DSP in China. Table 3.2 shows a brief summary of these two datasets.
The SSP dataset is used throughout the whole experiments while the DSP dataset is
used for further exploring advertisers’ strategies in RTB. In these two datasets, all the
bids are expressed as CPM.
Table 3.3 illustrates our experimental design. The SSP dataset is divided into one
training set, one development set and one test set. In the training set, we investigate
RTB campaigns and estimate model parameters. In the development set, we use the
discussed model to allocate and price the impressions that are created on 14/02/2013.
Guaranteed contracts are sold over the period from 08/01/2013 to 13/02/2013 and the
rest impressions are auctioned off on the delivery date 14/02/2013. In the development
set, we simulate the transactions of guaranteed contracts and calculate the remaining
campaigns of RTB on 14/02/2013. The test set contains the actual bids and winning
payment prices of 14/02/2013, which is used to evaluate the revenue maximisation per-
formance. Note that time periods of training and development sets can be different. For
example, the development period can be a few days/weeks later than the training pe-
riod. However, this requires a number of forecasting methods to estimate all the model
parameters (features). As our primary intention here is not to discuss better forecasting
methods, we choose a learning period that is close to the impression delivery date so
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Figure 3.3: Overview of statistics for the winning advertisers from the SSP dataset in the
training period.
that the learned parameters are more accurate for the evaluation purpose.
3.3.2 Bidding Behaviours
We first examine if selling guaranteed impressions in advance can be a viable way to
segment advertisers according to their bids, and then discuss how much of revenue
growth can be expected.
Let us first look at advertisers behaviours in RTB. From the SSP dataset, we find
that advertisers mainly join auctions in the morning from 6am to 10am. It is the time
period that supplied impressions arrive peak. We also find that the winning advertisers’
final payments are much less than their bids. Figure 3.3 provides some descriptive
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Table 3.4: Summary of winning advertisers’ statistics from the SSP dataset in the training
period: the numbers in the brackets represent how many advertisers who use the combined
bidding strategies.
Bidding No. of No. of Average change Ratio of payment
strategy advertisers impressions rate of payment price to winning bid
prices
Fixed price 188 (51) 454681 188.85% 43.93%
Non-fixed price 200 (51) 6068908 517.54% 58.94%
Table 3.5: Summary of advertisers’ winning campaigns from the DSP dataset. All advertisers
use the fixed price bidding strategy. Each user tag contains many ad slots and an ad slot is
sampled from the dataset only if the advertiser wins more than 1000 impressions from it.
Advertiser No. of No. of No. of Average change Ratio of payment
ID user tags ad slots impressions rate of payment price to winning
won prices bid
1 69 635 196831 58.57% 36.07%
2 69 428 144272 58.94% 34.68%
3 69 1267 123361 79.24% 30.89%
4 65 15 3139 104.19% 22.32%
statistics about this finding across all 31 ad slots. Winning advertisers are divided into
two groups. The first group contains those who always offer a fixed bid; the second
group contains those who frequently change their bids. Figure 3.3 shows that more
winning advertisers adopt the non-fixed price bidding in RTB. They intend to offer
higher bids on each impression, endure more variance in payment prices due to the
second price auction, and obtain more impressions. The second price auction in RTB
provides an opportunity for making more revenue by selling impressions in advance:
(i) a risk-averse advertiser is willing to buy in advance to lock in the price; (ii) the
publisher would be able to increase the price for the guaranteed contracts by charging
advertisers their private valuations rather than the second price bids. The question is
how big the difference between the top bids and actually payments (the second price).
Table 3.4 shows that the publisher can expect 100% increase in revenue because the
current average ratio of actual payment price (the second price) to winning bid (the
first price) is about 50%.
We further examine the DSP dataset, and find all four advertisers use the fixed
price strategy in their bidding. This might be because the DSP itself adopts the fixed
price strategy for these 4 advertisers. While the DSP dataset itself is biased, we can still
take a look at the average volatility of the advertisers’s payment prices and the average
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ratio of payment price to winning bid. The DSP dataset shows that advertisers actually
bid for user tags instead of specific ad slots. Each user tag contains a set of ad slots
that have similar features so that advertisers are able to target a certain group of users.
Therefore, RTB is an auction mechanism with user targeting. Consider in a user tag the
advertiser’s bids are not well distributed among ad slots, we only investigate the ad slots
where the advertiser wins more than 1000 impressions. Table 3.5 confirms our earlier
statement from a buy side perspective. Even using the fixed price bidding strategy,
advertisers’ payment prices are volatile (more than 50% from each impression). In
fact, these advertisers can afford more to reduce the risk because the current payment
prices are much lower than their private valuations (around 30% across 4 advertisers).
3.3.3 Supply and Demand
Figure 3.4 presents some descriptive statistics about supply and demand of all 31 ad
slots from the SSP dataset in the training set. The ad slots have the same daily supply
levels as well as their upper and lower bounds. However, the levels of daily demand are
significantly different: AdSlot25, AdSlot27, AdSlot29 and AdSlot31 are in
higher demand than others, about 9 bidders per impression while the rest ad slots have
the average value around 5. As shown in Figure 3.5, we take the average distance [Han
et al., 2011] in ξ as the metric to cluster ad slots and obtain two groups. Note that ξ
significantly deviates from its mean value in a day’s period because many more adver-
tisers join RTB at peak time from 6am to 10am, as shown in Figure 3.6. In these hours,
ξ is 118.96% higher than other hours. We can develop regression or time-series models
to estimate Q and S on delivery date; however, this is not a significant part of our study
so we consider them as given parameters.
3.3.4 Bids and Payment Prices
Once ξ is given, either probabilistic or empirical models can be used to estimate the cor-
responding payment price φ(ξ) in RTB. In probabilistic models, bidders are assumed to
be symmetric, whose bids follow a log-normal distribution. However, the distribution
tests shown in Table 3.6 reveal the fact that actual bids in RTB are not log-normally dis-
tributed. This confirms the statement that advertisers in the real-world environment are
not symmetric. They may frequently change their bids for unclear reasons. Therefore,
we use the empirical method to estimate φ(ξ) as well as ψ(ξ) and pi(ξ).
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Figure 3.4: Overview of daily supply and demand of ad slots in the SSP dataset in the train-
ing period: S is the number of total supplied impressions; Q is the number of total demand
impressions; ξ is the per impression demand (i.e., the number of advertisers who bid for an
impression).
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Figure 3.6: Overview of advertisers’ hourly arrival per day, where the red shaded bar represents
the peak hour.
Table 3.6: Summary of bids distribution tests, where the numbers in the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
(K-S) and Jarque-Bera (J-B) tests represent the percentage of tested auctions that have lognor-
mal bids.
Group of ad slots No. of auctions K-S test J-B test
where ξ ≥ 30
Low competition 286 0.00% 0.00%
High competition 15702 0.00% 0.00%
Table 3.7: Comparison of estimations between the empirical distribution and the actual bids:
φ(ξ) is the expected payment price; ψ(ξ) is the standard deviation of payment prices; pi(ξ) is
the expected winning bid; and the per impression demand ξ = Q/S.
Group of ad slots Difference Difference Difference
in φ(ξ) in ψ(ξ) in pi(ξ)
Low competition 14.35% 814.45% 24.43%
High competition 6.23% 11.25% 1.22%
Figure 3.7 illustrates an example of our empirical distribution method for
AdSlot25. In the learning set, each winning price can be plot against the demand
level ξ. We then use Algorithm 3.1 to compute φ(ξ). As described earlier, ψ(ξ) and
pi(ξ) are obtained numerically in the similar manner. In our experiments, 10% span
of smoothing is allowed. As shown in Figure 3.7, φ(ξ) and pi(ξ) are increasing with
ξ while ψ(ξ) shows a quadratic pattern on ξ. Once ξ is given, we can calculate the
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Figure 3.7: Empirical example of estimating pi(ξ), φ(ξ) and ψ(ξ) for AdSlot25 from histor-
ical bids, where ξ is the per impression demand, pi(ξ) is the expected winning bid, φ(ξ) is the
expected payment price and ψ(ξ) is the standard deviation of payment prices.
value of the terminal condition p(0) by Eq. (3.2). Figure 3.7 also confirms our earlier
statement on λ. Advertisers are not risk-averse if λ = 0; and they are risk-sensitive for
a large λ. In our experiments, we set λ = 1.
Table 3.7 examines the forecast performance of empirical method and compares
the estimated values of φ(ξ), ψ(ξ), pi(ξ) to the results of actual bids in the test set. The
estimations of φ(ξ) and pi(ξ) are much better accurate than that of ψ(ξ). We find that
the weak estimations of ψ(ξ) mainly come from AdSlot24, AdSlot26, AdSlot28
and AdSlot30. Their average per impression demand (in both learning and test sets)
are around 1.3. As also shown in Figure 3.7, the lower ξ the larger ψ(ξ). Therefore, for
the ad slots with a very low level of competition, we set p(0) = pi(ξ).
3.3.5 Demand for Guaranteed Impressions
The advertisers’ purchase behaviour of guaranteed impressions is modeled by parame-
ters α, β, ζ , η as well as be restricted by the expected risk-aversion cost φ(ξ) + λψ(ξ).
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Here we discuss how to learn the values of α and ζ .
If we only consider the price effect, we can create the function c(p) = e−αp from
Eq. (3.6) to represent the probability that an advertiser would like to buy an impres-
sion at price p when τ = 0. In RTB, this probability can be learned from the data by
investigating the inverse cumulative distribution function (CDF) of all bids, denoted
by z(x) = 1 − F (x). For a same domain space of p and x, we can have two series
of probabilities c(p) and z(x). Therefore, α can be calibrated as the value that gives
the smallest root mean square error (RMSE) between c(p) and z(x). Figure 3.8 illus-
trates an empirical example of this calibration graphically for AdSlot25 where the
estimated α = 1.72.
The values of ζ can also be calibrated from data. Consider a small time step dτ˜,
then we have the following inequality
e−αp(1+β×0)ζe−η×0dτ˜ ≤ Q× (1− F ({x ≥ p})). (3.17)
If dτ˜ = 1, then we can have ζ = Q× (1− F ({x ≥ p}))/e−αp.
It is difficult to learn the values of parameters β and η given our current datasets.
The two parameters represent the time effect on advertiser’s buy behaviour of guaran-
teed impressions. Here we simply adopt the initial parameter settings used in the flight
tickets booking system [Anjos et al., 2004, Malighetti et al., 2009] and set β = η = 0.2.
These two parameters can be then updated if the PG system runs for a certain period
of time. By having the values of all the model parameters, we can construct the de-
mand surface for a certain range of price series. Figure 3.9 presents a demand surface
that satisfies Assumptions 3.1-3.2. It is convex in the guaranteed price and in the time
interval between the purchase time and the delivery date.
3.3.6 Revenue Analysis
Two empirical examples are first presented to illustrate how the developed model works
with different levels of competition. The overall results are then provided.
Figure 3.10 shows an example of a less competitive market. The learned average
per impression demand on AdSlot14 is about 3.39 (in the test set the actual ξ = 6.21).
In such a market, advertisers would be less willing to purchase future impressions in
advance because they think they can obtain the targeted impressions at lower payment
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Figure 3.8: Empirical example of estimating the value of α for AdSlot25, where α is cal-
culated based on the smallest RMSE between the inverse function of empirical CDF of bids
z(x) = 1− F (x) and the function c(p) = e−αp.
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Figure 3.9: Numerical example of demand surface for guaranteed impressions of an ad slot,
where θ(τ, p(τ))f(τ)dτ represents the number of advertisers who will buy guaranteed impres-
sions at p(τ) and in [τ, τ + dτ]; other parameters are α = 1.85;β = 0.01; ζ = 2000; η =
0.01;T = 30.
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Figure 3.10: Empirical example of AdSlot14: (a) the optimal dynamic guaranteed prices;
(b) the estimated daily demand; (c) the daily demand calculated based on the actual bids in
RTB on the delivery date; (d) the winning bids and payment price in RTB on the delivery date;
(e) the comparison of revenues [see Table 3.8 for summary of notations B-I, B-II, B-III,
R-I, R-II]. The parameters are: Q = 17691;S = 2847;α = 2.0506;β = 0.2; ζ = 442; η =
0.2;ω = 0.05;κ = 1; γ = 0.4240; λ = 2.
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Figure 3.11: Empirical example of AdSlot27: (a) the optimal dynamic guaranteed prices; (b)
the estimated daily demand; (c) the daily demand calculated based on the actual bids in RTB
on the delivery date; (d) the winning bids and payment price in RTB on the delivery date; (e)
the comparison of revenues [see Table 3.8 for summary of notations B-I, B-II, B-III, R-I,
R-II]. The parameters are: Q = 89126;S = 7678;α = 1.7932;β = 0.2; ζ = 2466; η =
0.2;ω = 0.05;κ = 1; γ = 0.66; λ = 2.
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Table 3.8: Summary of plot notations in Figures 3.10 & 3.11.
Calculated revenue:
R-I Optimal total revenue calculated based on the estimated demand.
R-II Optimal total revenue calculated based on the actual bids in the test set.
Baseline:
B-I RTB revenue calculated based on actual winning bids in the test set.
B-II RTB revenue calculated based on actual payment prices in the test set.
B-III Estimated RTB revenue based on the learned empirical distribution.
Table 3.9: Summary of revenue evaluation of all 31 ad slots in the SSP dataset.
Group of ad slots
Performance of revenue maximisation
Estimated Actual Difference of RTB
revenue revenue revenue between
increase increase estimation & actual payment
Low competition 31.06% 8.69% 13.87%
High competition 31.73% 21.51% 6.23%
Group of ad slots
Performance of price discrimination
Ratio of actual Ratio of actual
2nd price reve optimal reve
to actual to actual
1st price reve 1st price reve
Low competition 67.05% 81.78%
High competition 78.04% 94.70%
prices. The model finally allocates 42.40% of future impressions to the guaranteed
contracts. In the meantime, the calculated guaranteed prices are not expensive. The
prices start with a value lower than the expected payment price from RTB and steadily
increases into the level that is close to the maximum value of advertisers’ bids. In Fig-
ure 3.10, we find that our forecasting values are close to the actual campaigns because
the estimated RTB revenue B-III is almost the same as the actual RTB revenue B-II.
Therefore, the estimated advertisers’ demand for guaranteed impressions is similar to
the actual daily demand (see Figure 3.10(b)&(c)). We also test the guaranteed selling
with the actual bids in the test set and find that the calculated revenue R-II is still
higher than actual second-price RTB revenue B-II. This shows that the developed
model successfully segments advertisers.
Figure 3.11 describes an example of a competitive market, where the learned aver-
age per impression demand for AdSlot27 is 9.63 (in the test set the actual ξ = 11.61).
More advertisers would be willing to purchase guaranteed impressions in advance be-
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cause of the increased level of competition and risk. The model finally allocates 66%
future impressions to guaranteed contracts and suggests higher prices at the beginning
of guaranteed selling. The estimated total revenue is maximised (i.e., R-I > B-III);
the optimal revenue calculated by the actual bids is more than the actual second-price
RTB revenue (i.e., R-II > B-II).
The overall results are presented in Table 3.9. The revenues calculated based on
the estimated demand are always maximised. If we use the actual bids to calculate the
demand at the given guaranteed prices, we still have increased revenues (compared to
the actual second-price auction market). The results successfully validate the developed
model and we find the model performs better in a more competitive environment. This
is because the publisher’s revenue is actually maximised by the price discrimination,
and in a competitive market there are more risk-averse advertisers to segment. With
more and more risk-averse advertisers buying the guaranteed impressions, the increased
total revenue will approximate advertisers’ private evaluations.
3.4 Summary
In this chapter, we investigated a dynamic model for a publisher (or SSP) who engages
in RTB to provide the guaranteed delivery of display impressions. We not only de-
signed the mechanism tailored to RTB but also explored its feasibility and performance
by analysing the real datasets. Our experimental evaluation successfully validated the
developed model as the publisher can receive increased revenues. This work opens
several directions for future research. First, we can further consider stochastic supply
and demand in revenue maximisation. Second, a parametric updating framework for
multi-period pricing and allocation would be of interest.
Chapter 4
Multi-Keyword Multi-Click Ad
Options for Sponsored Search
This chapter proposes an ad option tailored for the unique environment of sponsored
search, where multiple candidate keywords and a certain number of required clicks
are considered. Section 4.1 introduces the background and the problem. Section 4.2
describes the option structure and usage. We then discuss the option pricing methods
in Section 4.3 and analyse the revenue effects in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 presents our
experimental evaluation and Section 4.6 summarises the chapter. Several important
mathematical results are provided in Section 4.7.
4.1 Introduction
Sponsored search is an important form of online advertising. A search engine sells
ad slots in the search engine results pages (SERPs) generated in response to a user
query. Along with the click on the search button, the query term is what triggers the
results on the SERP to appear. The SERP has two types of result listings in response
to the submitted query: organic results and paid results. Organic search results are the
Web page listings that most closely match the user’s search query based on relevance.
Paid results are basically online ads – the companies who have paid to have their Web
pages displayed for certain keywords, so such listings show up when an user submits a
search query containing those keywords. The price of an ad slot is usually determined
by a keyword auction [Jansen, 2011, Bo¨rgers et al., 2013, Qin et al., 2014] such as
the widely used generalized second price (GSP) auction [Edelman et al., 2007, Varian,
2007]. In the GSP auction, advertisers bid on keywords present in the query, and the
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highest bidder pays the price associated with the bid next to him.
Despite the success of keyword auctions, there are two major drawbacks. First,
the uncertain and volatile bids make it difficult for advertisers to predict their campaign
costs and thus complicate their business planning [Wang and Chen, 2012]. Second, the
“pay-as-you-go” nature of the auction mechanisms does not encourage a stable rela-
tionship between advertiser and search engine [Jank and Yahav, 2010] – an advertiser
can switch from one search engine to another in the next bidding at near-zero cost.
To alleviate these problems, we propose a multi-keyword multi-click ad option in
this chapter. It is essentially a contract between an advertiser and a search engine. It
consists of a non-refundable upfront fee, known as the option price, paid by the ad-
vertiser, in return for the right, but not the obligation, to subsequently purchase a fixed
number of clicks for particular keywords for pre-specified fixed cost-per-clicks (CPCs)
during a specified period of time. From the advertiser’s perspective, fixing the CPCs
significantly reduces the uncertainty in cost of advertising campaigns. Moreover, for
a keyword, if the spot CPC set by keyword auction falls below the fixed CPC, the ad-
vertiser is not obligated to exercise the option, but can, instead, participate in keyword
auctions. Therefore, the option can be considered as an “insurance” that establishes an
upper limit on the cost of advertising campaigns. From the search engine’s perspective,
the proposed option is not only an additional guaranteed service provided for advertis-
ers. We show that the search engine can, in fact, increase the expected revenue in the
process of selling an option. Also, the option covers a specific period of time should
encourage a more stable relationship between advertiser and search engine. An impor-
tant question for us is to determine the option price and the fixed CPCs associated with
candidate keywords in the advertiser’s request list. Clearly if the option is priced too
low, then significant loss in revenue may ensure. Moreover, this may create an arbi-
trage opportunity where the buyer of the option sells the clicks their targeted keywords
to gain extra profits. Conversely, if the option is priced too high, then the advertiser
will not purchase it. In this chapter we consider a risk-neutral environment and price
the option under the no-arbitrage objective [Wilmott, 2006, Bjo¨rk, 2009]. We use the
Monte Carlo method to price the option with many keywords and show the closed-form
pricing formulas for the cases of single and two keywords. Further, the effects of ad
options on the search engine’s revenue is analysed.
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This chapter has three major contributions. First, we propose a new way to pre-sell
ad slots in sponsored search which provides flexible guaranteed deliveries to advertis-
ers. It naturally complements the current keyword auction mechanism and offers both
advertiser and search engine an effective risk mitigation tool to deal with the bid price
fluctuation. Although the proposed ad option belongs to a family of exotic options,
its payoff function differs from existing exotic options that we know from finance and
other industries (see Table 2.1 for detailed comparisons): it can be exercised not once
but multiple times during the contract period; it is not for a single keyword but multiple
keywords and each keyword has its own fixed CPC; it allows its buyer to choose which
keyword to advertise at the corresponding fixed CPC later during the contract period.
Second, we discuss a generalized pricing method for the proposed ad option (see Algo-
rithm 4.1) to deal with the high dimensionality. Third, we demonstrate that, compared
to keyword auctions, a search engine can have an increased expected revenue by selling
an ad option.
4.2 Flexible Guaranteed Deliveries via Multi-Keyword
Multi-Click Ad Options
We use the following example to illustrate our idea. Suppose that a computer science
department creates a new master degree programme Web Science and Big Data Ana-
lytics and is interested in search advertising based around relevant search terms such as
‘MSc Web Science’, ‘MSc Big Data Analytics’ and ‘Data Mining’ etc. The campaign is
to start immediately and last for three months and the goal is to generate at least 1000
clicks on the ad which directs users to the programme’s homepage. The department
(i.e., advertiser) does not know how the clicks will be distributed among the keywords,
nor how much the campaign will cost if based on keyword auctions. However, with
the ad option, the advertiser can submit a request to the search engine to lock-in the
advertising cost. The request consists of the candidate keywords, the overall number
of clicks needed, and the duration of the contract. The search engine responds with a
price table for the option, as shown in Figure 4.1. It contains the option price and the
fixed CPC for each keyword. The CPCs are fixed yet different across the candidate
keywords. The contract is entered into when the advertiser pays the option price.
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Sell clicks from the requested keywords in advance 
via a multi-keyword multi-click option .
Pay $50 option price (i.e., upfront fee) to buy 
the multi-keyword multi-click option. The 
contract can be exercised 1000 times for total 
1000 clicks on the candidate keywords in 
period [0, T].
t = 0
t = T
Multi-keyword multi-click option contract
(3 month period, T=0.25)
Option price
(max 1000 clicks)
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Fixed 
CPCs
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$1.80
‘MSc Big Data 
Analytics’
$6.25
‘Data Mining’ $8.67
Exercise 100 clicks of the keyword ‘MSc 
Web Science’ via option.
t = t1
Reserve an ad slot of  the keyword ‘MSc Web 
Science’ for the advertiser for 100 clicks until all the 
100 clicks are fully clicked by users.
Pay $1.80 to the search engine for each click 
until the requested 100 clicks are fully 
clicked by users. 
t = t1
c
Timeline
If the advertiser thinks the fixed CPC $6.25 
of the keyword ‘MSc Big Data Analytics’ is 
expensive (i.e., higher than the winning 
payment CPC from keyword auctions),  he 
can attend keyword auctions to bid for the 
keyword as other bidders, say $6.
Select the winning bidder for the keyword ‘MSc Big 
Data Analytics’ under the GSP auction model. 
Lose/win the campaign. If the advertiser is 
the winning bidder, he obtains the ad slot and 
pays at the bid next to him.
…
Exercise 5 clicks of the keyword ‘MSc Big 
Data Analytics’ via option. 
t = t2
Reserve an ad slot of  the keyword ‘MSc Big Data 
Analytics’ for the advertiser for 5 clicks until all the 
5 clicks are fully clicked by users.
.
Pay $6.25 to the search engine for each click 
until the requested 5 clicks are fully clicked 
by users. 
t = t2
c
Submit a request of guaranteed deliveries for 
the keywords ‘MSc Web Science’, ‘MSc Big 
Data Analytics’ and ‘Data Mining’ for the 
future 3 month period [0, T], where T = 0.25.
Search engine
Advertiser
Figure 4.1: Schematic view of buying, selling and exercising a multi-keyword multi-click ad
option for sponsored search.
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During the contract period [0, T ], where T represents the contract expiration date
(in terms of year format and is three months in this example), the advertiser has the
right, at any time, to exercise portions of the contract, for example, to buy a requested
number of clicks for a specific keyword. This right expires after time T or when the
total number of clicks have been purchased, whichever is sooner. For example, at time
t1 ≤ T the advertiser may exercise the right for 100 clicks on the keyword ‘MSc Web
Science’. After receiving the exercise request, the search engine immediately reserves
an ad slot for the keyword for the advertiser until the ad is clicked by a 100 times.
In our current design, the search engine decides which rank position the ad should be
displayed as long as the required number of clicks is fulfilled - we assume there are
adequate search impressions within the period. It is also possible to generalise the
study in this research and define a rank specific option where all the parameters (CPCs,
option prices etc.) become rank specific.
The advertiser can switch among the candidate keywords and also monitor the
keyword auction market. If, for example, the CPC for the keyword ‘MSc Big Data
Analytics’ drops below the fixed CPC, then the advertiser may choose to participate in
the auction rather than exercise the option for the keyword. If later in the campaign,
the spot price for the keyword ‘MSc Big Data Analytics’ exceeds the fixed CPC, the
advertiser can then exercise the option.
The above example illustrates the flexibility of the proposed ad option. Specifi-
cally, (i) the advertiser does not have to use the option and can participate in keyword
auctions as well, (ii) the advertiser can exercise the option at any time during the con-
tract period, (iii) the advertiser can exercise the option up to the maximum number of
clicks, (iv) the advertiser can request any number of clicks in each exercise provided
the accumulated number of exercised clicks does not exceed the maximum number,
and (v) the advertiser can switch among keywords at each exercise with no additional
cost. Of course, this flexibility complicates the pricing of the option, which is discussed
next.
4.3 Option Pricing Methods
The proposed multi-keyword multi-click ad option enables an advertiser to fix his ad-
vertising cost beforehand, yet leave the decision of selecting suitable keywords and the
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exact timing to place the ad to later. Since the advertiser enjoys great flexibility in
sponsored search, there is an intrinsic value associated with an ad option and it buyer
needs to pay an upfront option price first. In the following discussion, we focus on
calculating a fair upfront option price for the given option specifications, such as the
candidate keywords, the current winning payment prices and volatility of these key-
words, the length contract period, the risk-less bank interest rate, the preferred fixed
CPCs. Recall that Table 2.1 presents the payoff functions of the proposed ad option.
We discuss the option pricing for the first payoff function here and in Section 4.3.4 we
briefly explain how the introduced option pricing methods can be applied to the second
payoff function.
4.3.1 Underlying Stochastic Model
The winning payment CPC of the candidate keyword Ki (for a specific slot/position)
at time t is denoted by Ci(t), and whose movement can be described by a multivariate
Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) [Samuelson, 1965a]:
dCi(t) = µiCi(t)dt+ σiCi(t)dWi(t), i = 1, . . . , n, (4.1)
where µi and σi are constant drift and volatility of the CPC respectively, and Wi(t) is a
standard Brownian motion satisfying the conditions:
E(dWi(t)) = 0,
var(dWi(t)) = E(dWi(t)dWi(t)) = dt,
cov(dWi(t), dWj(t)) = E(dWi(t)dWj(t)) = ρijdt,
where ρij is the correlation coefficient between keywords Ki and Kj , such that ρii = 1
and ρij = ρji. The correlation matrix is denoted by Σ, so that the covariance matrix
is simply MΣM , where M is the matrix with the σi along the diagonal and zeros
everywhere else. For the reader’s convenience, detailed descriptions of notations are
provided in Table 4.1.
Since the GBM assumption lays down the foundation of pricing the proposed ad
option, we also provide several discussions and investigations on the GBM. In Sec-
tion 4.3.4, we explain why the GBM assumption is suitable for pricing an ad option
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Table 4.1: Summary of notations.
Notation Description
r Constant continuous (risk-less) interest rate.
T Option expiration date.
t Continuous time point in [0, T ].
m Number of total clicks specified by an ad option.
n Number of total number of keywords specified by an ad option.
K Keywords specified by an ad option,K = (K1, . . . ,Kn).
F Pre-specified fixed CPCs for keywordsK.
C(t) Winning payment CPCs for keywordsK from auctions at time t.
V (t,C(t);T,F ,m) Value of an n-keyword m-click ad option at time t.
µi Constant drift of CPC for keyword Ki, i = 1, . . . , n.
σi Constant volatility of CPC for keyword Ki, i = 1, . . . , n.
Σ Price correlation matrix, in which ρij is the correlation coefficient be-
tween ith and jth keywords, such that ρii = 1 and ρij = ρji.
MΣM Price covariance matrix, whereM is the matrix with σi along the diag-
onal and zeros everywhere else.
Φ(C(t)) Payoff function of an ad option at time t.
pi Option price (i.e., upfront fee) of an ad option.
MVN(µ,MΣM) Multivariate normal distribution with mean µ and varianceMΣM .
in sponsored search as well as indicate its limitations. In Section 4.5.2, we discuss the
estimation of the GBM parameters. In Section 4.5.3, we investigate the goodness-of-fit
tests with the real datasets and track the “errors” is the GBM underlying model is not
valid empirically.
4.3.2 Terminal Value Pricing
To simplify the discussion and without loss of generality, the value of an n-keyword
m-click ad option can be decomposed as the sum of m independent n-keyword 1-click
ad options. If an advertiser buys an ad option at time 0, the option price pi can be
expressed as follows
pi = V (0,C(0);T,F ,m) = mV (0,C(0);T,F , 1), (4.2)
where V (0,C(0);T,F ,m) represents the option value at time 0.
Our focus now centres on the n-keyword 1-click ad option. By adopting the basic
economic setting [Narahari et al., 2009], we assume that an advertiser is risk-neutral.
Simply, he has no preference across the candidate keywords and exercises the option
for the keyword which has the maximum difference between its winning payment price
and the pre-specified fixed price. This difference shows the value of the option because
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the advertiser is offered the right to move from the auction market to the guaranteed
market. Let’s consider if the advertiser exercises the option at the contract expiration
date T , the option payoff can be defined as follows
Φ(C(T )) = max{C1(T )− F1, . . . , Cn(T )− Fn, 0}. (4.3)
Note that the option payoff in sponsored search does not mean the direct reward but it
measures the difference of advertising cost between the auction market and the guar-
anteed market. By having Eq. (4.3), we can see if the advertiser would like to early
exercise the option by using the backward deduction method. The option value at time
time t < T is then
V (t,C(t);T,F , 1) =
{
Φ(C(t)), if early exercise,
EQt
[
e−r(T−t)Φ(C(T ))
]
, if not early exercise,
where r is the constant risk-less bank interest rate and EQt [·] is the conditional expec-
tation with respect to time t under the probability measure Q. As we use the risk-less
bank interest rate as the discounted factor, the probability measure Q is also called the
risk-neutral probability measure [Bjo¨rk, 2009]. Here we do not further discuss why us-
ing the risk-less bank interest rate while we provide a brief explanation in Section 4.7.2
together with introducing an alternative way of option pricing.
Let’s back to the decision making problem. If the ad option is early exercised
at time t, the option value is equal to its payoff Φ(C(t)). However, if the ad option
is not exercised, the option value at time t is equal to the discounted value of the
expected payoff from the expiration date T . The comparison between Φ(C(t)) and
EQt
[
e−r(T−t)Φ(C(T ))
]
can tell us the optimal decision for the advertiser. Since the
payoff function defined is convex, we then obtain the following inequality (see Sec-
tion 4.7.1):
Φ(C(t)) ≤ EQt
[
e−r(T−t)Φ(C(T ))
]
. (4.4)
Eq. (4.4) illustrates, to gain the maximum option value, the advertiser will not exercise
the option until its expiration date. Hence, the option price should be computed at
the discounted value of the expected payoff from the expiration date T . Together with
4.3. Option Pricing Methods 77
Eq. (4.2), we can obtain the option pricing formula for the n-keywordm-click ad option
as follows
pi = me−rTEQ0
[
Φ(C(T ))
]
. (4.5)
It is worth noting that we rule out the arbitrage [Varian, 1987] between the auction
market and the guaranteed market in option pricing. The concept of arbitrage can
be understood as the “free lunch”. As a market designer, we need to make sure that
everyone obtains something by paying something so that it is fair for both buy and sell
sides. Since we assume that an advertiser is risk-neutral, then it makes sense that the
risk-less bank interest rate can be employed as the benchmark rate to rule out arbitrage.
Eq. (4.5) can also be obtained by constructing an advertising strategy for the advertiser
and the detailed discussion is provided in Section 4.7.2.
4.3.3 Solutions
Eq. (4.5) can be expanded in an integration form as follows
pi = me−rT
(
2piT
)−n
2 |Σ|− 12
(
n∏
i=1
σi
)−1
×
∫ ∞
0
· · ·
∫ ∞
0
Φ(C˜)∏n
i=1 C˜i
exp
{
−1
2
ζTΣ−1ζ
}
dC˜, (4.6)
where ζ = [ζ1, . . . , ζn]T, ζi = 1σi
√
T
(
ln{C˜i/Ci(0)} − (r − σ
2
i
2
)T
)
, and other notations
are described in Table 4.1.
Closed form solutions to Eq. (4.6) can be derived if n ≤ 2. If n = 1, Eq. (4.6)
is equivalent to the Black-Scholes-Merton (BSM) pricing formula for an European call
option [Black and Scholes, 1973, Merton, 1973]. If n = 2, Eq. (4.6) contains a bivariate
normal distribution and the option price can be obtained by employing the pricing for-
mula for a dual-strike European call option [Zhang, 1998]. The discussed two formulas
are provided in Section 4.7.3.
If n ≥ 3, taking integrals in Eq. (4.6) is computationally difficult. In such a
case, we resort to numerical techniques to approximate the option price. Algorithm 4.1
illustrates our Monte Carlo method. Let’s consider n˜ number of simulations, and for
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Algorithm 4.1 Pricing a multi-keyword multi-click ad option via Monte Carlo simula-
tion. Detailed notations are provided in Table 4.1.
function OPTIONPRICINGMC(K,C(0),Σ,M ,m, r, T )
n˜← 1000; # Number of simulated paths;
for k ← 1 to n˜ do
[z1,k, . . . , zn,k]← GeneratingMultiNoise(MVN[0,MΣM ])
for i← 1 to n do
Ci,k ← Ci(0) exp
{
(r − 1
2
σ2i )T + σizi,k
√
T
}
.
end for
Gk ← Φ([C1,k, . . . , Cn,k]).
end for
pi ← me−rTE0[Φ(C(T ))] ≈ me−rT
(
1
n˜
∑n˜
k=1Gk
)
.
return pi
end function
each simulation, we generate a vector of multinormal noise and then calculate the CPCs
at time T . Eq. (4.4) shows that there is no need to generate the whole paths in each
simulation as we only consider the CPCs on the expatriation date in the calculation of
option payoff. Hence, by having n˜ payoffs at time T , the option price pi can be then
approximated numerically, and Algorithm 4.1 is lightweight and computationally fast.
4.3.4 Discussion
Like other methods based on the GBM assumption, the candidate keywords’ prices may
not follow it empirically because some time series features, such as jumps and volatil-
ity clustering, cannot be captured effectively [Marathe and Ryan, 2005]. However,
the GBM assumption is still a good choice for pricing ad options in sponsored search.
First, in our data analysis (see Section 4.5.3.1), we find that several keywords’ winning
payment CPCs satisfy the GBM assumption. Second, for the cases that the GBM as-
sumption is not valid empirically (see Section 4.5.3.2), we find that the pricing model
is reasonably robust as the identified arbitrage values in many experimental groups are
small. Third, our dataset might be biased. However, other previous research in key-
word auctions support the GBM assumption: Lahaie and Pennock [2007] tested the
log-normality of bids on Yahoo! search advertising data and gave the estimated distri-
bution parameters; Ostrovsky and Schwarz [2011] performed a field experiments based
on the log-normal bids on Yahoo! search advertising platform; Pin and Key [2011]
observed random bids from Microsoft Bing and simulated similar bids based on the
log-normal distribution. Since in these research the advertisers’ bids are tested across
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auctions, the winning payment prices over time should also satisfy the log-normal dis-
tribution (because they are the second-highest bids from auctions). Recall that in the
GBM assumption, the difference between two logarithms of winning payment prices
follows a time dependent normal distribution. If we consider the average daily winning
payment price as the underlying variable, these previous work can provide the distribu-
tion hypothesis tests to support the GBM assumption in sponsored search. However, for
display advertising, the GBM assumption is mostly not valid. This has been indicated
by Chen et al. [2014c] and Yuan et al. [2014].
In addition, the option payoff defined in Eq. (4.3) can be used for both keyword
exact match and keyword broad match settings. It depends on the type of the win-
ing payment prices used. Also as described in Table 2.1, if we only have the exactly
matched C(T ), we can still construct a broad match structure for the option, similar to
Eq. (4.3), the option payoff function on time T is
Φ(C(T )) = max
{ k1∑
i=1
ω1iC1i(T )− F1, · · · ,
kn∑
i=1
ωniCni(T )− Fn, 0
}
. (4.7)
where ωji is the probability that the ith broad matched keyword (i.e., the sub-phrase
occurs in search queries) for the keyword Kj . Eq. (4.1) can be still used to model the
underlying CPCs’ movement but the selected keywords need to be uniquely distinctive
from each other. For simplicity, we denote them by C˜(T ). The correlation matrix is the
correlation between these distinctive underlying keywords, denoted by Σ˜. By having
the distinctive underlying keywords in Eq. (4.1), the option price pi0 can be calculated
by Algorithm 4.1.
4.4 Revenue Analysis for Search Engine
The proposed ad option can be loosely considered as a kind of insurance for an adver-
tiser. It does not come without a cost because the advertiser needs to pay the upfront
option price; therefore, the ad option is also beneficial to the search engine’s revenue.
In the following discussion, we analyse the effect of an ad option on the search engine’s
revenue. We provide a functional analysis for the 1-keyword 1-click ad option in this
section and leave the empirical investigation of the n-keyword cases in Section 4.5.
Let D(F ) be the difference between the expected revenue from ad option and the
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expected revenue from only keyword auctions, we then have
D(F ) =
(
C(0)N [ζ1]− e−rTFN [ζ2] + e−rTF
)
P(EQ0 [C(T )] ≥ F )︸ ︷︷ ︸
= Discounted value of expected revenue from option if EQ0 [C(T )]≥F
+
(
C(0)N [ζ1]− e−rTFN [ζ2] + e−rTEQ0 [C(T )]
)
P(EQ0 [C(T )] < F )︸ ︷︷ ︸
= Discounted value of expected revenue from option if EQ0 [C(T )]<F
− e−rTEQ0 [C(T )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
= Discounted value of expected revenue from auction
.
= C(0)N [ζ1]− e−rTFN [ζ2]− e−rT (EQ0 [C(T )]− F )× P(EQ0 [C(T )] ≥ F ),
(4.8)
where N [·] represents the cumulative probability of a standard normal distribution.
Let us take a look at the boundary values first. If F = 0, the option price pi
achieves its maximum value e−rTEQ0 [C(T )]; therefore, D(F )→ 0. If pi = 0, the fixed
CPC F is as large as possible, and P(EQ0 [C(T )] ≥ F )→ 0 and D(F )→ 0. Since
ln{C(T )/C(0)} ∼ N((r − σ2/2)T, σ2T),
we can have
P(EQ0 [C(T )] ≥ F ) = P
(
C(0) exp{(r − 1
2
σ2)T} ≥ F
)
= P
(
ln{F/C(0)} − (r − 1
2
σ2)T ≤ 0
)
= P
(
ln{C(T )/C(0)} − (r − 1
2
σ2)T
≤ ln{C(0)/F}+ (r − 1
2
σ2)T + σW (T )
)
≈ N
[
1
σ
√
T
(
ln{C(0)/F}+ (r − 1
2
σ2)T
)]
= N [ζ2]. (4.9)
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Substituting Eq. (4.9) into Eq. (4.8) gives
D(F ) = C(0)N [ζ1]− e−rTEQt (C(T ))N [ζ2]
≥ C(0)N [ζ1]− e−rTEQt (C(T ))N [ζ1] (because N [ζ1] ≥ N [ζ2])
≥ C(0)N [ζ1]− e−rTC(0)e(r− 12σ2)TN [ζ1]
= C(0)N [ζ1](1− e− 12σ2T ) > 0, (4.10)
suggesting that the search engine can have an increase expected revenue if he sells the
click via an option rather than through an auction. We then take the derivative of D(F )
with respect to F and assign its value to zero:
∂D(F )
∂F
= C(0)
∂N [ζ1]
∂ζ1
∂ζ1
∂F
− e−rTN [ζ2]− e−rTF ∂N [ζ2]
∂ζ2
∂ζ2
∂F
− e−rT (EQ0 [C(T )]− F )
∂P(EQ0 [C(T )] ≥ F )
∂F
+ e−rTP(EQ0 [C(T )] ≥ F ) = 0.
(4.11)
Since ∂N (x)/∂x = 1√
2pi
e−
1
2
x2 , the following equation holds
∂N [ζ2]
∂ζ2
/
∂N [ζ1]
∂ζ1
= exp
{
1
2
(ζ21 − ζ22 )
}
=
C(0)erT
F
. (4.12)
Taking the derivative of ζ1 and ζ2 with respect to F gives
∂ζ1
∂F
=
∂ 1
σ
√
T
(
ln{C(0)/F}+ (r + 1
2
σ2)T
)
∂F
= − 1
Fσ
√
T
, (4.13)
∂ζ2
∂F
=
∂ζ1
∂F
− ∂σ
√
T
∂F
= − 1
Fσ
√
T
. (4.14)
and we find that D(F ) achieves its maximum or minimum value at F = EQ0 [C(T )].
Further taking the second derivative of D(F ) with respect to F = EQ0 [C(T )] gives
∂2D(F )
∂F 2
=
∂P(EQ0 [C(T )] ≥ F )
∂F
=
∂N [ζ2]
∂ζ2
∂ζ2
∂F
= − 1√
2pi
e−
1
2
ζ2
2 1
Fσ
√
T
< 0.
Hence, if the fixed CPC is set as same as the estimated spot CPC on the contract expi-
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Table 4.2: Overview of experimental settings of data.
Market Group Training set (31 days) Development & test set (31 days)
US
1 25/01/2012-24/02/2012 24/02/2012-25/03/2012
2 30/03/2012-29/04/2012 29/04/2012-31/05/2012
3 10/06/2012-12/07/2012 12/07/2012-17/08/2012
4 10/11/2012-11/12/2012 11/12/2012-10/01/2013
UK
1 25/01/2012-24/02/2012 24/02/2012-25/03/2012
2 30/03/2012-29/04/2012 29/04/2012-31/05/2012
3 12/06/2012-13/07/2012 13/07/2012-19/08/2012
4 18/10/2012-22/11/2012 22/11/2012-24/12/2012
ration date (i.e., F = EQ0 [C(T )]), the search engine can have a maximised profit.
4.5 Experiments
This section presents our evaluation results. We first describe the dataset, then conduct
assumption and fairness tests, and finally investigate the effects of ad options on the
search engine’s revenue.
4.5.1 Data and Experimental Design
The data1 used in the experiments are collected from Google AdWords by using its
Traffic Estimation service Google. When an advertiser submits his ad keywords, bud-
get, and other settings such as keyword match type and targeted ad location, the Traffic
Estimation will return a list of data values, including estimated CPC, clicks, global im-
pressions, local impressions and position etc. Such values are recorded for the period
from 26/11/2011 to 14/01/2013, for a total of 557 keywords across US and UK mar-
kets. Note that in the data 21 keywords have missing values and 115 keywords’s CPCs
are all 0.
For each market, the data is split into four experimental groups and each group
has one training, one development, and one test set, as illustrated in Table 4.2. The
training set is used to: (i) select the keywords with non-zero CPCs; (ii) test the statistical
properties of the underlying dynamic and estimate the model parameters. We then
price ad options and simulate the corresponding buying and selling transactions in the
development set. Finally, the test set is used as the baseline to examine the priced ad
options.
1The data is available at:
http://www.computational-advertising.org [Yuan and Wang, 2012].
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4.5.2 Parameter Estimation and Option Pricing
In the experiments, we use the method suggested by Wilmott [2006] to estimate the
GBM parameters. For the keywordKi, the volatility σi is the sample standard deviation
of change rates of log CPCs and the correlation is calculated as follows
ρij =
∑m˜
k=1
(
yi(k)− y¯i
)(
yj(k)− y¯j
)√∑m˜
k=1
(
yi(k)− y¯i
)2∑m˜
k=1
(
yj(k)− y¯j
)2 , (4.15)
where m˜ is the size of training data and yi(tk) is the kth change rate of log CPCs.
Figure 4.2 illustrates an empirical example, where the candidate keywords are
K =

K1
K2
K3
 =

‘canon cameras’
‘nikon camera’
‘yahoo web hosting’
 ,
and the model parameters are estimated as follows
σ =

0.2263
0.4521
0.2136
 , Σ =

1.0000 0.2341 0.0242
0.2341 1.0000 −0.0540
0.0242 −0.0540 1.0000
 .
Note that a high contextual relevance of keywords normally means that they have a
high substitutional degree to each other, such as ‘canon cameras’ and ‘nikon camera’,
whose CPCs move in the same direction with correlation 0.2341. The other keyword
‘yahoo web hosting’ is contextually less relevant to the formers and also has very low
price correlations to them. The example also shows that the contextual relevance of
keywords has an impact on their CPCs movement.
Based on the estimated parameters, we draw a sample of simulated paths of a 3-
dimensional GBM in Figure 4.2(a) for 31 days (where the x-axis is expressed in terms
of year value). Recall that the option payoff at any time t in the contract lifetime is
max{C1(t) − F1, . . . , Cn(t) − Fn, 0}. In Figure 4.2(b), we plot the price difference
between the spot CPC and the fixed CPC of each candidate keyword (i.e., Ci(t) − Fi,
i = 1, . . . , n) and also indicate the corresponding option daily payoffs (shown by the
cyan curve). It suggests that switching between keywords would help the advertiser
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Figure 4.2: Empirical example of generating paths under a GBM for a 3-keyword 1-click option
and calculating the corresponding payoffs: K1 = ‘canon cameras’, K2 = ‘nikon camera’,
K3 = ‘yahoo web hosting’, F1 = 3.8505, F2 = 4.6704 and F3 = 6.2520.
to maximise the benefits of the ad option. Repeating the above simulations 50 times
generates 50 simulated vales of each keyword for each day, as shown in Figure 4.2(c).
We then calculate 50 option payoffs and their daily mean values to obtain the final
option price, as shown in Figure 4.2(d).
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To examine the fairness (i.e., no-arbitrage) of the calculated option price, we can
construct a risk-less value difference process by delta hedging ∂V/∂Cj and check if
any arbitrage exists (see Section 4.7.2 or [Wilmott, 2006]). The hedging delta of the
1-keyword 1-click ad option can be obtained as follows
∂V
∂C
= N (ζ1) + C(0)N (ζ1)′∂ζ1
∂C
− Fe−rTN (ζ2)′∂ζ2
∂C
, (4.16)
and
ζ1 =
1
σ
√
T
(
ln{C(0)/F}+ (r + σ
2
2
)T
)
,
ζ2 = ζ1 − σ
√
T .
Therefore, ∂ζ1/∂C = ∂ζ2/∂C. Since
N (ζ1)′ = 1√
2pi
e−
ζ21
2 , (4.17)
N (ζ2)′ = 1√
2pi
e−
(ζ1−σ
√
T )2
2 =
C(0)
F
erTN (ζ1)′, (4.18)
then ∂V/∂C = N (ζ1).
For the n-keyword 1-click option, the hedging delta of each keyword can be com-
puted by the Monte Carlo method, i.e., ∂V/∂Ci = EQ[∂V (T,C(T ))/∂Ci(T )]. Ac-
cording to Section 4.7.2, we can define the 31-day growth rate of the value difference
process as γ˜ =
(
Π(t31) − Π(t0)
)
/Π(t0), and compare γ˜ to the risk-less bank interest
rate r = 5% (equivalent to r˜ = 4.12% per 31 days return2). The arbitrage detection
criteria is
|γ˜ − r˜| ≤ ε ? arb doesn’t exist : arb exists, (4.19)
where the notation ε is the model variation threshold (and we set ε = 5% in experi-
2The relationship between the continuous compounding r and the return per 31 days r˜ is: 1 + r˜ =
er×30/365 [Wilmott, 2006].
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Table 4.3: Test of arbitrage for ad options under the GBM assumption: n is the number of
keywords, N is the number of options priced in a group, P(α) is percentage of options in a
group found arbitrage, and the E[α] is the average arbitrage value of the options found arbitrage,
where the arbitrage α is defined by Eq. (4.20) and the risk-less bank interest rate r = 5%.
n Group
US market UK market
N P(α) E[α] N P(α) E[α]
1
1 94 0.00% 0.00% 76 0.00% 0.00%
2 64 0.00% 0.00% 45 0.00% 0.00%
3 94 1.06% 0.75% 87 0.00% 0.00%
4 112 0.89% -0.37% 53 0.00% 0.00%
2
1 47 4.26% 1.63% 38 0.00% 0.00%
2 32 9.38% 0.42% 22 4.55% 13.41%
3 47 4.26% 0.84% 43 4.65% 0.82%
4 56 5.36% 3.44% 26 23.08% -6.22%
3
1 31 0.00% 0.00% 25 4.00% 0.00%
2 21 4.76% -1.38% 15 0.00% 0.00%
3 31 0.00% 0.00% 29 3.45% -1.12%
4 37 10.81% 3.87% 17 35.29% -2.54%
ments). Then the identified arbitrage α is defined as the excess return, that is
α =
{
γ˜ − (r˜ + ε), if γ˜ ≥ r˜ + ε,
γ˜ − (r˜ − ε), if γ˜ ≤ r˜ − ε.
(4.20)
Hence, a positive α means that the advertiser buys an option can obtain arbitrage while
a negative α indicates the case of making arbitrage by selling an option.
Table 4.3 presents the overall results of our arbitrage test based on the GBM. We
generate paths for candidate keywords with 100 simulations and examine the options
price using delta hedging. There are 99.76% (1-keyword), 93.06% (2-keyword) and
92.71% (3-keyword) options fairly priced. Only a small number of options exhibits
arbitrage and most of the mean arbitrage values lie within 5%, such as shown in Fig-
ure 4.3. The existence of small arbitrage may be due to two reasons. First, the stability
of process simulations in both option pricing and arbitrage test. Second, the candidate
keywords are randomly selected for the 2-keyword and 3-keyword options. The signif-
icant differences on the absolute prices these keywords can generates a large variation
of calculated option payoffs, which then trigger arbitrage.
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Figure 4.3: Empirical example of the arbitrage analysis under the GBM dynamic for the US
market.
4.5.3 Model Validation and Robustness Test
We now examine the GBM assumption and investigate if arbitrage exists when the
keywords in an option do not follow the GBM movement.
4.5.3.1 Checking the GBM Assumption
To validate the GBM assumption, two validation conditions are tested [Marathe and
Ryan, 2005]: (i) the normality of change rates of log CPCs; and (ii) the independence
from previous data. Normality can be either checked graphically by histogram/Q-Q
plot or verified statistically by the Shapiro-Wilk test [Shapiro and Wilk, 1965]. To
examine independence, we employ the autocorrelation function (ACF) [Tsay, 2005]
and the Ljung-Box statistic [Ljung and Box, 1978]. Figure 4.4 provides an empirical
example of the keyword ‘canon 5d’. Figure 4.4 (a)-(b) exhibit the movement of CPCs
and log change rates while Figure 4.4 (c)-(d) show that the stated two conditions are
satisfied in this case.
We check the discussed two conditions with the training data. As shown in Fig-
ure 4.5, there are 14.25% and 17.20% of keywords in US and UK markets that satisfy
the GBM assumption, respectively. Thus 15.73% of keywords can be effectively priced
into an option based on the GBM. It is worth mentioning that not all keywords follow
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Figure 4.4: Empirical example of the GBM assumptions checking for the keyword ‘canon
5d’, where the Shapiro-Wilk test is with p-value 0.2144 and the Ljung-Box test is with p-value
0.6971.
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Figure 4.5: Overview of the GBM assumption checking for all candidate keywords of experi-
mental groups in both US and UK markets.
the GBM. Next, we examine the robustness of pricing model and investigate the arbi-
trage based on non-GMB models.
4.5.3.2 Examining Arbitrage for Non-GBM Dynamics
Several popular stochastic processes (together with the real data) are tested to check the
arbitrage in option pricing. Table 4.4 shows the candidate models and each model can
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Figure 4.6: Overview of model similarity testing: Wilcoxon test, Ansari-Bradley (A-B) test
and Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test.
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Figure 4.7: Overview of pricing model robust tests.
Table 4.4: Other underlying models or dynamics examined, where the parameter ki is set 0.5
and the rest of parameters are estimated from the training data.
Dynamic Stochastic differential equation (SDE)
CEV dCi(t) = µiCi(t)dt+ σi(Ci(t))1/2dWi(t)
MRD dCi(t) = ki(µi − Ci(t))dt+ σi(Ci(t))1/2dWi(t)
CIR dCi(t) = ki(µi − Ci(t))dt+ (σi)1/2Ci(t)dWi(t)
HWV dCi(t) = ki(µi − Ci(t))dt+ σidWi(t)
Note: the Constant elasticity of variance (CEV) model [Cox and Ross, 1976]; the Mean-
reverting drift (MRD) model [Wilmott, 2006]; the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross (CIR) model [Cox
et al., 1985]; the Hull-White/Vasicek (HWV) model [Hull and White, 1990].
capture certain features of time series data, such as mean-reversion, constant volatility
and square root volatility [Wilmott, 2006]. The arbitrage tests here are slightly different
from that of GBM. We estimate the model parameters from the actual data in the test
sets instead of the learning sets and treat the actual data as one single path of each
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model. Hence, the simulated data has the same drift, volatility and correlations as the
test data. We are now able to examine the arbitrage multiple times when the real-world
environment does not follow GBM. Also, for the candidate models, hypothesis tests
are used to check if the simulated path and actual data come from a same distribution.
These tests include the Wilcoxon test [Wilcoxon, 1945], Ansari-Bradley test [Mood
et al., 1974] and Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test [Justel et al., 1997]. Figure 4.6
summarizes the results of models’ goodness-of-fit tests, where the y-axis represents the
mean percentage of simulated paths not rejected by the hypothesis tests. Even though
the three tests give different absolute percentages, the dynamics’ performance is similar
and consistent: the CEV model has the best simulations for the actual data, followed
by the MRD model; the CIR and HWV models are very close.
Table 4.5 presents the arbitrage testing results for non-GBM dynamics, where
most of experimental groups exhibit arbitrage. The CEV model gives the best no-
arbitrage performance, showing that 78.65% of CEV-based keywords can be fairly
priced by using the GBM-based option pricing model. About 53.05% of CIR and about
43% of MRD or HWV based options have no arbitrage. For single-keyword options,
the fairness percentage is more than 85% across all groups. However, this figure drops
to around 38% for multi-keyword options (36.27% for 2-keyword options and 42%
for 3-keyword options). For the identified arbitrage, many groups (especially single-
keyword options) show small arbitrage values around 10% while arbitrage explodes in
some groups.
In summary, Tables 4.3 and 4.5 illustrate that our option pricing methods are effec-
tive and reasonably robust for the real sponsored search data. As shown in Figure 4.7,
when the keywords’s price follow a GBM (15.73%), the pricing model ensures that
95.17% of ad options are fairly priced under the 5% arbitrage precision. For the non-
GBM keywords, the CEV model is the best performance model, giving 78.65% of
fairness; the CIR model is worst performance model and is with only 31.97% of fair-
ness. Overall, the best expected fairness for all keywords is 81.25% while the worst is
41.91%. We find that the increase of the number of candidate keywords in an ad option
increases the likelihood of arbitrage. This is confirmed by the fact that expected fair-
ness drops from 86.83% (99.76% GBM and 83.60% non-GBM for 1-keyword options)
to 43.69% (2-keyword options) and 53.39% (3-keyword options), respectively.
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Figure 4.8: Empirical example of analysing the search engine’s revenue for the keyword ‘canon
cameras’.
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Figure 4.9: Empirical example of analysing the search engine’s revenue for the keywords ‘non
profit debt consolidation’ and ‘canon 5d”, where ρ = 0.0259.
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4.5.4 Effects on Search Engine’s Revenue
Let us start with the case of 1-keyword options. The example of keyword ‘canon cam-
eras’ in Figure 4.8(a) illustrates (other keywords exhibit the similar pattern) the conclu-
sions from our theoretical analysis in Section 4.4 that (i) the revenue difference between
option and auction is always positive and (ii) that when the fixed CPC F = EQt [C(T )],
the revenue difference D(F ) achieves its maximum and the two boundary values are
approximately zero.
The non-GBM cases are further examined in Figure 4.8(b)-(e), which show that
when the fixed CPC is close to zero, the revenue difference D(F )→ 0. This is because
when the fixed CPC approximates zero, it is almost certain that the option will be used
in the contract period. As such, the only income for the keyword is from the option
price, which in this case is close to the CPC in the auction market (discounted back to
t=0). On the other hand, if the fixed CPC is very high, it is almost certain that the option
won’t be used. In this case, the option price pi → 0 and the probability of exercising the
option P(EQt [C(T )] ≥ F ) → 0. Hence, D(F ) is zero. However, under the non-GBM
dynamics, the point F = EQt [C(T )] is not the optimal value that gives the maximum
D(F ), which indicates that arbitrage may occur.
Next, Figure 4.9 illustrates an empirical example a 2-keyword ad option. The
candidate keywords are ‘non profit debt consolidation’ and ‘canon 5d”. Figure 4.9(a)
tells that the higher the fixed CPCs the lower is the option price (even though the option
price is less sensitive to the keyword ‘canon 5d”) and it achieves the maximum when
all the fixed CPCs are zeros. This monotone results are as same as the 1-keyword
options. Figure 4.9(b) then shows the revenue difference curve of the search engine,
where the red star represents the value where F1 = EQt [C1(T )] and F2 = E
Q
t [C2(T )].
The expected revenue differences are all non-negative, showing that this 2-keyword ad
option is beneficial to the search engine’s revenue. However, the red star point is not
the maximum difference revenue. This is different to we see in 1-keyword ad options.
For higher dimensional ad options (i.e., n ≥ 3), we cannot graphically examine the
revenue difference. However, based on the earlier discussions, we can summarize two
properties. First, there are boundary values of the revenue differences. If every Fi → 0,
D(F) → 0; and if every Fi → ∞, D(F) → 0. Second, there exists a maximum
revenue difference value even though this may not at the point where Fi = EQt [Ci(T )].
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Hence, compared to only keyword auctions, proper setting the fixed CPCs can increase
the search engine’s expected revenue.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed a novel framework to provide flexible guaranteed deliveries
for sponsored search, from which both buy and sell sides can benefit. On the buy side,
advertisers are able to secure a certain number of clicks from their targeted keywords
in the future and can decide how to advertise later. They can be released from auction
campaigns and can manage price risk under the given budgets. On the sell side, search
engine can sell the future clicks in advance and can receive a more stable and increased
expected revenue over time. In addition, advertisers would be more loyal to a search
engine due to the contractual relationships, which has the potential to boost the search
engine’s revenue on the long run.
We also believe that the proposed ad options will soon be welcomed by the spon-
sored search market. Several similar but different developments appeared in the display
digital markets are able to support our point of view. They are:
09/2013: AOL’s Programmatic Upfront3.
03/2013: OpenX Programmatic Guarantee [OpenX, 2013].
10/2012: Adslot Media’s Programmatic Direct Media Buying4.
10/2012: Shiny Ads Direct’s End-to-end Programmatic Direct Advertising Platform5.
10/2012: iSOCKET’s Programmatic Direct6.
Our work differs to the above developments in many aspects. First, we focus on spon-
sored search while they are for display advertising. Second, the proposed ad options
provide flexible guaranteed deliveries (e.g., multi-keyword targeting, multi-click exer-
cise, early exercise, no obligation of exercise) while other recent developments do not
provide such new features.
Our work leaves several directions for future research. First, to address the limita-
tions of GBM, other stochastic processes tailored to some specific keywords are worth
3http://www.aolnetworks.com/programmaticupfront.
4https://media.adslot.com/marketplace.
5http://www.shinyads.com/solutions.
6https://www.isocket.com/programmatic-direct.
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studying, such as the jump-diffusion model [Kou, 2002]. The most challenging part
of this future research is that the underlying model is multi-dimensional and needs to
be computational fast. Second, it would be interesting to discuss an optimal pricing
and allocation model of ad options so that a search engine can algorithmically manipu-
late the limited future clicks in front of uncertain demand. Third, the game-theoretical
pricing of ad options can be another direction.
4.7 Chapter Appendix
4.7.1 Proof of the No-Early Exercise Property for the Ad Option
Eq. (4.3) can be rewritten as Φ(x) = max{x − f , 0}, where x = [x1, . . . , xn]T and
f = [f1, . . . , fn]
T. It is not difficult to find that Φ(x) is multivariate convex. Let
0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 and let y = [y1, . . . , yn]T, if the elements of vector a = y − x are all
non-negative, we have
Φ
(
λx+ (1− λ)y) ≤ λΦ(x) + (1− λ)Φ(y).
If taking y = [0, . . . , 0]T, and using the fact that Φ(0) = 0, we obtain
Φ(λx) ≤ λΦ(x), for all xi ≥ 0, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1.
For 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T , we have 0 ≤ e−r(t−s) ≤ 1, and then
EQs
[
e−r(t−s)Φ
(
X(t)
)] ≥ EQs [Φ(e−r(t−s)X(t))]
≥ Φ(EQs [e−r(t−s)X(t)]) (by the Jenen’s Inequality)
= Φ
(
ersEQs
[
e−rtX(t)
])
,
where EQs [·] is the conditional expectation with respect to time s under the risk-neutral
probability Q. As e−rtX(t) is a martingale under Q [Bjo¨rk, 2009], we have
Φ
(
ersEQs
[
e−rtX(t)
])
= Φ
(
erse−rsX(s)
)
= Φ
(
X(s)
)
.
Therefore, we obtain EQs
[
e−r(t−s)Φ
(
X(t)
)] ≥ Φ(X(s)), showing that e−rtΦ(X(t))
is a sub-martingale under Q. This tells that we can price the proposed ad option as
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same as its European structure, focusing on the payoff on the contract expiration date.
For the detailed definitions of martingale and sub-martingale, see Bjo¨rk [2009].
4.7.2 Derivation of the Ad Option Pricing Formula
As the proposed ad option complements the existing keyword auctions, there may exist
a situation that some advertisers make guaranteed profits from the difference of costs
between the option and auctions without taking any risk. This situation is called the
arbitrage opportunity [Varian, 1987]. Therefore, we must fairly evaluate the option so
that arbitrage is eliminated.
We consider the advertiser buys a n-keyword m-click ad option. At time t, the
difference between the option value and the market value of candidate keywords can be
expressed as
Π(t) = V (t,C(t);F , T,m)−
n∑
i=1
ψi(t)Ci(t), (4.21)
where ψi(t) represents the number of clicks needed for the keyword Ki such that∑
i ψi(t) = m. Here we call Π(t) as the value difference process. As in Eq. (4.3)
we consider the value of a n-keyword m-click option as the sum of m independent n-
keyword 1-click options, for the mathematical convenience, we can rewrite Eq. (4.21)
as follows
Π(t) =m
(
V (t,C(t);F , T, 1)−
n∑
i=1
∆iCi(t)
)
, (4.22)
where ∆i represents the probability that the click goes for the keyword Ki and∑n
i=1 ∆i = 1. The changes of Π over a very short period of time dt is
dΠ(t) = m
(
∂V
∂t
dt+
1
2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
σiσjρijCiCj
∂2V
∂Ci∂Cj
dt+
n∑
i=1
∂V
∂Ci
dCi −
n∑
i=1
∆idCi
)
.
(4.23)
We can remove the uncertain components in dΠ(t) if choosing ∆i = ∂V/∂Ci. This
is called delta hedging in financial option pricing [Wilmott, 2006]. Therefore, Π(t) is
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now a risk-less process over time
dΠ(t) = m
(
∂V
∂t
+
1
2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
σiσjρijCiCj
∂2V
∂Ci∂Cj
)
dt. (4.24)
Consider if the advertiser has no initial fund. He borrows the money from a bank
at the risk-less bank interest rate r. Then the interest of this debt is
dΠ(t) = rΠ(t)dt = rm
(
V −
n∑
i=1
∂V
∂Ci
Ci
)
dt. (4.25)
Eqs. (4.24) and (4.25) should be equal otherwise arbitrage exists. If the risk-less
growth rate of the value difference process is larger than the risk-less bank interest rate,
the advertiser can obtain arbitrage by: (i) borrowing the money from bank at interest
rate r to buy an ad option first; (ii) selling the ad option later to repay the bank interest.
In the case when the risk-less growth rate of the value difference process is smaller than
the risk-less bank interest rate, the advertiser can obtain the risk-less surplus by: (i)
selling short an ad option first and deposit the revenue into bank; (ii) using the deposit
money to buy the clicks of underlying keywords later. In either case, the advertiser can
finally receive a risk-less surplus; therefore, arbitrage exists.
Solving Eqs. (4.24)-(4.25) gives a parabolic partial differential equation (PDE) for
the no-arbitrage equilibrium as follows
∂V
∂t
+ r
n∑
i=1
∂V
∂Ci
Ci +
1
2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∂2V
∂Ci∂Cj
σiσjρijCiCj − rV = 0.
The PDE satisfies the boundary condition in Eq. (4.3). We can employing the multidi-
mensional Feynman-Kac˘ stochastic representation [Bjo¨rk, 2009] to obtain the solution
V (t,C(t);F , T, 1) = e−r(T−t)EQt [Φ(C(T ))],
where EQt [·] is the conditional expectation with respect to time t under the risk-neutral
probability Q. Under this, the process Ci(t) is rewritten as
dCi(t) = rCi(t)dt+ σiCi(t)dW
Q
i (t),
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where WQi (t) is the standard Brownian motion under Q. Therefore, the option price pi0
can be calculated by
pi0 = V (0,C(0);F , T,m) = mV (0,C(0);F , T, 1) = me
−rTEQ0 [Φ(C(T ))].
4.7.3 Option Pricing Formulas for Special Cases
If there is only one candidate keyword (i.e. n = 1), Eq. (4.6) is equivalent to the
Black-Scholes-Merton (BSM) pricing formula for an European call option [Black and
Scholes, 1973, Merton, 1973], so we have
pi0 = mC(0)N [ζ1]−mFe−rTN [ζ2], (4.26)
where ζ1 = 1σ√T
(
ln{C(0)/F}+ (r + σ2
2
)T
)
and ζ2 = ζ1 − σ
√
T .
If there are two candidate keywords (i.e. n = 2), Eq. (4.6) contains a bivari-
ate normal distribution. We can use the formula from a dual-strike European call op-
tion [Zhang, 1998] to calculate the option price, given by
pi0 = mC1(0)
∫ ζ1+σ1√T
−∞
f(u)N
[
q1(u+ σ1
√
T )− ρσ1
√
T + ρu√
1− ρ2
]
du
+mC2(0)
∫ ζ2+σ2√T
−∞
f(v)N
[
q2(u+ σ2
√
T )− ρσ1
√
T + ρv√
1− ρ2
]
dv
−me−rT
(
F1
∫ ζ1
−∞
f(u)N
[
q1(u) + ρu√
1− ρ2
]
du+ F2
∫ ζ2
−∞
f(v)N
[
q2(v) + ρv√
1− ρ2
]
dv
)
,
(4.27)
where
q1(u) =
1
σ2
√
T
(
ln
{
F2 − F1 + C1(0)e(r− 12σ21)T−uσ1
√
T
C2(0)
}
− (r − 1
2
σ22)T
)
,
q2(u) =
1
σ1
√
T
(
ln
{
F1 − F2 + C2(0)e(r− 12σ22)T−vσ2
√
T
C1(0)
}
− (r − 1
2
σ21)T
)
,
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ζ1 =
1
σ1
√
T
(
ln{C1(0)/F1}+ (r − 1
2
σ21)T
)
,
ζ2 =
1
σ2
√
T
(
ln{C2(0)/F2}+ (r − 1
2
σ22)T
)
.
Eq. (4.27) appears somewhat complicated and we can further approximate the op-
tion price by using some polynomial functions. More detailed discussions are provided
by Zhang [1998].
Chapter 5
Lattice Methods for Pricing Display
Ad Options
This chapter studies an ad option for display advertising. Section 5.1 introduces the
background and indicates the problem. Section 5.2 investigates several one-factor lat-
tice methods reviewed in Table 2.2, which are all based on the GBM underlying model.
Section 5.3 discusses our proposed lattice method for pricing a display ad option with
the SV underlying model. We present several experimental results in Section 5.4 and
summarise the chapter in Section 5.5. Some important mathematical results are pro-
vided in Section 5.6.
5.1 Introduction
Options, as a concept, have been introduced recently into online advertising to solve
the non-guaranteed delivery problem as well as provide advertisers with greater flexi-
bility. Moon and Kwon [2010] focused on an option for advertisers to make a choice
between CPM and CPC, whereas Wang and Chen [2012] and Chen et al. [2014a] pro-
posed ad options between buying and non-buying the future impressions. In practice,
the latter has been implemented as a “First Look” tactic that is widely offered by pub-
lishers who offer prioritised access to selected advertisers within an open RTB market
environment [Yuan et al., 2013]. Instead of the winning impression going to the high-
est bid in RTB, “First Look” affords first the right of refusal for an impression within
an exchange based on a pre-negotiated floor or fixed price. If a buyer requests it, he
is guaranteed to win the impression. Formally, an ad option is a contract in which an
advertiser can have a right but not obligation to purchase future impressions or clicks
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from a specific ad slot or keyword at a pre-specified price. The pre-negotiated price is
usually called the strike price in finance. In display advertising, the price can be charged
as either a CPM or CPC depending on the underlying ad format. The corresponding
winning payment price of impressions or clicks from real-time auctions is called the
underlying price. The publisher or search engine grants this right in exchange for a
certain amount of upfront fee, called the option price. Options are more flexible than
guaranteed contracts as on the delivery date, if the advertiser thinks that the spot market
is more beneficial, he can join online auctions as a bidder and his cost of not using an
ad option is only the option price.
When evaluating ad options, the previous research [Wang and Chen, 2012, Chen
et al., 2014a] is mostly restricted in their usage to those situations where the underlying
price follows a GBM [Samuelson, 1965b]. According to Yuan et al. [2013], Yuan
et al. [2014] and Chen et al. [2014b], there are only a very small number of ad slots or
keywords whose CPM or CPC satisfies the GBM assumption. Therefore, the previous
studies fail to provide an effective unified framework that covers general situations.
In this chapter, we address the issue and provide a more general pricing frame-
work. Our option pricing is based on lattice methods and uses a stochastic volatility
(SV) model to describe the underlying price movement for the cases where the GBM
assumption is not valid. Based on the SV model, a censored binomial lattice is con-
structed for option pricing. We also examine several binomial and trinomial lattice
methods to price a display ad option with the GBM underlyings and deduce a close-
form solution to examine the convergence performance of these lattice methods. Our
developments are validated by experiments using real advertising data. We examine the
fitness of the underlying model, and illustrate that the options provide a more flexible
way of selling and buying ads. In particular, we show that an advertiser can have better
deliveries in a bull market, where the underlying price increases. On the other hand, a
publisher or search engine is able to reduce the revenue volatility over time. In a bear
market, where the underlying price decreases, there is a growth in total revenue.
5.2 Lattices for the GBM Underlying Model
This section introduces the basic settings of the lattice based option pricing framework
in the context of display advertising. We examine the previous lattice methods based
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Table 5.1: Summary of key notations in Chapter 5.
Notation Description
T Option expiration date (in terms of year).
n Total number of time steps and the length of each time step is ∆t = T/n.
r̂, r Constant risk-less interest rate: r̂ is the discrete-time interest rate in ∆t and r˜ =
1 + r̂; r is a continuous-time interest rate such that er∆t = r˜.
u,m, d State transition scale in upward, unchanged and downward movement.
q1, . . . , qn Risk-neutral transition probability, nodes are labelled from top to bottom.
Q{i}(tk) Risk-neutral probability on each node, i = 1, . . . , k + 1.
Mi,M(t) Mi is CPM at time step i, i = 0, . . . , n; M(t) is CPM at time t.
Ci, C(t) Ci is CPC at time step i; C(t) is CPC at time t.
H Constant CTR.
Ri Revenue in time step i, i = 0, . . . , n (see Section 5.6.1).
Φn Option payoff on the expiration date (i.e., the time step n).
FM , FC Strike price in terms of CPM, CPC.
pi0 Option price at time 0 (i.e., the time step 0).
µ, σ, σ(t) Constant drift, constant volatility and stochastic volatility for the underlying price.
κ, θ, δ Constant speed, long-term mean, and volatility for the stochastic volatility model.
on the GBM assumption (see Table 2.2) and provide a comparative analysis of their
convergence performances to a closed-form pricing formula (see Section 5.6.4). For
the reader’s convenience, the key notations used throughout the chapter are described
in Table 5.1. It is worth mentioning that we here discuss the case where an ad option
allows its buyer to pay a fixed CPC for display impressions. Therefore, the strike price
of the option is the fixed CPC and the underlying price is the uncertain winning payment
CPM from RTB, where each single impression being auctioned off is paid at the second
highest bid [Google, 2011, Yuan et al., 2013]. Other ad option cases can be discussed
in the same manner. For example, the case where an ad option allows its buyer to pay
a fixed CPM for display impressions, or the case where an ad option allows its buyer to
pay a fixed CPM or CPC for clicks.
5.2.1 Binomial Lattice
Suppose that an advertiser buys a display ad option in time 0 which allows him to
purchase several impressions from a publisher’s ad slot in time 1 at a fixed CPC, de-
noted by FC . As impressions are normally auctioned off at a CPM value, the un-
derlying price is the winning payment CPM from RTB, denoted by Mi, i = 0, 1.
In time 1, the underlying price may rise or fall, denoted by M{u}1 or M
{d}
1 . Let’s
consider the upward case. If M{u}1 /(1000H) ≥ FC , the advertiser will exercise the
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option; if M{u}1 /(1000H) < F
C , he will not exercise the option but join RTB in-
stead. Note that H represents a constant CTR; therefore, the underlying and strike
prices can be compared on the same measurement basis. Mathematically, we use
the option payoff function Φ{u}1 to describe the above decision making, Φ
{u}
1 :=
max{M{u}1 /(1000H)− FC , 0}. Similarly, if the winning payment CPM moves down-
ward, the option payoff Φ{d}1 := max{M{d}1 /(1000H)− FC , 0}.
We adopt a general economic setting and assume that the advertiser is risk-neutral
so he exercises the ad option only if the option payoff is maximised [Wilmott, 2006,
Narahari, 2014]. In finance, the so-called risk-neutral probability measure [Bjo¨rk,
2009] is defined by the statement that the expected risky return of an asset is equal to
a risk-less bank interest return. In the online advertising environment, the risk-neutral
probability measure Q = (q, 1− q) satisfies the following equation
r˜M0 ≡ quM0 + (1− q)dM0, (5.1)
where r˜ = (1 + r̂) is the risk-less return over the period from time 0 to time 1, u =
M
{u}
1 /M0 and d = M
{d}
1 /M0 are the movement scales of CPM. Therefore, we can
obtain the risk-neutral transition probability q = (r˜ − d)/(u − d). Note that here q
equals to q1 in Table 2.2, which describes the probability that CPM moves upward
in time 1. Since the option value can be considered as a bivariate function of time and
underlying price, the option value at time 0 can be obtained by discounting the expected
option value at time 1 under Q = (q, 1− q) [Bjo¨rk, 2009, see Martingale]. The option
value at time 1 is actually the option payoff; therefore, the option price at time 0 can be
obtained by discounting the expected payoff, that is
pi0 = r˜
−1EQ[Φ1] = r˜−1
(
qΦ
{u}
1 + (1− q)Φ{d}1
)
. (5.2)
This option price pi0 is fair because it rules out arbitrage [Varian, 1987, Bjo¨rk,
2009]. Arbitrage means that an advertiser can obtain a profit larger or smaller than the
risk-less bank interest rate with certainty. Consider if the option price is overestimated,
i.e., pi0 > r˜−1(qΦ
{u}
1 + (1− q)Φ{d}1 ), the advertiser can sell short an ad option at time 0
and save the money into bank to get the risk-less profit r˜pi0 − (qΦ{u}1 + (1 − q)Φ{d}1 ).
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Figure 5.1: Binomial lattice for CPM. Detailed description of notations is given in Table 5.1.
Converse strategies can be used to obtain arbitrage if the option price is underestimated.
Up to this point, we have discussed the option pricing framework that is the one-step
binomial method, initially proposed by Sharpe [1978]. Eq. (5.2) can also be derived
from the perspective of a publisher who wants to hedge the revenue risk incurred from
CPM changes (see Section 5.6.1 for more details).
For a multi-step binomial lattice, as shown in Figure 5.1, the possible values of
CPM and the corresponding risk-neutral transition probabilities can be estimated di-
rectly by investigating various combinations of each one-step model, so the option
price pi0 can be obtained as follows
pi0 = r˜
−n
(
n∑
j=0
f {j}n Φ
{j}
n
)
(where f {j}n is the risk-netural probability for Φ
{j}
n )
= r˜−n
(
n∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
qj(1− q)n−j max
{
ujdn−jM0
1000H
− FC , 0
})
.
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Figure 5.2: Trinomial lattice for CPM. Detailed description of notations is given in Table 5.1.
If for any j ≥ j∗, ujdn−jM0/(1000H) ≥ FC , then
pi0 = r˜
−n
(
n∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
qj(1− q)n−j u
jdn−jM0
1000H
− FC
n∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
qj(1− q)n−j
)
=
M0
1000H
n∑
j=j∗
(
n
j
)(
qu
r˜
)j(
(1− q)d
r
)n−j
− FC r˜−n
n∑
j=j∗
(
n
j
)
qj(1− q)n−j
=
M0
1000H
n∑
j=j∗
(
n
j
)
q˜j(1− q˜)n−j − FC r˜−n
n∑
j=j∗
(
n
j
)
qj(1− q)n−j
=
M0
1000H
ψ(j∗, n, q˜)− FC r˜−nψ(j∗, n, q), (5.3)
where q˜ = q × (u/r˜). If each time step ∆t = T/n is sufficiently small, a continuous-
time closed-form formula for pi0 can be obtained (see 5.6.2 for more details), which
is very similar to the BSM option pricing formula [Black and Scholes, 1973, Merton,
1973].
5.2.2 Trinomial Lattice
Figure 5.2 shows a trinomial lattice. There are 6 parameters: u,m, d are state move-
ment scales; q1, q2, q3 are the corresponding risk-neutral transition probabilities. These
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parameters uniquely determine the movement of CPM, which then determines a unique
value of an ad option written on CPM. They must be restricted such that the constructed
trinomial lattice converges to the log-normal distribution of CPM in continuous time
(i.e., the GBM assumption). The moment matching technique [Cox et al., 1979] can be
used to define the basic restrictions as follows:
q1 + q2 + q3 = 1, (5.4)
q1u+ q2m+ q3d = γ = e
r∆t, (5.5)
q1u
2 + q2m
2 + q3d
2 = γ2ζ = e2r∆teσ
2∆t (5.6)
where 0 ≤ q1, q2, q3 ≤ 1. Since there are 6 parameters, 3 additional equations are
necessary to define a unique solution. In this research, we examine the additional con-
ditions discussed by previous research [Boyle, 1988, Kamrad and Ritchken, 1991, Tian,
1993] and use the same settings to price a display ad option. For the sake of complete-
ness, a simple algorithm is provided in Section 5.6.3, which describes how to construct
a trinomial lattice for the underlying price and then how to calculate the option value
backward iteratively.
5.2.3 Discussion
The main results of related binomial and trinomial lattices are presented in Table 2.2.
In Figure 5.3, we compare the convergence performance of these lattice methods for
pricing a display ad option with the GBM underlying. The BSM-like closed-form so-
lution (see Eq. (5.34) in Section 5.6.2) is used as the gold standard to examine how
quickly that the option price calculated based on a lattice can approximate its closed-
form value. Figure 5.3(a) illustrates the situation where the option value at time 0 is
in the money (i.e., M0/(1000H) ≥ FC) and Figure 5.3(b) shows the out of the money
case (i.e., M0/(1000H) < FC). Several findings are worth mentioning here. First,
the convergence rate of the trinomial lattice is faster than that of the binomial lattice;
however, more nodes need to be computed for the former, i.e., (n+1)2 nodes for the tri-
nomial lattice while there are only (n+1)(n+2)/2 nodes for binomial lattice. Second,
we find that the Tian-TRIN [Tian, 1993] model has a better convergence performance
than the others.
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Figure 5.3: Comparison of the convergence performance of the binomial and trinomial lattices
for pricing a display ad option with the GBM underlying: (a) the option value at time 0 is in the
money where M0 = 2, FC = 0.005, CTR = 0.3, r = 0.05, T = 31/365 and σ = 0.5; and
(b) the option value at time 0 is out of the money where M0 = 2, FC = 0.075, CTR = 0.3,
r = 0.05, T = 31/365 and σ = 0.5. Detailed descriptions of notations are provided in
Table 5.1.
5.3 Censored Binomial Lattice for the SV Underlying
When the GBM assumption is not valid empirically, the SV model can be used to
describe the underlying price movement. Let us extend the case whereby an ad option
allows its buyer to pay a fixed CPC for display impressions. The SV model for the
uncertain winning payment CPM (i.e., M(t)) can be expressed as follows:
dM(t) = µM(t)dt+ σ(t)M(t)dW (t), (5.7)
dσ(t) = κ(θ − σ(t))dt+ δ
√
σ(t)dZ(t), (5.8)
where µ is the constant drift of CPM, σ(t) is the volatility of CPM, W (t) and Z(t) are
the standard Brownian motion under the real world probability measure P, and κ, θ, δ
are the volatility parameters. The drift factor κ(θ−σ(t)) ensures the mean reversion of
σ(t) towards its long-term value θ. The volatility factor δ
√
σ(t) avoids the possibility
of negative σ(t) for all positive values of κ and θ.
Let X(t) = ln(M(t)), the following risk-neutral form of Eq. (5.7) can be obtained
(see Section 5.6.5.1 for more details):
dX(t) =
(
r − σ
2(t)
2
)
dt+ σ(t)dWQ(t), (5.9)
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Algorithm 5.1 Censored binomial lattice method for pricing a display ad option with
the SV underlying. Detailed description of notations is provided in Table 5.1.
function OPTIONPRICINGCENSOREDBINLATTICE(M0, σ0, κ, θ, δ,H, T, n, r, FC)
∆t← T/n; r˜ ← er∆t;
for k ← 0 to n− 1 do
i ∈ nodes in time step k
if i = 1 then
Step ¬;
else
Step ­;
end if
end for
pi0 ← Eq. (5.21) (see Step ®);
end function
where r is the constant continuous-time risk-less interest rate and WQ is a standard
Brownian motion under the risk-neutral probability measure Q. The process X(t) can
be weakly approximated by a series of binomial processes, say X˜(ti), i = 1, . . . , n. The
approximation conditions are discussed by Nelson and Ramaswamy [1990] (see 5.6.4
for more details).
In Algorithm 5.1, we present our method of calculating the option price for a
display ad option whose underlying is the SV model. Simply, a binomial lattice for
X˜(ti) is first constructed to approximates X(t) weakly. The lattice is constructed from
time step 0 to time step n, and at each time step, nodes are calculated from top to
bottom. In the following discussion, we explain the details of Steps ¬-®. Figure 5.4
illustrates the calculation from time step k to time step k + 1.
Step ¬ We start the estimation from the first node X˜{1}(tk) in Figure 5.4, whose
two successors can be expressed as follows
X˜{1,u}(tk + ∆t) = (J{1}(tk) + 1)σ(tk + ∆t)
√
∆t+
(
r − σ
2(tk + ∆t)
2
)
∆t, (5.10)
X˜{1,d}(tk + ∆t) = (J{1}(tk)− 1)σ(tk + ∆t)
√
∆t+
(
r − σ
2(tk + ∆t)
2
)
∆t, (5.11)
where J{1}(tk)σ(tk + ∆t)
√
∆t is the point on the grid closest to X˜{1}(tk), given by
J{1}(tk) = inf
J∗∈N
∣∣∣ J∗ × σ(tk + ∆t)√∆t− X˜{1}(tk) ∣∣∣, (5.12)
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Figure 5.4: Censored binomial lattice for the SV underlying. Detailed description of notations
is provided in Table 5.1.
and σ(tk + ∆t) can be estimated by (see Section 5.6.5.2)
σ(tk + ∆t) = σ(t0)e
−κ(tk+∆t) + θ(1− e−κ(tk+∆t)). (5.13)
Eqs. (5.10)-(5.11) verify the conditions that a binomial lattice can be used to
approximate a general diffusion process (see Eqs. (5.37)-(5.39) in Section 5.6.4).
Eqs. (5.10)-(5.11) can be rewritten in terms of their conditional increments as follows:
X˜{1,u}(tk + ∆t)− X˜{1}(tk) = σ(tk + ∆t)
√
∆t−K{1}(tk) +
(
r − σ
2(tk + ∆t)
2
)
∆t,
(5.14)
X˜{1,d}(tk + ∆t)− X˜{1}(tk) = − σ(tk + ∆t)
√
∆t−K{1}(tk) +
(
r − σ
2(tk + ∆t)
2
)
∆t,
(5.15)
where K{1}(tk) is the grid adjusting parameter for the successors of the first node at
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time tk. As shown in Figure 5.4, the value of K{i}(tk), i = 1, 2, . . . , 2k − 1, can be
either positive or negative, To satisfy the approximation condition set in Eq. (5.36) (see
Section 5.6.4), the following equation holds:
E
[
X˜{1}(tk + ∆t)− X˜{1}(tk) | F(tk)
]
=
(
r − σ
2(tk + ∆t)
2
)
∆t (5.16)
Then, the following system of equations is obtained
(
σ(tk + ∆t)
√
∆t−K{1}(tk)
) q{1}1 (tk)
Q{1}(tk)
+
(
− σ(tk + ∆t)
√
∆t−K{1}(tk)
) q{1}2 (t)
Q{1}(t)
= 0,
q
{1}
1 (tk) + q
{1}
2 (tk) = Q
{1}(t),
where q{1}1 (tk) and q
{1}
2 (tk) are the risk-neutral probabilities that the successor of the
first node at time tk rises or falls in time tk + ∆t, and Q{1}(tk) is the risk-neutral
probability for the first node at time tk. Solving the above equations gives
q
{1}
1 (tk) =

Q{1}(tk)
2
(
1 + K
{1}(tk)
σ(tk+∆t)
√
∆t
)
, if 0 ≤ Q{1}(tk)
2
(
1 + K
{1}(tk)
σ(tk+∆t)
√
∆t
)
≤ Q{1}(tk),
0, if Q
{1}(tk)
2
(
1 + K
{1}(tk)
σ(tk+∆t)
√
∆t
)
< 0,
Q{1}(tk), if
Q{1}(tk)
2
(
1 + K
{1}(tk)
σ(tk+∆t)
√
∆t
)
≥ Q{1}(tk),
= max
{
0,min
{
Q{1}(tk),
Q{1}(tk)
2
(
1 +
K{1}(tk)
σ(tk + ∆t)
√
∆t
)}}
, (5.17)
q
{1}
2 (tk) = Q
{1}(tk)− q{1}1 (tk). (5.18)
Eqs. (5.17) and (5.18) show that transition probabilities q{1}1 (tk) and q
{1}
2 (tk) are
censored in the approximation.
Step ­ We then move to other nodes and construct their successors in the same
manner. However, as some nodes in the next step are recombining, the following equa-
tions hold for 1 ≤ i ≤ k:
X˜{i,d}(tk + ∆t) = (J{i}(tk)− 1)σ(tk + ∆t)
√
∆t+
(
r − σ
2(tk + ∆t)
2
)
∆t,
= X˜{i+1,u}(tk + ∆t) = (J{i+1}(tk) + 1)σ(tk + ∆t)
√
∆t+
(
r − σ
2(tk + ∆t)
2
)
∆t,
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therefore, J{i+1}(tk) = J{i}(tk) − 2 and K{i+1}(tk) = J{i+1}(tk)σ(tk + ∆t)
√
∆t −
X˜{i+1}(tk). The transition probabilities for the node X˜{i+1}(tk) can be given by
q
{i}
1 (tk) = max
{
0,min
{
Q{i}(tk),
Q{i}(tk)
2
(
1 +
K{i}(tk)
σ(tk + ∆t)
√
∆t
)}}
, (5.19)
q
{i}
2 (tk) = Q
{i}(tk)− q{i}1 (tk). (5.20)
Step ® We follow the calculation steps ¬-­ for each time step until the contract
expiration date, and finally obtainQ{i}(tn) and X˜{i}(tn), for all nodes (i = 1, . . . , n+1)
at time step n. Then the option price can be obtained as follows:
pi0 = r˜
−n
n+1∑
i=1
Q{i}(tn) max
{
1
1000H
eX˜
{i}(tn) − FC , 0
}
. (5.21)
Similar to Algorithm 5.2, the option value can also be calculated recursively over the
lattice.
In the above discussion, we follow Florescu and Viens [2008] to construct the
binomial lattice and use variables K{i}(tk) and J{i}(tk) to tune the grid so that the
constructed framework is recombining. In the meantime, it satisfies the approxima-
tion conditions proposed by Nelson and Ramaswamy [1990]. We here use a modified
mean-reverting process (i.e., the Cox-Ingersoll-Rubinstein (CIR) model [Cox et al.,
1985]) for the volatility underlying so that the volatility will always be non-negative.
We also simplify the calculation of node parameters in Florescu and Viens [2008].
Since the transition probabilities are censored directly at each node, K{i}(tk), J{i}(tk)
and Q{i}(tk) can be calculated sequentially from top to bottom alongside the lattice
construction for the underlying price. Once the upper node is calculated, it can be used
to update the value of its lower node. Hence, the risk-neutral probability distribution
Q{i}(tk) for each node can be quickly computed as follows:
Q{i}(tk + ∆t) =

q
{1}
1 (tk), if i = 1,
q
{i−1}
2 (tk) + q
{i}
1 (tk), if 1 < i < k + 1,
q
{k+1}
2 (tk), if i = k + 1,
and Q(t0) = 1.
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Figure 5.5 presents an empirical example of constructing a censored binomial lat-
tice for pricing a display ad option written on an ad slot from a SSP in the UK. The
given values of the model parameters are estimated from the training data. Figure 5.5(a)
shows a censored binomial lattice for the underlying CPM and Figure 5.5(b) illustrates
how the option value is calculated backward iteratively from the expatriation date to
time 0. For the sake of comparison, Figure 5.6 illustrates the binomial lattices con-
structed by the CRR model with the same parameter settings. Obviously, the changing
volatility can be found in Figure 5.5(a) while 5.6(a) exhibits a constant volatility over
time. We find that the option price given by the SV model is slightly smaller than that
of the CRR model. This is because the long-term mean value of volatility is 0.2959,
smaller than its initial value 0.8723. Therefore, the drift drags the volatility downside
to its long-term level and the option value based on the SV model contains less risk
than the CRR model.
5.4 Experiments
Our experimental results are presented in this section. We examine the GBM assump-
tion with the real advertising data, compare the goodness-of-fit of the underlying mod-
els, analyse if an advertiser can have better deliveries under a fixed daily budget, and
discuss the effects on the publisher’s (or search engine’s) revenue.
5.4.1 Datasets and Experimental Design
The following two datasets are used in the experiments (see Table 5.2): a RTB dataset
from a SSP in the UK; and a sponsored search dataset from Google AdWords. The RTB
dataset contains all advertisers’ bids and the corresponding winning payment CPMs
(per transaction). The Google dataset is obtained by using Google’s Traffic Estimation
service [Yuan and Wang, 2012], in which we remove 21 keywords that have over 30%
missing values and also 115 keywords whose CPCs are all zero.
Tables 5.3-5.4 illustrate our experimental settings. Each dataset is divided into
several experimental groups, each of which consists of one training, one development
and one test set. The model parameters are estimated in the training set. Display ad
options are priced in the development set. The actual bids in the test set are used to
examine the priced options. The default value of CTR in the experiments is set to 0.03.
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Figure 5.5: Empirical example of binomial lattices for an ad slot from the SSP dataset: (a) the
censored binomial lattice for CPM based on the SV model, where r = 0.05, T = 0.0384, n =
14, CPM = 0.7417, σ0 = 0.8723, κ = 96.4953, θ = 0.2959, δ = 14.9874; (b) the censored
binomial lattice for the option value. The model parameters are estimated based on the training
data.
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Figure 5.6: Example of binomial lattices for the same ad slot in Figure 5.5: (a) the CRR bino-
mial lattice for CPM based on the GBM model, where r = 0.05, T = 0.0384, n = 14, CPM =
0.7417, σ0 = 0.8723. Here we use the same parameters’ values in Figure 5.5; (b) the CRR bi-
nomial lattice for the option value.
5.4.2 Fitness of GBM and SV Models
The following two conditions hold if the GBM assumption is valid empiri-
cally [Marathe and Ryan, 2005]: (i) the normality of the logarithm ratios of the
winning payment price1; and (ii) the independence of the logarithm ratios from the
previous data. Normality can be graphically checked by a histogram and Q-Q plot, and
be statistically verified by the Shapiro-Wilk test [Shapiro and Wilk, 1965]. To examine
the independence, we use the autocorrelation function (ACF) [Tsay, 2005] and the
1The logarithm ratio of winning payment price Li is defined by Li = ln(Mi+1/Mi) or Li =
ln(Ci+1/Ci).
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Table 5.2: Summary of datasets for experiments.
Dataset SSP Google AdWords
Period 08/01/2013 - 14/02/2013 26/11/2011 - 14/01/2013
No. of ad slots or keywords 31 557
No. of advertisers 374 ×
No. of impressions 6646643 ×
No. of bids 33043127 ×
Winning payment price
√ √
Bid quote GBP/CPM GBP/CPC
Table 5.3: Experimental settings of the SSP dataset.
Training set (31 days) Development & test set (7 days)
08/01/2013-07/02/2013 08/02/2013-14/02/2013
Table 5.4: Experimental settings of the Google AdWords dataset.
Market Group Training set (31 days) Development & test set (31 days)
US
1 25/01/2012-24/02/2012 24/02/2012-25/03/2012
2 30/03/2012-29/04/2012 29/04/2012-31/05/2012
3 10/06/2012-12/07/2012 12/07/2012-17/08/2012
4 10/11/2012-11/12/2012 11/12/2012-10/01/2013
UK
1 25/01/2012-24/02/2012 24/02/2012-25/03/2012
2 30/03/2012-29/04/2012 29/04/2012-31/05/2012
3 12/06/2012-13/07/2012 13/07/2012-19/08/2012
4 18/10/2012-22/11/2012 22/11/2012-24/12/2012
Ljung-Box statistic [Ljung and Box, 1978]. If the winning payment price satisfies the
GBM assumption, we evaluate the ad option by using the Tian-TRIN model (or the
BSM-like closed-form formula). If the GBM assumption is not valid empirically, we
develop a SV model and price the ad option by using the censored binomial lattice
method.
Figure 5.7 presents an empirical example of testing the GBM assumption for an
ad slot from the SSP dataset, where the underlying winning CPM cannot be described
accurately as a GBM. In fact, none of the 31 ad slots in the SSP dataset satisfy the
GBM model. Therefore, we use the SV model for the ad slots in the SSP dataset.
Figure 5.8 presents an example of a keyword from the Google dataset. The keyword’s
winning CPC satisfies the GBM assumption. The log-normality of CPC is validated in
Figure 5.8(a)-(c) and the independence is confirmed by Figure 5.8(d). The overview
results of the Google dataset is shown in Figure 5.9. There are 14.25% and 17.20% of
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Figure 5.7: Empirical example of testing the GBM conditions on an ad slot from the SSP
dataset: (a) the plot of the average daily winning payment CPMs from auctions; (b) the his-
togram of the logarithm ratios of the CPM, i.e., ln(Mi+1/Mi), i = 1, . . . , n − 1; (c) the QQ
plot of the logarithm ratios; (d) the plot of the ACFs of the logarithm ratios. The Shapiro-Wilk
test is with p-value 0.0009 and the Ljung-Box test is with p-value 0.1225.
the keywords in the US and UK markets respectively that can be accurately described
by the GBM model. We will price the remaining keywords using the SV model.
Figure 5.10 gives an empirical example of the model fitness test for the situation
where the GBM assumption is not valid. We give three different instances of simulated
paths from the GBM and SV models for the same keyword. Figure 5.10(a),(c),(d) com-
pares the simulations from these two models with the actual winning payment CPCs in
real-time auctions. The smooth movement pattern of these three instances is examined
in Figure 5.10(b),(d),(f). We find that the SV model has a better fitness to the data. In
addition, we use the Euclidean distance (also called the L-2 distance) to examine the
similarity of a simulated path and the test data. The overall results of the ad slots and
keywords in our datasets are presented in Tables 5.5-5.6, showing that the SV model
has a general better fitness to the real data.
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Figure 5.8: Empirical example of testing the GBM conditions on the keyword “canon 5d”
from the Google AdWords dataset: (a) the plot of average daily winning payment CPCs; (b) the
histogram of logarithm ratios of CPC, i.e., ln(Ci+1/Ci), i = 1, . . . , n − 1; (c) the QQ plot of
the logarithm ratios; (d) the plot of the ACFs of the logarithm ratios. The Shapiro-Wilk test is
with p-value 0.2144 and the Ljung-Box test is with p-value 0.6971.
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Figure 5.9: Summary of the GBM conditions test for all keywords in the Google AdWords
dataset in (a) the US market; and (b) the UK market.
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Figure 5.10: Empirical example of comparing the fitness of GBM and SV models to the key-
word “kinect for xbox 360” from the Google AdWords dataset. The training period is from
time step 1 to 50, the development and test periods are from time step 51 to 150. Plot (a), (c),
(e) illustrates three instances of simulated paths from the estimated GBM and SV, respectively.
Plot (b), (d), (f) provides the corresponding smooth pattern and confidence interval of plot (a),
(c), (e).
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5.4.3 Delivery Performance for Advertiser
Tables 5.7-5.8 provide an empirical example that compares an advertiser’s delivery
performance between RTB and ad options. Tables 5.7 shows the advertiser’s delivery
performance in RTB with a fixed daily budget. If the supplied impressions are at same
levels and if the average winning payment CPMs increase, the advertiser will receive
fewer impressions. In Table 5.8, the advertiser buys several display ad options in ad-
vance. Consider if he purchases an ad option with expiration date 08/02/2013, he has
the right to secure impressions that will be created on 08/02/2013 at a fixed CPC. Here
we consider the advertiser uses the daily budget from the corresponding delivery date
to pay the upfront option price. Therefore, as shown in Table 5.8, the advertiser’s ad-
vertising strategy is to purchase as many ad options in advance as possible, and the
remaining daily budgets will be used on the corresponding delivery dates. Actual bids
from RTB are used to simulate the real-time feeds of the spot market, so if the market
value of a click is higher than the fixed payment, the advertiser will use ad options to
secure the needed clicks and then pay the fixed CPCs accordingly. Otherwise, the ad-
vertiser will obtain the equivalent clicks from RTB. Our example shows a “bull market”
where the average spot CPM in the test set is far higher than the initial CPM. Therefore,
the bought ad options would be actively used by the advertiser to purchase the clicks.
Compared to Table 5.7, the advertiser can receive more clicks (increased by 20.92%)
in a bull market via ad options.
The overall results are presented in Tables 5.9-5.10. For the SSP dataset, we con-
sider the ad options that allow advertisers to pay a fixed CPC to purchase impressions of
targeted ad slots. For the Google dataset, we consider the ad options that allow adver-
tisers to pay a fixed CPM to purchase clicks of their targeted keywords. To summarise,
we find that an advertiser’s daily budget can be used more effectively in a bull market
and that his delivery increases as well. The advertiser’s average cost spent on each
impression or click is reduced. In a bear market (i.e., the underlying price decreases),
the advertiser will use the ad options less (and sometimes not at all) and the maximum
cost is just the option price. It is worth noting that here we consider the ad options are
in the money at time 0 (i.e., the strike price is less than the current underlying price). In
Table 5.7, there are 4 ad slots that exhibit somewhat bear markets. However, these 4 ad
slots do not receive enough bids in the test set and the actual winning payment CPMs
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Table 5.9: Overview of the improvement in delivery performance by using ad options for all
ad slots in the SSP dataset.
Bull market Bear market
Change on used budget (%) -8.7878% –
Change on delivery of impressions (%) 6.1781% –
Table 5.10: Overview of the improvement in delivery performance by using ad options for
keywords in the Google AdWords dataset.
Market Group
Change in used budget (%) Change in delivery of impressions (%)
Bull market Bear market Bull market Bear market
US
1 0.3447% 2.3438% 9.3050% -0.1122%
2 1.7748% 3.9687% 2.3153% -2.6285%
3 0.5372% 4.8567% 44.3735% -0.0940%
4 5.6288% 29.3626% 1.6433% -1.0993%
UK
1 21.4285% 6.8940% 3.0717% -0.2523%
2 5.4426% 0.0000% 0.4419% 0.0000%
3 10.9285% 3.8474% 28.7706% -2.1066%
4 6.7155% 0.1552% 16.6955% -2.1550%
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Figure 5.11: Empirical examples of the publisher’s revenue: (a) from an ad slot in the bull
market; and (b) from an ad slot in the bear market. The sell ratio represents the percentage of
future daily impressions that are sold in advance via display ad options. Note that here the ad
slot in the bear market does not receive enough bids in the test set, so we randomly simulate
some underlying prices for the bear market.
are just around its floor reserve level (i.e., the CPM is £0.01 so the per impression price
is £0.00001). Since these prices will seriously bias the results, we do not take them into
account in the situation of a bear market.
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5.4.4 Revenue Analysis for Publisher and Search Engine
The revenue for a publisher (or search engine) is examined in this section. We consider
the revenue effects when a certain amount of future impressions or clicks can be sold in
advance. Figure 5.11 presents two empirical examples of ad slots from the SSP dataset:
one exhibits the bull market while the other shows the bear market. The sell ratio in
the figure represents the percentage of future impressions that are sold in advance via
display ad options; therefore, when the sell ratio equals zero, the publisher auctions off
all of the future impressions in RTB. Figure 5.11(a) suggests that the publisher should
sell less future impressions in advance if the future market is bull. This is because
the ad options will be exercised by advertisers in the future and the obtained revenues
from the fixed payment are less than these impressions’ market values. Of course,
the publisher can choose a certain percentage of future impressions to sell according
to his level of risk tolerance or to meet other business objectives. For example, the
publisher may be willing to sacrifice some revenues in order to increase the advertisers’
engagement in the long run. Conversely, in a bear market, as shown in Figure 5.11(b),
the publisher is advised to sell more future impressions in advance because there is
more upfront income if more display ad options are sold, and in the future advertisers
will not exercise the sold options. Therefore, the increased revenue comes from the
option price.
Based on the above analysis, the revenue effects across all ad slots and keywords
in our datasets are examined. In the experiments, the display ad options in a bull market
are priced in the money while in a bear market they are priced out of the money. The
sell ratio is set at 0.20 in a bull market while it is set at 0.80 in a bear market. The
overall results are presented in Tables 5.11-5.12, which further confirm our analysis
in the empirical examples. The average revenue is reduced in the bull market as well
as the standard deviation (i.e., one kind of revenue risk). However, as described, the
publisher (or search engine) may be willing to sacrifice some revenue to establish a
long-term relationship with advertisers. In a bear market, the average revenue increases
significantly. This is because fewer display ad options are exercised. Many premium
advertisers join RTB so that the market equilibrium is almost as same as that in an
environment with only auctions. Finally, the publisher (or search engine) earns the
upfront payment without providing guaranteed deliveries.
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Table 5.11: Overview of the improvement in revenue by selling display ad options for ad slots
in the SSP dataset.
Bull market Bear market
Change on mean (%) -7.1283% 726.3085%
Change on standard deviation (%) -2.7041% 196.0547%
Table 5.12: Overview of the improvement in revenue by selling display ad options for ad slots
in the Google AdWords dataset.
Market Group
Change in mean (%) Change in standard deviation (%)
Bull market Bear market Bull market Bear market
US
1 -20.5880% 22.3898% -0.6507% 9.3291%
2 -23.2971% 17.1898% -17.6508% 9.4175%
3 -32.8388% 69.9113% -21.9468% -2.1065%
4 -24.4710% 8.9650% -10.6024% 95.4868%
UK
1 -8.5463% 15.4155% 4.5617% 10.4116%
2 -20.0632% 4.3816% -16.0239% 6.8847%
3 -16.9050% 30.7737% -11.4811% -19.4625%
4 -21.8142% 7.6342% -19.4368% 0.3877%
5.5 Summary
In this chapter, we described a new ad option tailored to the display advertising environ-
ment. We examined several lattice methods for an ad option with the GBM underlying,
and proposed a new lattice method to price it if the underlying price does not follow
the GBM model. Our lattice method is based on the SV model which can capture
the changing volatility and mean-reverting fact of price movement. Our developments
were examined and validated by experiments using real advertising data. For future
research, we are interested in developing a lattice method that can be used to price an
ad option with the multivariate non-GBM underlying.
5.6 Chapter Appendix
5.6.1 Proof of Equivalence of the Option Price under the One-Step
Binomial Lattice
We derive the option pricing formula from the perspective of a publisher who wants
to hedge the revenue risk incurred from price changes, and prove that under the one-
step binomial lattice the derived option price is equal to the one that is calculated from
the perspective of a risk-neutral advertiser. The derivation here follows the settings
proposed by Wang and Chen [2012] and considers the case where an ad option allows
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its buyer to pay a fixed CPC for display impressions. Therefore, the strike price of
the option is the fixed CPC and the underlying price is the uncertain winning payment
CPM in online auctions. The total number of future impressions to sell is assumed to
be deterministic, denoted by SM . If the CPM in time 1 goes up, the publisher’s revenue
can be expressed as
R
{u}
1 =
{
(1− α)SM/1000M{u}1 + αSMHFM , if M{u}1 ≥ FC ,
(1− α)SM/1000M{u}1 + αSM/1000M{u}1 , if M{u}1 < FC ,
(5.22)
where α is the percentage of estimated total impressions to sell via ad op-
tions. Eq. (5.22) shows that the publisher’s revenue is a combination of guar-
anteed and non-guaranteed impressions. Eq. (5.22) can be rewritten as R{u}1 =
SM/1000M
{u}
1 − αSMHΦ{u}1 , where Φ{u}1 is the option payoff function, defined
by max{M{u}1 /(1000H) − FC , 0}, and the superscript notation {u} represents the
upward movement. Similarly, if CPM in time 1 goes down, the publisher’s revenue is
R
{d}
1 = S
M/1000M
{d}
1 − αSMHΦ{d}1 , where Φ{d}1 = max{M{d}1 /(1000H)− FC , 0}.
Since the publisher uses α to control the revenue in bull and bear markets, there
exists a value α∗ such that R{u}1 (α
∗) = R{d}1 (α
∗), then α∗ = (M{u}1 −M{d}1 )/(Φ{u}1 −
Φ
{d}
1 ). As described, the publisher’s least requirement on the valuation is that his ex-
pected future revenue (including the upfront income in terms of option prices) should
be equal to the current revenue level from auctions alone, so the following equation
holds:
R0 =
α∗SM
1000
pi0 + r˜
−1R{u}1 (α
∗) =
α∗SM
1000
pi0 + r˜
−1R{d}1 (α
∗).
The option price pi0 can then be calculated by
pi0 = r˜
−1
(
r˜M0 −M{d}1
M
{u}
1 −M{d}1
Φ
{u}
1 +
M
{u}
1 − r˜M0
M
{u}
1 −M{d}1
Φ
{d}
1
)
= r˜−1
(
r˜ − d
u− dΦ
{u}
1 +
u− r˜
u− dΦ
{d}
1
)
, (5.23)
where u = M{u}1 /M0, d = M
{u}
1 /M0. Up to this point, we have proved that the calcu-
lated option price pi0 is no-arbitrage and hedges the revenue for the publisher.
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5.6.2 Convergence of the Binomial Lattice Option Pricing Model
to the BSMModel
Hsia [1983] discussed a general proof for the convergence of the binomial lattice option
pricing model to the BSM model. His work can be used to derive a continuous-time
closed-form option pricing formula for Eq. (5.3). To simplify the discussion, we here
adopt the settings proposed by Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein [1979] and derive a BSM-like
option pricing formula for Eq. (5.3).
We consider the case where an ad option allows its buyer to pay a fixed CPC for
display impressions. Therefore, the strike price of the option is the fixed CPC and
the underlying price is the uncertain winning payment CPM in online auctions. Let
∆t = T/n, u = eσ
√
∆t > 1, d = 1/u < 1, where σ is the volatility of CPM. Let r be
the constant continuous-time risk-less interest rate and let M(t) be the continuous-time
CPM at time t. Under the risk-neutral probability measureQ, the GBM underlying can
be expressed as
dM(t) = rM(t)dt+ σM(t)dWQ(t), (5.24)
where WQ(t) is a standard Brownian motion under Q.
As described, for j ≥ j∗, j = 1, 2, . . . , n, j∗ = 1, 2, . . . , n, the advertiser will
exercise the option to buy the targeted impressions, so the following inequality holds:
M0
1000H
uj
∗−1dn−j
∗+1 < FC ≤ M0
1000H
uj
∗
dn−j
∗
, (5.25)
then (
u
d
)j∗−1
≤ 1000HF
C
M0dn
≤
(
u
d
)j∗
, (5.26)
and, taking logarithms and dividing by ln(u/d) and subtracting nq from each side gives
j∗ − 1− nq√
n
≤ ln(1000HF
C/M0)− ln(unqdn(1−q))√
n(ln(u)− ln(d)) ≤
j∗ − nq√
n
. (5.27)
Since
lim
n→∞
j∗ − nq√
n
− j
∗ − 1− nq√
n
= 0,
then
ln(1000HFC/M0)− ln(unqdn(1−q))√
n(ln(u)− ln(d)) ≈
j∗ − nq√
n
. (5.28)
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Therefore, we can obtain
ψ(j∗, n, q) = P(j ≥ j∗, j ∈ {1, . . . , n})
= P
(
j − nq√
nq(1− q) ≥
j∗ − nq√
nq(1− q)
)
= 1−N
(
j∗ − nq√
nq(1− q)
)
= N
(
nq − j∗√
nq(1− q)
)
= N
(
ln(M0/(1000HF
c)) + ln(unqdn(1−q))√
n(ln(u)− ln(d))√q(1− q)
)
, (5.29)
where N (·) is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal distribution.
If n→∞ (or ∆t→ 0), the following convergence results can be obtained:
√
n ln(u) = lim
n→∞
√
n ln eσ
√
∆t = σ
√
T ,
√
n ln(d) = lim
n→∞
√
n ln e−σ
√
∆t = −σ
√
T ,
q =
r˜ − d
u− d = lim∆t→0
er∆t − e−σ
√
∆t
eσ
√
∆t − e−σ√∆t
= lim
∆t→0
σ + (r − 1
2
σ2)
√
∆t+ o(∆3/2)
2σ + o(∆t)
=
1
2
,
lim
∆t→0
2q − 1√
∆t
= lim
∆t→0
2√
∆t
er∆t − e−σ
√
∆t
eσ
√
∆t − e−σ√∆t =
r
σ
− σ
2
,
and then
ln(unqdn(1−q)) = nq ln(u) + n(1− q) ln(d)
= nqσ
√
∆t− n(1− q)σ
√
∆t = 2nqσ
√
∆t− nσ
√
∆t
≈ 2nσ
√
∆t lim
∆t→0
σ + (r − 1
2
σ2)
√
∆t+ o(∆t)
2σ + o(∆t)
− lim
∆→0
nσ
√
∆t
≈ lim
∆t→0
nσ
√
∆t+ (r − 1
2
σ2)T − lim
∆t→0
nσ
√
∆t = (r − 1
2
σ2)T.
Therefore, we have
ψ(j∗, n, q) = N
(
ln(M0/(1000HF
C)) + (r − 1
2
σ2)T
σ
√
T
)
. (5.30)
5.6. Chapter Appendix 127
Since q˜ = qu/r˜, we then have
ln(unq˜dn(1−q˜))− ln(unqdn(1−q)) = ln(un(q˜−q)dn(q−q˜))
= n(q˜ − q) ln(u) + n(q − q˜) ln(d)
= n(q˜ − q)σ
√
∆t− n(q − q˜)σ
√
∆t = 2n(q˜ − q)σ
√
∆t
= 2nq
u− r˜
r˜
σ
√
∆t = 2qσ
T√
∆t
eσ
√
∆t − er∆t
er∆t
≈ lim
∆t→0
2qσT
σ − r∆t
1 + r∆t
= σ2T.
Similarly,
q˜ = lim
∆t→0
1 + σ
√
∆
1 + ∆˜t
σ + (r − 1
2
σ2)
√
∆t)
2σ
=
1
2
,
we then obtain
ψ(j∗, n, q˜) = N
(
ln(M0/(1000HF
C)) + ln(unq˜dn(1−q˜))√
n(ln(u)− ln(d))√q˜(1− q˜)
)
= N
(
ln(M0/(1000HF
C)) + ln(unqdn(1−q))√
n(ln(u)− ln(d))√q˜(1− q˜)
+
ln(unq˜dn(1−q˜))− ln(unqdn(1−q))√
n(ln(u)− ln(d))√q˜(1− q˜)
)
= N
(
ln(M0/(1000HF
C)) + (r + 1
2
σ2)T
σ
√
T
)
. (5.31)
Finally, the continuous-time option pricing formula can be obtained as follows
pi0 =
M0
1000H
N (ς1)− FCe−rTN (ς2), (5.32)
ς1 =
1
σ
√
T
(
ln
(
M0
1000HFC
)
+ (r +
1
2
σ2)T
)
, (5.33)
ς2 =
1
σ
√
T
(
ln
(
M0
1000HFC
)
+ (r − 1
2
σ2)T
)
. (5.34)
Hence, if the GBM assumption is valid, one can use the closed-form solution to
calculate the option price. However, as described, lattice methods provide an alternative
way to calculate the option price and, in general, is simpler in terms of implementation.
We here use the closed-form pricing formula to examine the convergence error of vari-
ous lattice methods which are based on the GBM underlying model.
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5.6.3 Trinomial Lattice Methods for Pricing Display Ad Options
with the GBM Underlying
The calculation of the option price for a display ad option with the GBM underlying
model over a trinomial lattice is described in Algorithm 5.2. We here consider the
case where an ad option allows its buyer to pay the fixed CPC for display impressions.
Therefore, the strike price of the option is the fixed CPC and the underlying price is the
uncertain winning payment CPM from online auctions. Algorithm 5.2 can be easily
extended to calculate the option price over a binomial lattice (see Table 2.2).
Algorithm 5.2 Trinomial lattice method for pricing an ad option with the GBM un-
derlying. The strike price is the fixed CPC and the underlying price is the uncertain
winning payment CPM from online auctions.
function OPTIONPRICINGTRINOMIALLATTICE(M0, σ,H, T, n, r, FC)
# Initialization:
∆t← T/n; r˜ ← er∆t;
u,m, d, q1, q2, q3 ← Boyle-TRIN (or KR-TRIN or Tian-TRIN) in Table 2.2;
# Build a (recombining) trinomial lattice for CPM
Σ(n+1)×(n+1) ← 0(n+1)×(n+1); Σ(1,1) ←M0;
for j ← 2 to n+ 1 do
Σ(1,j) ← u× Σ(1,j−1); Σ(2,j) ← m× Σ(1,j−1); Σ(3,j) ← d× Σ(1,j−1);
if 2(j − 1) + 1 > 3 then
for k ← 4 to 2(j − 1) + 1 do
Σ(k,j) ← d×Σ(k−2,j−1);
end for
end if
end for
# Calculate the terminal payoffs and the option value backward recursively
Σ˜(n+1)×(n+1) ← 0(n+1)×(n+1); Σ˜(:,n+1) ← max{Σ(:,n+1)/(1000H)− FC , 0};
for j ← n to 1 do
for k ← 1 to 2(j − 1) + 1 do
if k = 1 then
Σ˜(k,j) ← r˜−1(q1Σ˜(k,j+1) + q2Σ˜(k,j+1) + q3Σ˜(k,j+1));
else if k ≥ 2 then
Σ˜(k,j) ← r˜−1(q1Σ˜(k−1,j+1) + q2Σ˜(k,j+1) + q3Σ˜(k+1,j+1));
end if
end for
end for
return pi0 ← Σ˜(1,1)
end function
5.6.4 Binomial Diffusion Approximation
The discussed discrete-time binomial process can be used to approximate a general
stochastic diffusion process. Let M(t) be the continuous-time process of CPM at time
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t ∈ [0, T ] and let X(t) = ln(M(t)). A general stochastic diffusion process can be
expressed as follows:
dX(t) = α(t,X(t))dt+ β(t,X(t))dW (t), (5.35)
where α(t,X(t)) and β(t,X(t)) are continuous-time drift and diffusion functions, and
W (t) is a standard Brownian motion under the real-world probability measure P. Con-
sider a process X˜(t), which is a step function with initial value X(0) and transition
movements only at times ∆t, 2∆t, . . ., n∆t. For simplicity, we denote the time steps
by t0 = 0, t1 = ∆t, . . . , tn = n∆t = T . Then, Eq. (5.35) can be weakly converged by
a (discrete-time) binomial process X˜(t) if the following conditions hold [Nelson and
Ramaswamy, 1990]:
lim
∆t→0
sup
tk≤t<tk+∆t,0≤k<n
| α(tk, X˜(tk))− α(t,X(t)) | → 0, (5.36)
lim
∆t→0
sup
tk≤t<tk+∆t,0≤k<n
| β(tk, X˜(tk))− β(t,X(t)) | → 0, (5.37)
lim
∆t→0
sup
tk≤t<tk+∆t,0≤k<n
| X˜u(tk + ∆t)−X(t) | → 0, (5.38)
lim
∆t→0
sup
tk≤t<tk+∆t,0≤k<n
| X˜d(tk + ∆t)−X(t) | → 0, (5.39)
where X˜u(tk + ∆t) and X˜d(tk + ∆t) are the successors of X(t) and at each time step
the process can make one of two possible moves: up to a value X˜u(tk + ∆t) or down
to a value X˜d(tk + ∆t).
5.6.5 Mathematical Results of the SV Model
The mathematical results of the SV model defined in Eqs. (5.7)-(5.8) are provided in
this appendix, including the arbitrage-free condition, the estimation of volatility in the
constructed binomial lattice, and the estimation of the model parameters κ, θ, δ.
5.6.5.1 Risk-Neutral Probability Measure for Eq. (5.7)
By applying the Itoˆ Lemma to Eq. (5.7), we obtain
M(t) = M(0) exp
{∫ t
0
(µ− 1
2
σ2(t))ds+
∫ t
0
σ(s)dW (s)
}
. (5.40)
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Consider a discount process D(t) = e−rt, where r is a constant risk-less interest rate.
Then dD(t) = −rD(t)dt. Therefore, the discounted CPM process is
D(t)M(t) = M(0) exp
{∫ t
0
(µ− r − 1
2
σ2(t))ds+
∫ t
0
σ(s)dW (s)
}
, (5.41)
and its differential is
d
(
D(t)M(t)
)
= M(t)dD(t) +D(t)dM(t)
= − rD(t)M(t)dt+D(t)(µM(t)dt+ σ(t)M(t)dW (t))
= σ(t)D(t)M(t)
(
µ− r
σ(t)
dt+ dW (t)
)
= σ(t)D(t)M(t)dWQ(t), (5.42)
where WQ(t) = W (t) +
∫ t
0
µ−r
σ(s)
ds. According to the Girsanov Theorem [Wilmott,
2006], if choosing the process τ(t) = µ−r
σ(t)
, then WQ(t) is a standard Brownian motion
under a new probability measureQ. ThisQ is risk-neutral because it rendersD(t)M(t)
into a martingale. Therefore, the risk-neutral formulation of Eq. (5.7) is then
dM(t) = rM(t)dt+ σ(t)M(t)dWQ(t). (5.43)
Therefore, dX(t) = (r − σ2(t)/2)dt+ σ(t)dWQ(t).
5.6.5.2 Estimation of σ(tk + ∆t) for the Censored Binomial Lattice
Eq. (5.8) is the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross (CIR) model [Cox et al., 1985]. Several CIR model
forecasting results can be used to estimate σ(tk + ∆t). Since
d(eκtσ(t)) = κeκtσ(t)dt+ eκdσ(t)
= κeκtσ(t)dt+ eκ
(
κ(θ − σ(t))dt+ δ
√
σ(t)dZ(t)
)
= eκtκθdt+ eκtδ
√
σ(t)dZ(t). (5.44)
Then, we have
σ(t) = σ(0)e−κt + θ(1− e−κt) + δ
∫ t
0
e−κ(t−s)
√
σ(s)dZ(s). (5.45)
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Recall that the expectation of an Itoˆ integral is zero, we obtain
E[σ(t) | F(0)] = σ(0)e−κt + θ(1− e−κt), (5.46)
where F(0) represents the information up to time 0. Therefore, the conditional stochas-
tic volatility σ(tk + ∆t) can be obtained by the following formula
σ(tk + ∆t) = σ(t0)e
−κ(tk+∆t) + θ(1− e−κ(tk+∆t)).
5.6.5.3 Estimation of Parameters κ, θ, δ
Several statistical methods can be used to estimate the values of parameters κ, θ, δ. The
simplest method is the ordinary least squares (OLS) method [Kladivko, 2007]. The
discreteness form of Eq. (5.8) is
σ(tk)− σ(tk−1) = κ(θ − σ(tk))∆t+ δ
√
σ(tk)(tk), (5.47)
where (tk) ∼ N(0,∆t). The equation can be rewritten as follows
σ(tk)− σ(tk−1)√
σ(tk)
=
κθ∆t√
σ(tk)
− κ
√
σ(tk)∆t+ δ(tk), (5.48)
The sum of square errors
∑n˜−1
k=1
(
δ(tk)
)2
can be minimized so that κ and θ can be
obtained, where n˜ is the size of training data. Then, we have
(κ̂, θ̂) = argminκ,θ
n˜−1∑
k=1
(
σ(tk)− σ(tk−1)√
σ(tk)
− κθ∆t√
σ(tk)
+ κ
√
σ(tk)∆t
)2
. (5.49)
Therefore,
κ̂ =
(n˜+ 1)2 +
∑n˜−1
k=1 σ(tk+1)
∑n˜−1
k=1
1
σ(tk)
−∑n˜−1k=1 σ(tk)∑n˜−1k=1 1σ(tk) − (n− 1)∑n˜−1k=1 σ(tk+1)σ(tk)(
(n˜+ 1)2 −∑n˜−1k=1 σ(tk)∑n˜−1k=1 1σ(tk)
)
∆t
,
θ̂ =
(n˜− 1)∑n˜−1k=1 σ(tk+1)−∑n˜−1k=1 σ(tk+1)σ(tk) ∑n˜−1k=1 σ(tk)
(n˜+ 1)2 +
∑n˜−1
k=1 σ(tk+1)
∑n˜−1
k=1
1
σ(tk)
−∑n˜−1k=1 σ(tk)∑n˜−1k=1 1σ(tk) − (n− 1)∑n˜−1k=1 σ(tk+1)σ(tk) .
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Then, we obtain the estimation of δ̂ by the formula
δ̂ =
( n˜−1∑
k=1
∆t
)−1
×
n˜−1∑
k=1
(
σ(tk+1)− σ(tk)√
σ(tk)
− κ̂θ̂∆t√
σ(tk)
+ κ̂
√
σ(tk)∆t
)21/2
=
 1
(n˜− 1)∆t
n˜−1∑
k=1
(
σ(tk+1)− σ(tk)√
σ(tk)
− κ̂θ̂∆t√
σ(tk)
+ κ̂
√
σ(tk)∆t
)21/2 . (5.50)
Kladivko [2007] discussed the Maximum Likelihood (ML) method as an alterna-
tive way and compared the results to the OLS method for a specific dataset. In our
experiments, we find that the calculated option prices of display ad options are less
sensitive to OLS and ML methods; therefore, we adopt the OLS method as it is com-
putationally simpler.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this chapter, we summarise the main points made in Chapters 3-5 and point out the
future directions that can be carried out to extend the research of this thesis.
6.1 Concluding Remarks
The work presented in this thesis looked at the non-guaranteed delivery problem in
online advertising. Three novel solutions were proposed by employing and extending
the mathematical models from modern financial theories. In Chapter 3, we studied an
optimal dynamic model for a publisher or SSP who engages in RTB to allocate and
price the future display impressions into guaranteed contracts. The developed model
mimics the advanced booking system in the airline industry, and connects RTB and PG
algorithmically in order to maximise the publisher’s expected revenue. In Chapter 4,
we proposed a multi-keyword multi-click ad option for sponsored search and discussed
the corresponding option pricing methods based on the assumption that the underlying
winning payment prices of candidate keywords follow a GBM. This option allows an
advertiser to target multiple keywords and exercise multiple times in the contract life-
time. Our theoretical and empirical analysis also showed that the search engine can
have an increased expected revenue over time. In Chapter 5, we discussed another ad
option for display advertising and investigated a lattice framework for option evalua-
tion under a more general situation that the GBM assumption is not valid empirically.
This option allows an advertiser to pay a fixed CPM or CPC for an impression or click
that is same or different to its underlying measurement model from auctions. We used
the SV model to describe the underlying price movement and constructed a censored
binomial lattice to approximate the underlying SV model.
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Table 6.1: Summary the developments in Chapters 3-5.
Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5
Development Optimal model Ad option Ad option
Ad type/format Display Search Display, search
Objective Revenue maximisation No arbitrage No arbitrage
Expected revenue Increase Increase Increase
Inventory allocation
√ × ×
Contract pricing
√ √ √
Exercise right × √ √
Exercise time Fixed Flexible Fixed
Exercise opportunities Single Multiple Single
Underlying inventory Single Multiple Single
Underlying assumption Probabilistic, empirical GBM GBM, SV
Behaviour assumption Risk-neutral Risk-neutral Risk-neutral
Modelling setting Continuous-time Continuous-time Discrete-time
Table 6.1 provides an overview summary and comparison of the developments
in Chapters 3-5. These developments have many similarities in solving the non-
guaranteed delivery problem. First, they can all be implemented in conjunction with
auction mechanisms. Second, advertisers are assumed to be risk-neutral [Wilmott,
2006, Krishna, 2009, Narahari, 2014] in the modelling. Third, these developments can
increase the seller’s expected revenue. They support the two most popular measure-
ment models (i.e., the CPM and CPC models) in our discussions and can be extended
easily to others like the cost-per-action (CPA) model.
In the meantime, these developments are uniquely different from each other. The
optimal model discussed in Chapter 3 offers a complete automated system that deals
with both optimal allocation and pricing of future inventories. Even though only the
guaranteed contracts can be sold, the model is not limited to any presumed bids’ dis-
tribution (i.e., works for both probabilistic and empirical bids’ distributions). The ad
option proposed in Chapter 4 is the first research work that discusses the option contract
mechanism in the context of sponsored search. Advertisers are able to have greater flex-
ibility and a more personalized delivery. As also described earlier (see Section 4.3.4),
the proposed ad option is priced based on a GBM and the GBM assumption is rea-
sonable because several observations have been made in the sponsored search mar-
ket. However, this GBM assumption is not valid for display advertising. Therefore,
Chapter 5 investigated the possibility of using the SV model as the underlying force
to describe the winning price movement. The ad option discussed in Chapter 5 has a
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different contract structure but it is currently limited to the single underlying variable.
6.2 Future Work
Financial methods open up many new possibilities for developing online advertising
sales models and markets. The studies discussed in this thesis represent only a small
step in using the full potential of financial methods in online advertising. The following
research directions are interesting to further explore in the future.
6.2.1 Optimal Stochastic Dynamic Models
Given the static supply and demand, the dynamic model discussed in Chapter 3 max-
imises the expected revenue of a publisher (or SSP) who wants to sell some of the
estimated future display impressions in advance via guaranteed contracts and the re-
maining estimated supply will be auctioned off in RTB. This research can be further
extended with considering the stochastic supply and demand. Simply, the arrival of
advertisers and online users can be modelled by two independent stochastic processes.
Gallego and van Ryzin [1994] provided some insights on this issue while they only
used a Poisson process to represent the arrival of demand. In future research, we can
extend the Poisson process to model the supply. In addition, as described in Chap-
ter 3, the expected salvage value of display impressions from RTB is not zero, which
is determined by the new levels of remaining future supply and demand. Therefore,
the optimal pricing and allocation of display impressions will depend on balancing the
filled or unfilled demand with the arriving speed of supply.
6.2.2 Stochastic Processes for Market Price
Stochastic processes that describe the movement of the spot market prices of ad inven-
tories (i.e., the winning payment CPMs or CPCs from online auctions) are the one that
have received surprisingly little attention in online advertising. Here the spot market
price is similar but slightly different to the one that we see in financial markets because
there are no posted winning payment CPMs or CPCs in any ad exchanges or search
advertising platforms. However, a seller, such as publisher, SSP and search engine,
have the information about the advertisers’ bids and winning payment prices for some
specific ad slots or keywords. Such information could be used to analyse the market’s
supply and demand levels.
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In Chapters 4-5, we discussed the GBM and SV models for pricing ad options.
These stochastic processes can be investigated independently as they can also be used
to analyse the statistical properties of market price movements. As described earlier,
the studied GBM and SV models still have their limitations. The former is restricted
by a constant volatility while the latter is unable to capture the price jumps and spikes.
Many other stochastic processes can be further explored in the future. For example, we
can study the parametric mean-reverting jump diffusion process [Kou, 2002] to capture
the long-term mean-reverting fact as well as the distribution of price jumps.
6.2.3 Game-Theoretical Models for Ad Option Pricing
Game theory can provide an alternative way to evaluate an option written on ad inven-
tories. For an advertiser, two advertising strategies can be considered: (i) bidding in
online auctions; (ii) buying and exercising ad options. Advertisers are assumed to be
identical and risk-neutral. The interesting and difficult part of this research is to find
the advertisers’ equilibrium in a mixed strategy game. This equilibrium may not be
a simple Nash because most of the current advertising auction mechanisms adopt the
GSP auction model where advertisers follow a symmetric Nash (or locally Envy-free)
equilibrium [Edelman et al., 2007, Varian, 2007]. However, once a certain type of equi-
librium is found in this mixed strategy game, the option can be evaluated accordingly.
Two different objectives can be considered for the game-theoretical option pricing.
First, the optimal models which maximise the expected revenue of a publisher or search
engine. Second, the efficient models which maximise the social welfare (or surplus) of
advertisers. In this research, VCG auctions can be explored. Under a VCG auction,
it would be interesting to examine if the incentive compatibility and the individual ra-
tionality constraints are satisfied in the option pricing [Narahari et al., 2009, Nadarajah
et al., 2012]. The former ensures that an advertiser reveals his true value and the latter
ensures the advertiser’s payoff to be non-negative. This is a broad research direction
and many game-theoretical models can be investigated.
6.2.4 Market Design of Ad Derivatives
Designing an ad derivatives market would be another interesting topic for future re-
search. Most of the current online advertising markets are one-sided auctions [McAfee
and Vassilvitskii, 2012], in which an advertiser can only submit his bids to purchase
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the targeted ad inventories and is limited to real-time transactions. The ad derivatives
market will be two-sided auctions, where an advertiser can not only submit bids to buy
but also can receive bids to sell. The transactions are for the ad inventories that will
be created in the future. This will give advertisers a market place to buy and sell their
future ad inventories centrally in order to speculate profits or hedge risks.
One interesting thing for further discussion is whether the prices should be posted
in the ad derivatives market or not. Sealed-bid auctions are mostly adopted in online
advertising markets and the transaction information is not disclosed to advertisers. If
there are posted prices in ad derivatives market, advertisers may use such prices to
estimate the spot market prices inversely. They will then adjust their bidding strategies
in real-time auctions, which can further influence the prices posted in the ad derivatives
market because the values of ad derivatives are calculated based on the corresponding
spot market prices. This interesting problem can be examined in two stages. First, we
can study this as the implied price problem, similar to the implied volatility problem in
option pricing [Wilmott, 2006]. Second, we can move one step further to the system
level and discuss the new equilibrium between the spot and guaranteed markets.
Appendix A
Glossary of Technical Terms
The technical terms used throughout the thesis are briefly explained in this glossary.
Many term definitions here are drawn from Wilmott [2006], Jansen [2011], IAB [2013]
and Wikipedia directly.
Ad: the commercial portion of message content for which an advertiser has paid or
will pay when an online user sees his content.
Ad exchange: a technology platform that facilitate the bidded buying and selling of
online media advertising inventory from multiple ad networks. The approach is
technology-driven as opposed to the historical approach of negotiating price on
media inventory.
Ad slot (or ad space): the allocated real estate on a Web page of a site in which an ad
can be placed. Each space on a site is uniquely identified; therefore, multiple ad
slots can exist on a single page.
Advertiser: also called the marketer, the company who pays for the ad display or click.
Banner ad: an ad embedded on a Web page that is usually intended to drive traffic to
a different Web page by linking to the advertiser’s site.
Bear market: a market in which market prices are falling and investors, fearing losses,
tend to sell. This can create a self-sustaining downward spiral.
Bull market: a market in which the market prices are generally rising.
Click: a click on an ad on a Web page, which takes a user to another site.
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Click-through rate (CTR): the rate of clicked ads to total ads displayed.
Cost per click (CPC): also called pay-per-click (PPC), is an online advertising mea-
surement model used to direct traffic to websites, where an advertiser pays a
search engine (or a publisher) when his ad is clicked by an online user.
Cost per mille (CPM): also called pay-per-mille (PPM), is an online advertising mea-
surement model used to direct traffic to websites, where an advertiser pays a
publisher when his ad is displayed 1000 times to online users.
Demand-side platform (DSP): an automated bidding platform for advertisers to get
good impressions at low cost, by participating in multiple auctions among various
ad exchanges at the same time.
Impression: a display of an ad to a user on a Web page. Note that a single page view
can have more than one impression if there is more than one ad slot on the page.
Interest rate: a percentage used to calculate the cost of borrowing money. In this
thesis, we only consider the constant risk-less bank interest rate.
Keyword: a specific word or combination of words that an online searcher might type
into a search field. Advertisers can purchase keywords to guarantee that their
website information is displayed prominently.
Publisher: an individual or organization that prepares, issues, and disseminates con-
tent for public distribution. Simply, a publisher has the space for ads to be dis-
played.
Query: a series of terms entered by a searcher into a search engine, which initiates a
search and results in a search engine result page (SERP) with organic and paid
listings.
Real-time bidding (RTB): refers to the means by which ad inventory is bought and
sold on a per-impression basis, via programmatic instantaneous auction, similar
to financial markets.
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Search engine: a program that indexes Web pages and then attempts to match then
by relevancy to the users’ search requests. Examples of search engines include
Google, Bing, Baidu etc.
Search engine results page (SERP): a page that online users see after they have en-
tered their query into the search box. The SERP has two types of result listings
in response to the submitted query: organic results and paid results. Organic
search results are the Web page listings that most closely match the user’s search
query based on relevance. Paid results are basically ads – the websites have paid
to have their Web pages display for certain keywords, so these listings show up
when someone runs a search query containing those keywords.
Supply-side platform (SSP): an automated platform for publishers to sell impressions
at an optimal price, by creating multiple auctions for the same impression in
different ad exchanges to reach more advertisers who are willing to bid.
User: an individual with access to the Internet and the WWW, and issues ad-hoc topics
to express his information needs, such as Web search or surfing.
Web page: the traditional presentation of information online. Web sites are made up
of Web pages, analogous to the pages in a book.
Appendix B
Related Publications
The following publications and submissions are related to this thesis:
• Bowei Chen and Jun Wang. A lattice framework for pricing display ad options
with the stochastic volatility model. Working Paper, 2014. In arXiv: http:
//arxiv.org/abs/1409.0697
• Bowei Chen, Shuai Yuan, and Jun Wang. A dynamic pricing model for unifying
programmatic guarantee and real-time bidding in display advertising. In Pro-
ceedings of the 8th International Workshop on Data Mining for Online Advertis-
ing (ADKDD’14), Best Paper Award, pages 1–9, New York, NY, USA, 2014b.
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• Bowei Chen, Jun Wang, Ingemar Cox, and Mohan Kankanhalli. Multi-keyword
multi-click ad options for sponsored search. Working Paper, 2014a. In arXiv:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1307.4980
• Jun Wang and Bowei Chen. Selling futures online advertising slots via option
contracts. In Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on World Wide
Web (WWW ’12), pages 627–628, Lyon, France, 2012. ACM
There are also other publications that were completed during my PhD study; while
relevant to the broader applications of financial methods into information technologies,
they are not directly solving the non-guaranteed delivery problem in online advertising:
• Shuai Yuan, Jun Wang, Bowei Chen, Peter Mason, and Sam Seljan. An empir-
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